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The general trend of agricultural land in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continues to tilt towards 
land scarcity emanating from farm household-level population pressure and increase in 
urbanisation rates. Understanding the agricultural household decisions nexus or linkages in 
ownership and access to agricultural land and non-land factor of production is of interest in 
policy research for development and transformation of rural economies in SSA. This thesis 
contributes to this scholarly literature. The objective is to assess the changing trends in land 
transactions, opportunities and constraints in institutions that facilitate transfers and distribution 
of agricultural land among smallholder farm households in Malawi, a country in SSA. Four 
independent but related empirical research papers in chapters two to five of this thesis address 
this objective, with a summary of the overall policy implications in the introduction chapter.  
The first research paper assesses the important spatial and intertemporal changes in the land 
shadow values or prices that shape patterns of agricultural land valuation and transactions. 
Paper two analyses the dynamic nature of transaction costs in the land rental markets that can 
facilitate land transactions in a market. Paper three addresses the question of whether downside 
and upside lagged rainfall shock effects, can kick-start access to rented land among potential 
tenants. Lastly, the fourth paper jointly assesses the farm household decisions to either rent-in 
land or hire out labour for casual work in seasonal agricultural labour markets.  
Almost a decade after global policy discussions on large-scale land transfers in SSA, this thesis 
recommends the need to refocus land policy discussions to improving farm household-level 
access to agricultural land. The agricultural development policies and land use strategies should 
promote land campaigns that can improve low-cost access to land market information at the 
local or community level. These policies and strategies should also aim at easing the capital 
burden or liquidity constraints amongst potential tenant households in the agricultural sector.  
The land information dissemination initiatives can take advantage of the existing agricultural 
extension and information systems. On the other hand, initiatives like establishing a land bank 
or implementing subsidies, can ease the capital burden and support agricultural operations or 
other household needs among farming households. With recurring rainfall shocks in Malawi, 
these initiatives should also target rural areas most affected by downside rainfall shocks. 
Overall, reducing the friction in the land markets can sustain livelihoods and contribute to the 





Landbruksland er i ferd med å bli en stadig knappere faktor i Afrika sør for Sahara (SSA) på 
grunn av økende befolkningspress og urbanisering. Forståelse av bønders tilpasning, eierskap 
og tilgang til land og andre produksjonsfaktorer er viktig for politikkutforming for bedre 
utvikling og transformasjon av rurale områder i SSA. Denne avhandlingen er et bidrag til 
litteraturen på dette området. Målsettingen er å analysere endringene i eiendomsforhold, 
institusjonelle muligheter og skranker som påvirker transaksjoner og eierstruktur blant 
småbrukere i Malawi, et land i SSA. Målsettingen oppfylles gjennom fire uavhengige, men 
relaterte artikler i kapittel to til fem i avhandlingen, samt en introduksjon i kapittel en som ser 
på overordnede politikkimplikasjoner.  
Den første artikkelen studerer geografisk variasjon og endringer over tid i skyggepriser på land 
som mål på verdsetting av landbruksland og landtransaksjoner. Den andre artikkelen analyserer 
hvordan transaksjonskostnader endrer seg dynamisk i leiemarkeder for land som bidrar til 
omfordeling av land. Artikkel fire studerer hvordan klimasjokk i form av tørke og flom påvirker 
omsetningen av land gjennom leiemarkeder. Den siste artikkelen analyserer hvordan 
småbønders beslutninger om å leie ut arbeidskraft og leie inn land henger sammen. 
Nesten et tiår etter de globale diskusjonene om store landtransaksjoner i SSA knyttet til høye 
energi- og matpriser, anbefaler denne avhandlingen et nytt fokus på landpolitikk for å bedre 
tilgangen til land for bønder. Landbrukspolitikken og strategien bør fokusere på kampanjer som 
kan redusere kostnadene med å få tilgang til land gjennom bedre markedsinformasjon på lokalt 
nivå. Denne politikken og virkemidlene bør vektlegge å redusere kapitalbehovet og 
likviditetsskranker blant potensielle landfattige leietakere i landbrukssektoren. 
Spredningen av landinformasjon kan gjøres gjennom eksisterende veilednings- og 
informasjonssystemer. I tillegg kan en landbank eller subsidier brukes til å lette på 
kapitalskrankene for å bønder som trenger det. Tiltak bør særlig rettes mot områder utsatt for 
klimasjokk som tørke. Ved å redusere friksjonen i landmarkedene kan bønder lettere tilpasse 





1. Introduction  
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), rural farm households and to an extent peri-urban dwellers are 
smallholder farmers whose livelihood heavily relies on agricultural land and human labour 
factors of production (Fan & Rue, 2020; Lowder et al., 2014; Masters et al., 2013). It is the 
ownership and access to these factors of production (land and labour), plus access to capital 
that helps to sustain their livelihoods, by either using these resources for own production or 
trading them in factor markets (Ellis, 2000; Scoones, 2009). Owned agricultural land and labour 
endowment further serve as a safety net amidst frequent agricultural production and climatic 
shocks; land scarcity and degradation; imperfect markets and food consumption shocks (Carter 
& Olinto, 2003; Holden, 2020). Therefore, agricultural land and labour are important resources 
for the livelihoods of rural farm households in SSA.  
Agricultural land is a central factor, but also has some fundamental characteristics that shape 
production and factor markets. This is because land is immobile, spatially dispersed and 
inherently heterogeneous. Hence, all other non-land factors (labour and capital) have to be 
taken to the land while output products are moved out of the land (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 
1986). This implies that the changes in ownership and access to agricultural land relative to 
labour or capital factors of production should be key in influencing the household decision to 
use or trade land and non-land resources. Despite this central role, agricultural land is 
increasingly becoming scarce across countries in SSA, especially in areas with high population 
density like in Rwanda and Malawi (Chamberlin et al., 2014; Masters et al., 2013).  
With increasing land scarcity challenges across countries, there is a growing need for policy 
research in factor markets, that can promote ownership and access to agricultural land in a way 
that sustains livelihoods of farm households in SSA (Holden, 2020; Jayne et al., 2014). Such 
research is also important for achieving and tracking the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that includes the SDGs and the 
implementation modalities (United Nations, 2015; United Nations Development Program, 
2017). The policy research is also important for implementing the African Union Agenda 2063 
that includes the declaration on land issues and challenges in Africa (African Union, 2020). 
Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to understand the changing trends in land transactions, 
opportunities and constraints in institutions that facilitate transfers and distribution of 
agricultural land among smallholder farmers in Malawi.  
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Historically, ownership and access to agricultural land in SSA have been mainly through 
government distribution and inheritance (Ainembabazi & Angelsen, 2016). However, the 
increase in population density and land fragmentation has reduced the redistribution of land 
over time (Blarel et al., 1992; Ntihinyurwa et al., 2019). With the limited redistribution of land, 
there is a growing heterogeneity in land ownership that has enabled the development of land 
markets, as an institution that can facilitate exchange between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller (Holden et al., 2010). Scholarly papers show that both land sales and rental markets are 
emerging across countries in SSA (Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; Holden et al., 2010). 
However, the extent to which land markets are reallocating agricultural land across space and 
over time remains an empirical question in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
On land sales markets, the need to permanently transfer land and the required capital when 
purchasing land make sales markets less prevalent, particularly among smallholder farm 
households in rural areas (de Janvry et al., 2002; Holden et al., 2010). On the contrary, rental 
markets temporary transfer use of agricultural land for a short or longer-term period and reduce 
the need for intensive capital to access land. Such flexibility in rental markets creates a wide 
range of opportunities for those willing to supply and those demanding agricultural land, hence 
making land rental markets more prevalent in SSA (Holden et al., 2010). With data from 
smallholder farmers in Malawi, this thesis assesses land rental markets, as an institution that 
facilitates access to agricultural land and use of non-land factors of production.   
The transactions in the land rental markets can be either through wage, sharecropping or fixed 
rent contracts, and can last for a short (one year) or a longer-term period (Alston et al., 1984; 
Holden et al., 2010). The wage rental contract is mainly an agreement on work or service 
offered on the farm with payment as wage. The sharecropping rental contracts entail shared 
output agreements while the fixed-rental contracts involve the use of land with a fixed payment 
agreement, mostly in monetary terms. In all the forms of contracts, participants in the land 
rental markets can incur transaction costs associated with access to market information, 
searching for a willing buyer or a willing seller (partners) and transport cost, before engaging 
in contract negotiations, supervision, monitoring and enforcement of rental contract costs 
(Alston et al., 1984; Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 2010).  
Such transaction costs can vary across space and over time, hence resulting in spatial and 
intertemporal differences in costs incurred by market participants. These variations plus the 
related amount of land transactions in the market are key in defining the allocative efficiency 
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of land rental markets. Therefore, this thesis analyses land transactions mainly under short-term 
and fixed-rent contracts that are dominant among smallholder farmers in Malawi. Through 
research work in four analytical papers, this thesis contributes to the agricultural land and labour 
factor markets literature and provides empirical evidence that could be relevant for land-use 
policies in Malawi and other countries across SSA. 
The first empirical contribution from paper one is on the changing trends in land shadow prices 
or land valuation at the farm household-level. The assessment comes in almost a decade after 
the 2007–08 sharp increase in the world energy and food prices, that triggered the recent 
discussions on “land grabs” in most African countries (Cotula, 2013; White et al., 2012). The 
second paper contributes to the literature on the dynamic nature of transaction costs and how 
such costs can affect entry and extent of participation (amount of land rented-in) in the land 
rental markets. Paper three’s contribution is on whether rainfall shocks can kick-start access to 
agricultural land through land rental markets whilst paper four contributes to the livelihood 
diversification and factor market allocations literature. This paper assesses the farm household 
decisions in the land rental and seasonal agricultural labour markets, as the livelihood trade 
response strategies to the growing land scarcity challenges in Malawi.  
This thesis is organised in five chapters and their respective sections. Going forward in this 
chapter, I give a background on agricultural land in Malawi in section two, followed by a 
conceptual and theoretical framework in section three. In section four I present the survey 
methods and data with a detailed summary of the scientific contributions in section five. This 
chapter ends with policy implications and future research gaps in sections six and seven. The 
next four chapters in this thesis are a compilation of the research papers.     
2. Agricultural land in Malawi: Tenure systems and land markets  
In Malawi, the total land available is estimated at 9.8 million hectares with an average 
population density estimated at 186 persons per square Km (Government of Malawi, 2019). 
Suitable land for agriculture is 7.7 million hectares where large-scale estate farms occupy at 
most 1.5 million hectares (Deininger & Xia, 2018; Government of Malawi, 2002). Almost 93 
percent of the estate owners hold between 10 to 30 hectares while only 6 percent hold above 
50 or 500 hectares (Deininger & Xia, 2018). The smallholder farm households occupy at least 
4.5 million hectares with an average landholding size of less than one hectare, after adjusting 
for wetlands, steep slopes, and traditional protected areas (Government of Malawi, 2002).  
4 
 
Of the total agricultural land, almost 90 percent is cultivated under rainfed farming, with some 
potential for irrigation that is yet to be fully developed (Chafuwa, 2017; Government of 
Malawi, 2016c). In 2019, the agricultural sector contributed 27 percent to the national Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) while contributing almost 80 percent of the export earnings 
(Government of Malawi, 2020). On average, the smallholder sub-sector contributes 70 percent 
while the estate sub-sector contributes 30 percent to the agricultural GDP (Government of 
Malawi, 2016c). Evidence shows that most of the estate land is currently being underutilised 
and underperforming in yield, hence failing to generate the anticipated positive and spill-over 
effects in the agricultural sector. Issues of expired lease titles, lack of proper documentation, 
lack of payments of land rent and overlapping boundaries are some of the bottlenecks 
contributing to the poor performance of the estate sub-sector in Malawi (Deininger & Xia, 
2018; Holden et al., 2006). 
The Malawi National Land Policy–2002 stipulates that land in Malawi is mainly governed 
using customary, public and private tenure systems, where private system include freehold or 
leasehold land titles (Government of Malawi, 2002). Of the total land available in Malawi, 67 
percent is under customary tenure system followed by 19 and 14 percent that is under public 
and private tenure systems, respectively. Agricultural land under smallholder farmers is mainly 
governed by the customary tenure system while estate land is mainly under private tenure 
systems. The customary tenure system grants communal land rights that are closely connected 
to ethnic identity, with Traditional Authorities (TA) or local leaders as custodians of the land.  
Prior to the enactment of Land and related land Acts in 2016, the Malawi National Land Policy 
2002 indicated that under the customary tenure system, “families and individuals are allocated 
exclusive fee simple usufruct1 in perpetuity subject to effective utilisation” (Government of 
Malawi, 2002). This construe that farm households only hold user rights that can be passed on 
through inheritance while radical ownership remains with the TA or local leaders on behalf of 
the State. Based on the Land and Customary Land Acts–1967, the user right under customary 
tenure system was not legally recognised because customary land ownership in Malawi was 
also considered a community or family resource to be passed on through either matrilineal or 
patrilineal inheritance systems (Government of Malawi, 1967a; Government of Malawi, 1967b; 
Lunduka et al., 2009).  
 
1 Usufruct is defined as “the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to 
another” Merriam-Webster dictionary (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/usufruct).  
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After revising the 1967 Acts, the Land and Customary Land Acts–2016 specifies the intention 
of the government to register all land as public or private (Government of Malawi, 2016a; 
Government of Malawi, 2016b). The private titles entail having well-defined land rights for 
either individual households under leasehold or to register customary land as a customary 
estate, that is demarcated at the level of the TA or local leaders. Public land includes 
government land and unallocated customary land. The Customary Land Act–2016 further 
stipulates that the aim of registering and legally recognising customary estate is to improve 
tenure security of landholders.  
On disposal of the customary estate, the Customary Land Acts–2016 indicates that “all 
transactions involving customary estates during the first five years of registering and titling the 
estates shall be approved by a land committee and the Traditional Authority in whose 
jurisdiction the land is situated. Any disposition of customary estate granted to a person or 
family unit shall not be permitted outside the immediate family during the first five years of 
titling the estate”. The Act indicates some exceptions that are subject to a full evaluation of the 
land committee in the area if a family request to dispose of a customary estate. What is not clear 
on this disposal of customary estate statements is whether short-term land rental transactions 
fall under this category, since such contracts are not permanent disposal of customary land. 
Nevertheless, the short-term exchange of agricultural land is not a new phenomenon in Malawi.  
Land rentals date back to the colonial period before independence in 1964. Upon colonising 
Malawi (then called Nyasaland), the British protectorate consolidated and transferred land to 
colonial settlers who established estate farms for producing export crops like tea and tobacco. 
To ensure sufficient access to labour, the colonial estate owners mobilised community labour 
through chiefs under a contract commonly called “thangata” system (Peters & Kambewa, 
2007). Although this system was later observed to be oppressive and was abolished after 
independence, under this agreement local people could be offered small pieces of agricultural 
land within the estate for own food production as they offered labour on the estate, similar to 
sharecropping arrangements (Holden et al., 2006; Peters & Kambewa, 2007). Despite 
abolishing the labour system, recent trends on estate land show that individuals continue to 
engage in negotiated wage or sharecropping contracts in Malawi (Holden et al., 2006).  
After independence, renting agricultural land under customary tenure system was still 
restricted, as farmland was considered a community property that could only be transferred 
through borrowing and not renting at a cost. It is only recently that evidence of renting 
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agricultural land has been observed on customary land and among smallholder farmers in 
Malawi. Ellis et al. (2003) reported that farm households who could not trade their land from 
missing or absent land markets, resorted to hiring out labour for seasonal agricultural casual 
work in Malawi. Furthermore, Chirwa (2004) argued that previous agricultural strategies in 
Malawi were not successful because they ignored the question of land use and exchange among 
smallholder farmers. Thus, evidence of a developing land rental market on customary land 
started in the new millennium, which is largely informal and mostly between households of the 
same or neighbouring communities (Holden et al., 2006).  
Recently, literature has been confirming the development of these markets, with evidence 
showing that participation is associated with improved perceived tenure security (Lunduka et 
al., 2009). Also land rental markets have been observed to have positive welfare impacts among 
smallholder farm households in Malawi (Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; Ricker‐Gilbert 
et al., 2019). Although evidence of land rental markets on agricultural land has surfaced in the 
new millennium in Malawi, recent policy discussions on the land use, exchange and the need 
to improve tenure security started around 1994. This was the time when the first newly elected 
democratic leader of Malawi established the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land 
Policy Reform (PCILPR) in 1996 (Holden et al., 2006).  
I refer to these land policy discussions as recent considering that it was also partly the land 
issues that lead to a revolution and independence in 1964. After independence, the ruling 
government also tried to correct the colonial land issues between 1968 and early 1970s. 
However, these efforts had less focus on customary agricultural land across the country (Holden 
et al., 2006; Peters & Kambewa, 2007). Fast forward to 1996, the work of the PCILPR resulted 
in the institutionalisation of the Malawi National Land Policy in 2002 and the enacted Land 
and Customary Land Acts in 2016. Building on this evidence and the associated policy changes, 
this thesis contributes to the land question on the use and exchange of agricultural land among 
smallholder farmers in Malawi.  
According to de Janvry et al. (2002), Deininger (2003), Ravallion and Van de Walle (2008) 
and Holden et al. (2010), improved tenure security and land markets were central in enhancing 
efficient allocation of land in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and parts of Africa like in 
Ethiopia. Evidence in these regions shows that improved access to land can allow rural farm 
households to generate more income and activate household assets, like family labour, with 
zero or low opportunity cost outside the agricultural sector. Access to land can also help farm 
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households achieve food self-sufficiency considering the price variations and shocks in 
agricultural output markets. With a willing buyer and a willing seller, transactions in the land 
rental markets can further complement other income strategies and facilitate migration or 
supply of labour in the wage market. Overall, land markets that efficiently allocate land for 
productive use and facilitate the use of non-land factors of production can help to reduce rural 
poverty and promote food security, even among landless households (de Janvry et al., 2002; 
Fan & Rue, 2020; Holden et al., 2010; Holden, 2020). Thus, contributing to the land question 
in Malawi while comparing the salient factors across the globe, should contribute to the 
development of land use policy strategies and lessons of relevance in SSA.                  
3. Conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
In rural economies, land and non-land resources are complementary factors of production while 
non-land capital and labour are weak substitutes because of imperfections in credit or labour 
markets. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) indicated that the incentive and moral hazard 
problems in the labour market result in high transaction costs for different market participants. 
Also, the long gestation period and poor collateral suitability of the agricultural sector further 
limit access to credit in the sector. These imperfections in the factor markets can lead to 
inefficient allocation of factors of production across space and over time. When non-land 
markets operate to improve such market imperfections, land markets are not necessary for 
reallocating resources to the most productive users (Deininger et al., 2008). Thus, land markets 
develop after output, capital and labour markets, as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in 
allocating factors of production (Holden et al., 2010).    
While land markets can develop to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, the 
immobility, spatially dispersed and inherent heterogeneity of the land also result in varying 
transaction costs. The costs include fixed or variable transaction costs, where fixed costs are 
more associated with pervasive market entry barriers that determine unit land rent. Such costs 
are mainly related to the land being immobile and spatially dispersed or fragmented with long 
distance between parcels that limits the amount of land that is traded in the market (Holden et 
al., 2010). On the contrary, varying transaction costs are more associated with access to 
information on available land in the market, searching for potential or suitable partners and 
contract negotiations that are idiosyncratic to market participants (Holden et al., 2010).  
With fixed costs, effective change can come with long-term investments like improving the 
transport infrastructure or facilitating land consolidation programs (Asiama et al., 2019; Holden 
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et al., 2010). For varying transaction costs, reducing the gap in idiosyncratic costs can come 
with market integration by improving the land-related market information systems (Holden et 
al., 2010). Thus, both fixed and variable costs can lead to varying spatial and intertemporal 
transaction costs that can ration the participation of farm households in factor markets. This is 
mainly a character of rural areas with poor access to information and transport infrastructure 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Holden et al., 2010). Thus, the economic theory on 
agricultural markets in rural economies (including most countries in SSA), generally indicates 
imperfect markets in both land and non-land factors of production (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 
1986; Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 2010).  
According to Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), such market imperfections or externalities imply 
that rural economies are constrained pareto in-efficient. Hence, there exist policy interventions 
that can minimise or reduce such constraints and enhance the efficiency of markets to achieve 
the associated welfare effects. Building on this discussion, Figure 1 presents the schematic 
conceptual framework on access to land, land markets and welfare implications. In the figure, 
the thin arrows are used to present and discuss these concepts while the thick and bold arrows 
are used to show the areas of focus in the four research papers compiled in this thesis. 
The conceptual framework in Figure 1 indicates that, although it is the geographical position 
of an area that defines available resources, distribution of these resources is partly shaped by 
institutions, policies and cultural norms that govern the ownership, access and use of resources. 
The governing policy includes the statutory laws and regulations instituted to facilitate resource 
allocation including development agendas like the commercialisation of the agricultural sector. 
Cultural norms represent the de facto rules instituted by communities in allocation and 
regulation of community resources while the geographical variables include the push or pull 
factors like population density, agro-ecological zones and urbanisation.  
Since geographical and institutional characteristics define distribution and redistribution of 
factors of production, they can lead to heterogeneity in the endowment of the land and “desired 
land” at the household level. From Figure 1, the “desired land” implies ownership of non-land 
factors (labour and capital) that households can use or trade to achieve the desired level of land 
use. The geographical and institutional characteristics also shape household social, time and 
risk preferences that can influence perceptions of tenure security, household endowment and 




Figure 1: Land access, participation in land rental markets and welfare implications. 
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The decision to participate in these markets also depends on the biophysical characteristics of 
factors of production that influence transaction costs and development of markets (Binswanger 
& Rosenzweig, 1986). Participation in factor markets is further influenced by the state of nature 
or environmental outcomes associated with production and food consumption shocks (Quiggin 
& Chambers, 2006). Figure 1 further shows that the household decisions to trade agricultural 
land and labour can influence the change in operational farmland at the household level. For 
short to medium-term, the decision to rent-in land can increase household operational farmland, 
thereby increasing production or improving productivity that leads to welfare gains. In line with 
de Janvry et al. (2002) and Holden and Ghebru (2016), farm households can achieve food 
security and manage to sustain their livelihoods through land rental markets. Therefore, the 
theoretical framework in this thesis draws heavily on the farm household model, the theory of 
transaction costs and imperfect markets school of thought (de Janvry et al., 1991; Greenwald 
& Stiglitz, 1986; Singh et al., 1986). 
Following the thick and bold arrows in the conceptual framework, Paper one analyses the 
changing trends in households’ valuation of owned agricultural land, as a function of policy 
changes, population pressure and urbanisation. Paper two assesses the dynamic nature of 
transaction costs associated with market experience and information asymmetry when 
transacting agricultural land in the rental markets. Paper three analyses how the revealed state 
of nature, defined as the spatial variations in lagged rainfall shock variables, are influencing the 
decision to rent-in agricultural land. Paper four analyses how the growing land scarcity relative 
to family labour is influencing the household decision to trade in either land rental or seasonal 
agricultural labour markets by doing casual work. In the next sub-section, I discuss the overall 
theoretical framework that forms the basis for the analytical work in the four research papers. 
3.1. A farm household and land rental market transaction costs model 
The farm household model indicates that a household endowed with land and labour can use 
and/or trade these assets to achieve the desired level of resource use. Following Singh et al. 
(1986), the problem for such a farm household is to maximise income [𝑌𝑌] utility generated from 
household decisions. The decisions include to either use these resources on own farm or trade 
them in the factor markets. The utility function for such a household can be given as 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑈𝑈 =
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌], where the utility is a twice differential quasi-concave function. Equation (i) specifies the 
farm household income utility function following the imperfect market theory. The theory 
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indicates that varying spatial and intertemporal non-linear transactions costs characterise land 
and non-land factor markets in most rural economies. 
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜,𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾; 𝑧𝑧ℎ) − �𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖�� + {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)} − �𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖�� + {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 − 𝜑𝜑(𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)} −  𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀]  (i) 
and  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0      
From the equation, (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜) are the choice or decision variables for renting-in �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� 
or out (𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜) agricultural land or hiring in �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖� or out (𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜) labour. The income function [Y] is 
equivalent to the consumption goods acquired by the household either through own-farm 
production or through the markets while subtracting the production costs (Singh et al., 1986). 
Thus, the revenue function has (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) for output prices and 𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿; 𝑧𝑧ℎ) for a production function 
that uses land (𝐴𝐴), labour (𝐿𝐿) and capital (K) factors, subject to household or community 
characteristics (𝑧𝑧ℎ).  
From equation (i), the cost function reflects the trade of land (A) and labour (L) plus the cost of 
buying other marketed inputs (M). In the equation, (𝜌𝜌) is for constant land rent and (𝜔𝜔) is for 
unit wage rate, which I assume to be linear in the amount of land and labour traded in the market 
across space and in line with Holden et al. (2010). However, due to spatial and intertemporal 
variations in market costs, market participants can face varying non-linear transaction costs. 
Thus, the parameters (η), (𝜃𝜃), (𝜏𝜏) and (𝜑𝜑) reflect the varying non-linear transaction costs that 
are a function of the amount of land and labour traded in the markets (Holden et al., 2010). 
Further, I assume that transaction costs on the demand side are higher than the transaction costs 
on the supply side. This is because households demanding land and labour are more likely to 
incur higher searching costs than those supplying the resources (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 
1986). Thus, (𝜂𝜂) is greater than (θ) and (𝜏𝜏) is greater than (𝜑𝜑) for land and labour markets, 
respectively. Lastly, (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚) is the price for other inputs purchased by the farm households.  
For simplicity, I assume away the liquidity constraints, household risk preferences and crop 
choices because of the long gestation period of agricultural outputs and high output price 
fluctuations in most rural economies, including in Malawi. (Carter & Yao, 2002; Cornia et al., 
2016; Quiggin & Chambers, 2006). Therefore, I normalise the output (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) and input (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚)  prices 
for all goods to one. After dropping the normalised prices and using the duality theory, I focus 
on the twice differentiable quasi-convex income function as specified in equation (ii). All 





𝑌𝑌 = 𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾; 𝑧𝑧ℎ) − {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)} − {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 − 𝜑𝜑(𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)} (ii) 
and  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0 
So far, the theory has generalised the farm household decisions on both the demand and supply 
sides of the market. However, the research work in this thesis focuses on farm household 
demand for agricultural land considering the land scarcity challenges in Malawi. Thus, to 
simplify the model, I further assume that the households renting-in the agricultural land are 
constrained in ownership of land, hence less likely to rent out their agricultural land. Thus, I 
drop the variables reflecting renting out of the land in equation (ii). On the labour decisions, 
the literature indicates that land markets transfer land-use from “land-rich and labour-poor” to 
“land-poor and labour-rich” households (Holden et al., 2010; Sadoulet et al., 2002). This means 
that a tenant household is less likely to also hire in labour. However, such households can hire 
out labour, especially among smallholder farmers with capital constraints to combine both 
renting-in land and hiring in labour. Therefore, I also drop the hire in labour variables from the 
specified income objective function to focus on households renting-in agricultural land or 
hiring out labour for agricultural work. 
In addition, the variability or seasonality of agricultural labour markets throughout the 
production season (Feuerbacher et al., 2020) implies that farm households might sequence their 
agricultural land and labour trade decisions. That is, starting with the trade of agricultural land 
decision at the start of the production season and later making labour market decisions 
recursively or sequentially throughout the season. This means that farm households can face 
different cost functions for renting-in the land and hiring-out the labour. Thus, equation (iii) 
presents the reduced form of the farm household income function.  
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜,𝐿𝐿
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑞𝑞(?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿� − 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 ,𝐾𝐾: 𝑍𝑍ℎ) − {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 − 𝜑𝜑(𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)}      and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿 > 0  (iii) 
From the production function given as 𝑞𝑞(. ), the variables �?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴� and (𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 = 𝐿𝐿) 
correspond to land and labour used on own farm, respectively. The (?̅?𝐴) and (𝐿𝐿�) reflects owned 
land and labour while �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� is for land rented-in and (𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜) is for hired out labour. Recall that the 
(𝐿𝐿�) includes time spent working and for leisure, while (𝜔𝜔) is for the market wage rate or shadow 
wage rate for non-traded labour. Based on this income function, the first-order conditions 









− 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
≤ 0                   ⊥         𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0       (iv) 
 i.e.  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
= 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
    if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 0    or   𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
< 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
  if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0     
From equation (iv), the net return in income with respect to rented-in land � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
� is equal to the 
marginal change in revenue from land rented-in � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 � less land rent (𝜌𝜌) and marginal change 
in non-linear transaction costs  � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�, which is a function of the amount of land rented-in. 
Solving equation (iv) and using the complementary slack conditions, a household renting-in 
the land will optimise income if the marginal revenue from the land rented-in � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
� is greater 
or equal to the marginal cost of renting-in land �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�. Secondly, land rented-in will be zero 
if the marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost of renting-in the land.  







≤ 0                   ⊥         𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 > 0              (v)       






≥ 𝜔𝜔 − 𝜕𝜕𝜑𝜑
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
       
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
= 𝜔𝜔 − 𝜕𝜕𝜑𝜑
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
  if 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 > 0  or  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
> 𝜔𝜔 − 𝜕𝜕𝜑𝜑
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
  if 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 = 0 
In equation (v), the marginal change in income subject to hiring out labour depends on the 
marginal change in wage rate less the marginal change in non-linear transaction costs 
�𝜔𝜔 − 𝜕𝜕𝜑𝜑
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
� being higher than the opportunity cost of using the labour for own production � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
�. 
That is, farm households will hire out labour only if the opportunity cost of using that labour 
on own farm is less than the wage earned in the market after subtracting the transaction costs. 
Non-participating households  
Based on the FOCs in equations (iv) and (v), the optimal conditions for non-participating 
household or the shadow value with respect to the land and labour endowment is given in 
equation (vi).  
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
< 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 for the land market  or  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿�
< 𝜔𝜔 − 𝜕𝜕𝜑𝜑
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
 for the labour market (vi) 
Equation (vi) indicates that non-participating households consider their shadow value to 
agricultural land and labour to be greater than the net return from either renting-in the land or 
hiring out labour. Overall, the theoretical framework shows that households will decide to trade 
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these factors of production if it is profitable to engage in these factor markets after accounting 
for non-linear transaction costs.  
The theory discussed so far is a static model with non-linear transaction costs that vary across 
space and in one production season. However, farm households are continuously engaging in 
these decisions over time, hence they accumulate knowledge that is used in subsequent years. 
Such knowledge or experience does not only depend on the within household decisions but also 
on community or geographical factors, governing policy and state of nature or environmental 
variables as presented in Figure 1. Thus, following Holden et al. (2007), I apply the reduced 
model of the farm household decision variable that reflect household intertemporal decisions 
in the factor markets. That is, renting-in agricultural land or hiring out labour is a dynamic 
decision with varying intertemporal transaction costs. This changes all the variables in equation 
(iii), where the dynamic choice variables are specified as (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) for land rented-in and (𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) for 
labour hired out. Where j is for the household and t is for time, applied to all variables in the 
equation.  
In addition to applying the dynamic farm household decisions to trade agricultural land (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) 
or labour (𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗), I also apply the state-contingent approach to production under uncertainty 
(O'Donnell & Griffiths, 2006; Quiggin & Chambers, 2006). The theory indicates that farm 
households make input decisions before the state of nature is revealed or environmental 
outcome is known. However, such decisions are not just stochastic but also depend on the 
probability of an outcome in the state of nature, where the probability is partly a function of 
household experience over time. Thus, farm households make state-contingent land and labour 
choices that aim at minimising both production and consumption shocks, ex-ante and ex-post 
the events (Dercon, 2002; Holden & Quiggin, 2017). Farm households make these state-
contingent input choices like renting-in agricultural land or hiring out labour in a way that does 
not only reduce risk but also substitute risk (Holden & Quiggin, 2017). Overall, the theory 
applied in this thesis is the farm household model with dynamic household decisions that are 
state-contingent to the revealed state of nature, previous policy mix, and experience in the factor 
markets. In line with the discussed conceptual and theoretical framework, all the four research 
papers compiled in this thesis use data from two sources, which I discuss in the next section. 
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4. Survey methods and data  
The work in this thesis combines the nationally representative household survey data and the 
10-year district-level rainfall data from Malawi. The survey data is from three-panel rounds of 
the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in (i) March 2010 to 
March 2011; (ii) April to December 2013; and (iii) April 2016 to April 2017. The Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) are a series of data collection processes conducted 
by the National Statistics Offices of most developing countries and facilitated by the World 
Bank–LSMS Department. The objective of collecting this data is to periodically assess the 
changes in the living conditions of people in developing countries. Thus, the LSMS data covers 
the household, agricultural and community characteristics (National Statistics Office, 2017a).   
In Malawi, the survey is conducted every five years and mainly focus on cross-sectional data. 
The recent cross-sectional survey rounds were conducted in 2010 and 2016, which randomly 
sampled at least 12 thousand households across urban and rural areas of Malawi (National 
Statistics Office, 2017a). Although the survey interval is 5 years in Malawi, in 2013 the World 
Bank–LSMS team introduced a short panel in between the cross-sectional survey rounds to 
increase the use of the LSMS data. In Malawi, they used the 2010 cross-sectional survey round 
as the baseline year to identify 3,246 households from 204 (out of 768) nationally representative 
Enumeration Areas (EAs). The identified households in these EAs were followed in 2013 and 
2016 survey rounds.  
Since the LSMS survey process tracks individuals within a household, if one member has split-
off, the new household is automatically incorporated in the sample when they are traced. 
Therefore, the survey round in 2013 tracked 3,104 households from 3,246 that represent almost 
4 percent attrition rate. However, due to members splitting off, the sample size increased to 
4,000 households in 2013 (National Statistics Office, 2014). Combining the panel and cross-
section survey in 2016, the LSMS team considered it feasible and efficient to reduce the panel 
sample from 204 EAs to 104 nationally representative EAs. From these EAs, they identified 
1,990 households that were interviewed in 2013, of which they traced 1,908 in 2016, 
representing a 4 percent attrition rate. But with split-off members, the sample increased to 2,508 
households (National Statistics Office, 2017a).  
Considering the magnitude of the LSMS survey questionnaire and the sample size, the low 
attrition rate in Malawi allows for more effective use of the panel data compared to the cross-
section data. Therefore, the survey data used in this thesis is the open-access panel data that 
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was released by the Malawi National Statistics Office and the World Bank–LSMS team 
(https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2939). In this data, the respective sample 
size for each survey round were 1,619 households from 2010 round; 1,990 households from 
2013 round; and 2,508 households from 2016 round (National Statistics Office, 2017b). In 
addition to using the unbalanced panel data in the first paper, I also constructed a balanced 
panel data for analysing household dynamic decisions while accounting for any attrition bias 
in the analysis.  
To complement the LSMS survey data, I used the 10-year monthly district-level rainfall data 
sourced upon request from the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services in 
Malawi (http://www.metmalawi.gov.mw/). The objective of using this data was to assess 
spatial rainfall variations over a long period, as opposed to using the rainfall data reported in 
each LSMS survey round. Thus, I requested and accessed monthly rainfall data from January 
2007 to December 2017 across different weather stations in the 28 districts of Malawi. This 
data was matched with household data and depicted within-region rainfall variations or shocks.  
In Malawi, the districts are grouped into three regions namely Northern (6 districts); Central (9 
districts); and Southern (13 districts). With the district monthly data, I was able to generate 
short-term and medium-term spatial rainfall shock variables that happen in the early to mid-
seasons, following a unimodal rainfall pattern that spans from November to April in Malawi. 
Use of such variables was more relevant in assessing the lagged rainfall shock effects on farm 
household decision to rent-in agricultural land or hire out labour for agricultural casual work.  
By merging the nationally representative household survey data with district-level rainfall data, 
I was able to assess household-level decision variables in relation to community, district and 
regional level variables. The well-disaggregated land sources and use of labour in the LSMS 
survey data further helped in categorising household decisions in line with the farm household 
model. Studies that have analysed coverage of LSMS data on land markets support the use of 
this data when assessing the demand for agricultural land, as it adequately captures data from 
tenants compared to the landlord households (Deininger et al., 2017; Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 
2019). Thus, assessing land transactions on the demand side using the LSMS panel data should 
reveal new empirical evidence and possibly relevant policy issues in the land rental markets 
developing in Malawi. With this data, the next sections summaries the scientific contributions 
in this thesis before presenting the policy implications, limitation and future research.   
17 
 
5. Scientific contributions  
The four research papers in this thesis respond to several empirical questions relevant in the 
current policy debates on land markets and efficient allocation of factors of production in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). The specific questions for this thesis are (i) what are the important 
spatial and intertemporal changes in land shadow prices that affect patterns of land valuation 
and transactions? (ii) what is the dynamic nature of transaction costs in the land rental markets 
developing in Malawi? (iii) how are transaction costs affecting entry and extent of participation 
(amount of land rented-in) amongst potential tenant households? (iv) are spatial variations in 
downside and upside lagged rainfall shocks kick-starting access to rented land among potential 
tenant households? (v) is more family labour relative to agricultural land (falling land to labour 
ratio due to land scarcity) a push factor associated with the household entry and the extent of 
participation in agricultural land rental and seasonal labour markets? and (vi) how are land 
rental markets influencing the decision to trade family labour for casual work in seasonal 
agricultural labour markets? In line with these questions, the sub-sections below summarise the 
objectives, theory, methods and main findings from each of the four research papers compiled 
in this thesis.      
Paper I: Urban proximity, demand for land and land shadow prices in Malawi 
Understanding the changing trends in the land values or prices is important for having insights 
on land productivity, profitability, land market forces of demand and supply, and overall 
economic development (Coomes et al., 2018). When recorded land prices observed from actual 
land transactions are not publicly accessible because of thin and spatially dispersed markets, 
Coomes et al. (2018) indicated that implicit land prices should reflect land values that are 
important for assessing demand for land and related land market transactions. To contribute to 
this understanding, this paper assesses the important spatial and intertemporal changes in 
farmland shadow prices, within the broader political economy perspective that shape patterns 
of land valuation and transactions.  
In the paper, we specifically analyse the Willingness-To-Accept (WTA) land sales and rental 
prices and their ratio across space and overtime on owned land at the farm household level. We 
assume that the ratio of the sales to rental prices should reflect the long-term expected returns 
to land compared to short-term gains. The ratio should also reflect the impact of converting 
land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes, especially near urban centres. We also 
propose that farm household-level population pressure has a spatial effect on household shadow 
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prices in peri-urban and rural areas. We use the unbalanced panel data from the Malawi Living 
Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) collected in 2010, 2013 and 2016 survey rounds.  
Building on the von Thünen theory of agricultural investments and economic rent across space 
(Sinclair, 1967), and the Capozza and Helsley (1989) stylized urban growth model, we focus 
on the policy changes that aimed at integrating the rural resources and communities to the 
global agricultural value chains in developing countries. This followed the recent discussions 
on “land grabs” in Africa associated with the 2007–08 spike in energy and food prices that 
created speculations for a roaming food crisis (Byerlee & Deininger, 2013; Cotula, 2013; White 
et al., 2012). Under this policy wave, Malawi like most African countries committed to 
providing land to large scale commercial investors under the Greenbelt initiative (Chinsinga, 
2017).  
This policy direction faced a lot of political discussions, which challenged the implementation 
of this policy, especially after the death of the championing president in 2012. Thus, in 2013, 
there was a change in political will towards such large-scale land transfers although demand 
for agricultural land continues in Malawi. We, therefore, assess how such policy changes and 
farm household-level population pressure have influenced household shadow land prices across 
space and over time. We split the sample of farm households into quintiles based on distance 
from the nearest major city area zone and use the Hedonic Price Method to analyse the changes 
in the land shadow prices. We considered 2013 as the transitioning year in the policy shift.  
The results indicate that generally, farmland shadow prices decrease with distance from urban 
centres while being positively correlated with farm household-level population pressure, 
especially in urban proximity. However, between 2010 and 2013, farmland shadow prices 
increased more sharply in rural areas compared to peri-urban areas. By 2016, the increasing 
trend in shadow sales prices had reversed to a similar trend as in 2010, where the shadow sales 
prices in urban proximity were three times higher than in rural areas. On the contrary, shadow 
rental prices continued to increase even after 2013, especially in rural areas.  
In summary, the results imply that the sharp increase in demand for large-scale land transfers 
affected smallholders’ land valuation, even in remote rural areas of Malawi. This is in addition 
to the local level population pressure that indicates a growing demand for agricultural land 




Paper II: Non-convex transaction costs and land rental market participation in Malawi 
The market theory in SSA suggests that high and non-linear transaction costs characterise factor 
markets across space and over time (Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 2010). In these markets, 
the transaction costs are non-linear and high from varying transportation costs and information 
asymmetry. The market theory further suggests that market participants invest in inter-personal 
networks of information, trust and reputation upon entering the factor markets in SSA 
(Fafchamps, 2004). These networks are important for searching, negotiating and enforcing 
contracts over time. Therefore, such inter-personal networks can lead to intertemporal, non-
linear and non-convex transaction costs in factor markets.  
Non-convex transaction costs imply marginally decreasing costs mainly from participants 
overcoming market entry barriers and with repeated engagements over time (Fafchamps, 2004). 
With such non-convex transaction costs, participation in the market can be state-dependent 
from networks of trust and reputation that facilitates access to market information. Despite the 
theoretical understanding of factor markets in SSA, the extent to which non-convex transaction 
costs characterise land markets, and whether such land transactions are state-dependent on 
previous participation remains an open empirical question in SSA.  
Using the farm household model and the dynamic non-linear transaction costs theory, this paper 
contributes to the above question. In the paper, we use three rounds of the Malawi Living 
Standards Measurement Survey conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016. We constructed a three-
year balanced panel data and applied the dynamic random effects panel probit and Tobit models 
for entry and extent of participation (Wooldridge, 2010). Our analysis focused on the extent to 
which non-linear and non-convex transaction costs ration potential tenants’ entry and extent of 
participation. We further assessed whether the extent of participation (amount of land rented 
in) is state-dependent on previous engagement in the markets.  
We observe that high and non-linear transaction costs potentially ration market participation in 
the land rental markets developing in Malawi. The results point towards thin land rental markets 
that hinder efficient resource recombination across farms, thereby constraining land-use 
efficiency. Although the transactions are high and non-linear, we also observed that they are 
non-convex over time. The observed non-convexity point towards transaction costs that exhibit 
reducing trend overtime if farm households overcome the first hurdle of entering the land rental 
market. Over time, such non-convex transaction costs should improve access to rented land 
despite the dominance of short-term and fixed-rentals contracts in Malawi. However, we did 
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not observe that the extent of participation (amount of land rented-in) is state-dependent on 
previous engagements in the rental markets.     
Paper III: Can rainfall shocks enhance access to rented land? Evidence from Malawi 
With non-missing land rental markets in SSA, farm households are now strategically 
reallocating their land and non-land resources through participation in the land rental markets 
developing in countries across SSA. Scholarly papers show that farm households use the land 
rental markets as a coping strategy ex-post downside rainfall shocks in form of distress renting 
out of agricultural land (Gebregziabher & Holden, 2011; Kusunose & Lybbert, 2014). Despite 
evidence on distress supply of rented agricultural land after rainfall shocks, the corresponding 
effect on the uptake or demand for the supplied agricultural land has not been subject to much 
research in the land rental markets literature. This is in addition to the generally limited 
evidence on the spatial variation effect of rainfall shocks on the household decision to rent-in 
farmland. Thus, if the rainfall shocks are shifting the supply of agricultural land, we consider 
understanding how tenant households are utilizing these opportunities as a missing link in the 
land rental markets literature.  
We assess whether spatial variations in downside and upside lagged rainfall shock effects are 
kick-starting access to rented land among tenant households. That is by shifting supply through 
distress rentals and hence creating opportunities for renting-in agricultural land across agro-
ecological zones. The analysis in this paper applies the state-contingent framework for risky 
input choice within a farm household decision model (Holden & Quiggin, 2017; Quiggin & 
Chambers, 2006). Furthermore, the farm household decision to participate in the land rental 
market is modelled subject to district-wise rainfall shock variables that depict regional level 
and spatial effects across different agro-ecological zones in Malawi.  
We use the three-year household balanced panel data from the Malawi Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016. The survey data was combined with 
10-year monthly rainfall data that captured district-level weather shocks while showing the 
within region variations, across the three regions of Malawi. By construction, we use the one-
year and two-year lagged early to mid-season rainfall deviation variables. These are deviations 
from the 10-year mean values at district level following a unimodal rainfall pattern that runs 
from November to April in Malawi. To assess entry and extent of market participation (amount 
of land rented-in at the farm households level given in hectares), we used the correlated and 
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dynamic random-effects panel probit and Tobit models (Chamberlain, 1982; Mundlak, 1978; 
Wooldridge, 2010).  
The results reveal spatial differences across the regions that exhibit different agro-ecological 
zones, population density and land rental market activity. Overall, we only observe the 
significant effect of the downside but not the upside lagged rainfall shock effects in the regions. 
In the Central Region of Malawi, where land rental markets are most active, the one-year and 
two-year lagged downside rainfall shocks are associated with increased access to rented land, 
even after controlling for entry barriers related to market information transaction costs.  
For the more land constrained Southern Region of Malawi, with less prevalence of land rental 
markets, the results show that the two-year lagged downside rainfall shock effects can reduce 
access to rented land among potential tenants. Both entry and extent of participation reduce 
with a two-year lag shock effect in this region. However, farm households with experience in 
the market within the Southern region were more likely to also participate in the subsequent 
years. These are possible market entry barriers that call for policy interventions that can assist 
access and use of agricultural land amidst recurring downside rainfall shocks.   
Paper IV: The falling land to labour ratios and agricultural trade response strategies in 
Malawi 
Owned agricultural land relative to labour endowment (land to labour ratio) at the farm 
household level continues to fall in most countries across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), because 
of increase in population pressure and urbanisation rates (Chamberlin et al., 2014; Headey & 
Jayne, 2014). Traditionally, farm households have been responding to this land scarcity 
challenge by shifting labour within the agricultural sector, mainly by doing casual work in 
seasonal agricultural labour markets. This has been partly because of missing, absent or thin 
land markets that could facilitate the use of land and non-land factors of production (Ellis, 2000; 
Jayne et al., 2014). However, land rental markets are now developing and giving opportunities 
for farm households to achieve closer to desired access to land, considering the persistent 
evidence of high and non-linear transaction costs that characterise factor markets in SSA 
(Fafchamps, 2004; Ricker-Gilbert & Chamberlin, 2018).  
In this paper, I focus on the farm households who are relatively labour rich compared to owned 
agricultural land (relative more family labour to owned farmland), who can either rent-in the 
land or hire-out the labour, as the trade response strategies to the growing land scarcity 
challenge. The focus on the relative labour rich households is because of the increase in farm 
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household-level population pressure and landlessness that is mostly leaving households with 
relatively more labour to owned farmland in SSA (Jayne et al., 2014).  
I jointly assess whether the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio is a push factor 
associated with household entry and the extent of participation in agricultural land rental and 
seasonal labour markets. In a recursive model, I further assess how the developing land rental 
markets are influencing the farm household decision to hire out labour for casual work, 
commonly known as ganyu in Malawi. Hiring out labour for casual work in SSA is considered 
as a livelihood strategy but also an income or food consumption coping strategy (Van 
Hoyweghen et al., 2020). Thus, I also assess the extent to which asset wealth to labour 
endowment ratio is influencing the trade decision in these factor markets, as the livelihood 
response strategy to the increase in land scarcity challenges in Malawi.  
I use the two-year household balanced panel data, constructed from the Malawi Living 
Standards Measurement Survey conducted in 2013 and 2016. The survey data is combined with 
the 10-year district-level rainfall data. To estimate the joint decision, I use the bivariate and 
recursive bivariate models for entry into factor markets while jointly using the Tobit and 
fractional probit models for the extent of participation. The Tobit model assesses the amount 
of land rented-in (measured in hectares) while the fractional probit model measures the share 
of adult equivalent labour hired out in seasonal agricultural labour markets and doing casual 
work. Considering the simultaneity and endogeneity issues in the systems approach, I used the 
correlated random effects model and the conditional mixed process estimation methods that 
apply full information maximum likelihood method (Chamberlain, 1982; Kassouf & 
Hoffmann, 2006; Mundlak, 1978; Roodman, 2011; Wooldridge, 2010).  
The results indicate that the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio is a push factor for 
farm households to participate in either land rental or seasonal agricultural labour markets. 
However, if a farm household rents in agricultural land, the probability of hiring out labour for 
short-term casual work reduces by 38 percentage points at one percent significance level. This 
shows that land rental markets can improve the probability of using labour on owned farm for 
medium to long-term gains as opposed to short-term gains doing ganyu work. Using asset 
wealth to labour endowment ratio, it is the wealthier farm households who are more likely to 
participate in the land rental markets. The very poor in asset wealth relative to labour and the 
majority of the smallholder farmers are more likely to hire out labour for casual work. A higher 
probability of smallholder farmers hiring out labour for casual work could be a sign of 
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household liquidity constraints related to agricultural operational and other household needs, 
or higher friction or transaction costs in the land rental markets compared to the labour markets. 
These are the issues that agricultural policy discussions and land-use strategies should continue 
to emphasize while aiming at reducing the friction in the factor markets in Malawi.       
6. Policy contributions and conclusion   
In Malawi and other Sub-Saharan African countries, much of the agricultural land policy 
discussions in the past decade has focused on the recent large-scale land transfers within the 
agricultural sector. This has overlooked the modalities of transferring land to smallholder farm 
households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Thus, the first recommendation in this thesis is on 
the need to re-focus the discussion to improving farm household access to agricultural land in 
rural, peri-urban and urban areas. This follows our observation that farm household level 
population pressure continues to drive land shadow values or prices in paper one. Such policy 
discussions should be important considering the growing population density and the increase 
in urbanisation rates in Malawi and countries across SSA.  
Again, the increase in agricultural land shadow values in peri-urban areas and shadow rental 
values in rural areas observed in paper one, demonstrate a growing trend in land values or prices 
among smallholder farmers. This trend points towards possible transferring of land to within 
the agricultural sector or reallocation of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, 
especially in peri-urban areas. With such developments, there is a need for the government to 
develop, update and implement the land use policy and land use maps in peri-urban and rural 
areas, in ways that should sustain agricultural productivity. This is because agriculture remains 
a central source of food supply and livelihood in both rural and urban areas of Malawi.  
One strategy in the land use policy can be to promote land rental markets as an affordable 
avenue for accessing agricultural land, especially for land constrained and potential tenants 
among smallholder farm households. But then, how can the policymakers promote such land 
markets? I contribute to this question based on the empirical evidence in paper two. From paper 
two, we observed that over time, high and non-linear transaction costs related to accessing land 
rental market information continue to ration the participation of potential tenants or farm 
households renting-in land in Malawi.  
To promote participation in the land rental markets, there is a need for policy strategies that can 
improve access to land market information and possibly facilitate the orchestration of partners 
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given the spatial nature of land rental markets. This comes from the observation that non-
convex transaction costs characterise land rental markets developing in Malawi. The non-
convex transaction costs imply marginally decreasing costs overtime from market participants 
overcoming entry into the land rental markets and developing networks of information, trust 
and reputation that can easily facilitate access to land market information. With non-convex 
transaction costs, the policy strategies can include the use of low-cost and community-level 
information dissemination channels like the pluralistic agricultural extension and information 
systems in Malawi.  
Considering the importance of improving access to land rental market information, it is also 
important to understand when and who is in most need of such information in the market. In 
paper three we observed that lagged downside rainfall shocks are associated with promoting 
participation in land rental markets where such markets are more active while being associated 
with reducing participation where land rental markets are less active. Such spatial variation 
effects call for the need to include land rental market information in climate response strategies 
at the local or community level. Improving access to land market information in areas most 
affected by downside rainfall shocks can promote participation in the land rental markets to be 
more competitive for those supplying in distress and those demand agricultural land 
aftershocks. Thus, deliberate land campaigns in rural areas should be promoted to improve 
access to land aftershocks.  
Land markets develop to enhance allocative efficiency of both land and non-land factors of 
production. To what extent are the developing rental markets achieving this in Malawi? Paper 
four partly tackle this issue by assessing jointly the household land and labour allocation 
decisions. While the results in paper four showed that renting-in the land can reduce the 
probability of hiring out labour for casual work, the poor and majority of the smallholder 
farmers in Malawi are still rationed from renting-in agricultural land and being pushed to hiring 
out labour for short-term wage returns. Such a higher probability of smallholder farmers hiring 
out labour for casual work concurs with the observation in paper two on high and non-linear 
transaction costs that characterise land rental markets in Malawi. This is in addition to the 
limited asset capital wealth or liquidity constraints that can push households to hire out labour 
for short-term gains.  
In conclusion, the empirical evidence presented in this thesis strongly points to the need for 
tailor-made policy strategies that can reduce friction or transaction costs in the land markets 
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while also easing the liquidity constraints among productive and progressing smallholder 
farmers, who are willing to rent-in agricultural land. The policy strategies can include 
promoting land rental market campaigns in rural areas, improving access to land market 
information on available agricultural land, land-use changes and land market values at the 
community level. Malawi can also aim at establishing a land bank that can facilitate access to 
capital for land rental transactions or implement subsidies that support agricultural operations. 
Such policy considerations can promote the land rental markets as an affordable avenue of 
accessing land in rural areas and among smallholder farmers. In general, this can help to sustain 
rural livelihoods and contribute to both rural and urban transformation, as land scarcity 
challenges continue in Malawi.  
7. Limitation and future research  
The empirical work in this thesis has assessed changing trends in land sales and rental shadow 
prices, the land rental market transactions, and agricultural factor market decisions nexus or 
linkages. However, an important limitation in the analysis was encountered due to the 
inadequacy of the data in capturing the households renting out land or landlord households. 
With the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data, the sample size for 
households renting out the land was too small to do meaningful analytical or comparative work. 
Therefore, there is need for further research that should include landlords or the supply side of 
the land market transactions. Using matched tenant and landlord data, future research can also 
assess the characteristics of landlords and tenants in the land rental and sales markets across 
space and over time in Malawi.  
At the end of this research work, I reckon I might be left with the need to contribute to the 
understanding of “whether it is the poor households renting out the land that are also hiring out 
the labour; or whether it is the wealthier tenants renting-in land that are also hiring-in labour”. 
Such research can further contribute to a broader understanding of changing trends in demand 
for agricultural land, opportunities and constraints in the land rental markets in Malawi and 
across other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.         
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A B S T R A C T
We assess the spatial and intertemporal variation in farmland prices using per hectare minimum willingness to
accept (WTA) sales and rental (shadow) prices in Malawi. We use three rounds of nationally representative farm
household panel data from the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), collected in 2010, 2013 and
2016. The sample is split in quintiles based on distance from the nearest major city, building on the land
valuation and transaction cost theory, and agrarian political economy perspectives on global and national land
transactions. Generally, farmland shadow prices decrease with distance from urban areas. However, farmland
shadow sales prices increased more sharply between 2010 and 2013 in rural areas (+100 % vs +30 % in urban
proximity). The results indicate that the sharp increase in demand for large-scale land transfers following the
sharp increase in energy and food prices also affected rural smallholders’ land valuation, even in remote rural
areas of Malawi. Conversely, by 2016 land shadow sales prices were again, like in 2010, about three times as
high in areas near urban centres compared to remote rural areas. Even though sales prices declined in remote
rural areas from 2013 to 2016, rental prices remained high. Using farm household-level population pressure
variable, we show that local population pressure is a driver of farmland shadow prices, indicating land scarcity
challenges, growing demand for land, and poorly developed land markets. With increasing land scarcity, land
markets are becoming more important and need to be factored in when formulating development policies that
aim to improve access to land in both peri-urban and rural areas.
1. Introduction
African cities are growing rapidly. Both population growth and
rural-urban migration drive this urbanisation (Jedwab et al., 2015). The
United Nations (UN) report shows that the proportion of urban to total
population in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is expected to increase by 19
percentage points between 2014 and 2050 (United Nations, 2014). This
increase in urban population has resulted in some African countries
reclassifying their urban boundaries through outward expansion into
rural space (Manda, 2013). Considering that most land in SSA is under
rural agricultural use, the changes in demand for land have contributed
to the growth of land markets in Africa (Holden et al., 2010). When
these markets work well, they contribute to the transfer of land to more
efficient producers at prices that make buyers and sellers better off
(ibid). These markets are crucial to facilitate the necessary future rural
and urban transformation processes, especially in SSA. However, these
markets are only emerging in most African countries despite land
scarcity challenges, due to land tenure restrictions and other
institutional, economic and biophysical characteristics (Binswanger and
Rosenzweig, 1986; Holden et al., 2010).
According to Byerlee and Deininger (2013); Deininger and Byerlee
(2011) and White et al. (2012), the world demand for agricultural land
increased after 2008, especially in SSA following the sharp increase in
world energy and food prices in 2007–2008 period. These authors in-
dicated that the recent “land grab” fears in Africa is associated with this
sharp increase in demand for large-scale land transfers, especially in
areas with weak land rights and tenure institutions, and for margin-
alised groups with weak land rights. However, White et al. (2012) in-
dicated that the policy responses and political discussion around these
“land grabs” had challenged agents involved in these large-scale land
transfers, thereby constraining the supply responses to this demand for
agricultural land in SSA.1 On the other hand, studies on land use and
urban proximity in Africa indicated that increasing demand for land
nearer urban centres is mainly a function of population growth, mi-
gration, economic development and accessibility to the city (Briggs,
1991; Kleemann et al., 2017).
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Despite the existing literature, smallholder agriculture land values
and prices have not yet been subject to much research in SSA. Coomes
et al. (2018) and Plantinga et al. (2002) indicated that where land price
data is available, studying land prices may give valuable insights on
land productivity, profitability, changes in demand and supply, urban
development, and overall economic growth. Coomes et al. (2018) fur-
ther pointed out that where recorded land prices are not available, the
use of implicit prices is also vital for understanding land market forces.
Therefore, our objective is to assess the effect of changing demands
for agricultural land on farmland shadow prices (Willingness-to-Accept
(WTA) sales and rental prices and their ratio) across space and over
time. The ratio of prices should reflect long-term relative to short-term
expected profitability or returns to land among respondent households
as well as the impact of converting land from agricultural to non-
agricultural purposes near urban centres. We also propose that farm
household-level population pressure might have an effect on household
shadow prices for land across space, in a country dominated by
smallholder agriculture and where land markets still are thin and
characterised by high transaction costs. This should make land shadow
prices sensitive to high and growing population density and the agri-
cultural policy that strongly emphasizes household food security
(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Government of Malawi, 2016c).
Our study uses the household survey responses to farmland shadow
sales and rental prices for all land parcels of a nationally representative
sample, from the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), col-
lected in 2010, 2013 and 2016 in Malawi. Land, being a capital asset, a
key production factor and a private good, should be considerably easier
to value than many of the public goods that are valued using the
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002;
Roka and Palmquist, 1997). We recognise that use of shadow (hy-
pothetical) prices reflect the land value based on familiarity with land
attributes by individual owners, which might be different from revealed
preferences when one uses actual or observed market prices (Carson
et al., 2001). Thus, we propose that the use of CVM and WTA prices
should give a good picture of perceived farmland values or shadow
prices at the household level for the years we have the data, in line with
changing demands for agricultural land in Malawi. The use of such
prices is preferable because of thin land markets in Malawi (Lunduka
et al., 2009). The alternative use of few recorded land prices from ac-
tual land transfers is unlikely to give a good representation of non-
traded land in Malawi.
We are only aware of two other studies that used contingent land
valuation methods (CVM) to study drivers of farmland values in Africa
and attitudes towards legalization of land sales in Ethiopia and
Tanzania (Holden and Bezu, 2016; Wineman and Jayne, 2017). By
using a nationally representative household panel data from Malawi,
our study adds to this limited literature. We aim to demonstrate the
important spatial and intertemporal changes in farmland shadow
prices, within the broader political economy perspective that shapes
patterns of land valuation in SSA.
We have organised the remaining paper in seven sections. Section
two presents the conceptual framework on land valuation within the
agrarian political economy perspective and states the hypotheses.
Within section two, we also briefly discuss the Malawi case and urba-
nisation rates related to changing demands for land. In section three, we
present the survey methods and data while in section four we discuss
the estimation method. Section five gives descriptive statistics. We
present and discuss the results in section six, and we conclude in section
seven.
2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
2.1. Theory of land valuation
The von Thünen theory of agricultural investments and economic
rent across space (Sinclair, 1967), and the Capozza and Helsley (1989)
stylized urban growth model generally indicates that farmland prices
decrease with increasing distance from urban centres because of
transportation costs and availability of output markets in urban areas.
The classical von Thünen theory states that agricultural land values or
prices are a function of economic rent or profit from agricultural use
that is estimated as a function of distance to a central market place
(Sinclair, 1967). Although the von Thünen theory provides the basis for
agricultural land valuation, Sinclair (1967) indicated that in-
dustrialisation and increase in urban population– that can result in
urbanisation and urban sprawl, can also influence rural agricultural
land use values even before the actual development of urban infra-
structure. That is, a high probability of conversion of land use from
rural to urban creates expectations that influence land-use values.
In line with the von Thünen theory, the Capozza and Helsley (1989)
stylized urban growth model fully integrates land valuation in urban
and rural areas. The model categorizes the unit land price into urban,
peri-urban and rural areas. The price per unit of land in urban areas is
mainly valued based on the cost of converting the land use or devel-
opment cost that captures capital improvements on land; and the value
of accessibility to the Central Business District (CBD) or transport cost.
The unit land price in peri-urban areas is mainly a function of agri-
culture land quality or economic rent; and the expected increase in land
value built on the trend of spatial expansion of urban areas in line with
Sinclair (1967). Beyond the urban fringe or in rural areas, per unit land
prices are only a function of the economic rent, which is the return from
farm investments as indicated in the von Thünen theory (Anderson,
2012).
The underlying assumption of the classical land valuation models is
that markets exist and that individual households freely trade their
products, especially agricultural products. However, theory and evi-
dence show that agricultural markets are characterised by high trans-
action costs beyond transport costs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Fafchamps, 2004). Land markets are usually thin or missing because of
the immobility and spatial dispersion of land, poor infrastructure,
seasonality of agriculture, information asymmetries and institutions
that shape patterns of trade (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986;
Fafchamps, 2004). The implication is that individual households face
high non-linear transaction costs in the land markets, especially in areas
with low population densities and poor infrastructure, but also in areas
with land scarcity such as Malawi where land market activity is in-
creasing (Holden et al., 2010).
2.2. Agrarian political economy perspective
In his study, Cotula (2013) indicated that after the 2007–2008 spike
in energy and food prices, a combination of policy and market forces
made land, particularly in Africa, a more attractive investment option
due to national and global concerns for long-term food and energy se-
curity. White et al. (2012) further indicated that the narratives on food,
energy and climate “crisis”2 led to a policy interest to integrate rural
resources and communities (mostly in developing countries) to the
global commodity value chains with an agri-business-oriented vision
for agriculture.
Although studies in most SSA countries (including Malawi) have
observed limited price transmission between global and domestic food
prices (Benson et al., 2008; Cornia et al., 2016; Cotula, 2013), the sharp
increase in demand for land, a ten-fold increase in large-scale invest-
ments and land transfers, commonly referred to as a “land grab” after
2007–2008, also created policy responses that influenced the direction
of agricultural investments in most SSA countries (Cotula, 2013; White
2White et al. (2012) use crisis in quotes because this was a phenomenon
based on anticipated global food and energy insecurity problems as well as the
competing demands for land in environmental management and infrastructure
development.
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et al., 2012). High food and energy prices created expectations of high
returns from growing food and energy crops and attracted many in-
vestors. It is not strange, however, that high food prices affect agri-
cultural land values more broadly, thereby increasing agricultural land
values across the globe. It was especially in SSA countries with weak
land governance frameworks and abundant land that investors saw
profitable investment opportunities (Byerlee and Deininger, 2013;
Cotula, 2013). Although these issues cut across regions, Cotula (2013)
indicated that context-specific factors also facilitated new agricultural
investments, especially in economies with weak investment capacity.
Thus, it should be worth investing in a deeper understanding the global
and local impacts associated with the sharp increase in demand for
agricultural land and how it affected local land valuation given the
imperfect nature of land markets. In this paper, we therefore focus on
Malawi, an agriculture-dependent country in SSA region.
2.3. The case of Malawi
Malawi is of particular interest in this study because the county’s
agricultural sector holds 56 percent of the total available land, con-
tributes 80 percent to the export earnings and employs 64 percent of the
country’s workforce (Government of Malawi, 2002, 2017). Further-
more, the country has a strong policy priority towards enhancing
agricultural production for both food security and nutrition
(Government of Malawi, 2016c). In trying to ensure food security and
income growth and to hedge agricultural production against rainfall
shocks, Malawi is among the SSA countries that experienced a high
demand for agricultural land from 2009. This demand was associated
with the promotion of large-scale commercial farming, with links to
smallholder out-grower contract farming under programs like the
Greenbelt Initiative (GBI) and the G8′s New Alliance for Food Security
and Nutrition (Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012; Gausi and Mlaka,
2015).
Chinsinga and Chasukwa (2012) reported that through the GBI,
Malawi committed to offering local and international investors land
lying within 20–30 Kms of the large water bodies (mainly the Lake
Malawi), an area amounting to 1 million hectares for large-scale irri-
gation farming of high valued crops. Literature reports large-scale land
deals under sugarcane production and other cash crops like paprika
(Chinsinga, 2017; Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012). This policy direc-
tion shifted the demand for rural agricultural land beyond peri-urban
areas by both local and foreign investors. Interestingly, the Malawi
Government made this policy direction amidst prolonged legislative
land policy reforms that were initiated in 1996 and recently enacted in
2016 (Government of Malawi, 2016a, 2016b). Furthermore, the Malawi
Government pursued the GBI policy agenda in a country with a high
population density (average of 185 persons per square Km), and a po-
pulation projection that shows that the proportion of urban population
to total population will double between 2014 and 2050, from both
natural increase and rural-urban migration (Government of Malawi,
2019; Kalipeni, 1997; Manda, 2013; United Nations, 2014). This policy
direction, therefore faced waves of political discussions on “land grab”
until around 2013, following the death of the Malawian president in
2012 and a change in the country’s leadership that shifted the political
and economic will towards less support for the GBI (Chinsinga, 2017;
Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012).
Despite the shift from GBI, the demand for agricultural land con-
tinues to grow in Malawi, especially in peri-urban areas. Manda (2013)
reported that urbanisation rates (share of urban population to total
population) in Malawi had facilitated reclassification of urban bound-
aries through horizontal expansion as opposed to vertical growth.
Malawi has four major city zones across the country, plus town area
zones in most districts (Manda, 2013). The city zones are Lilongwe,
Blantyre, Mzuzu3 and Zomba (Appendix – Fig. A1). Manda (2013) re-
ported that all the four city zones continue to experience horizontal
expansion from both population growth, migration and availability of
farmland area. Such area expansion has resulted in an increased area
under urban-rural space and land-scarcity challenges that are key for
understanding the effects of spatial expansion of urban areas on farm-
land shadow prices, as well as the dynamic change effects of demand
for agricultural land on land price trends in SSA.
2.4. Hypotheses
Based on our conceptual framework, we have formulated the fol-
lowing hypotheses that we aim to test and/or discuss in light of our data
and econometric results;
H1: Land shadow prices increase with increasing farm household-
level population pressure in rural as well as in peri-urban areas.
We build on the assumption that there are non-linear transaction
costs that lead to imperfections in both land and non-land factor mar-
kets that cause these markets to be imperfect (thin, missing, seasonal
and with limited competition in line with Binswanger and Rosenzweig
(1986)). The large majority of land parcels are not traded but still have
WTA (shadow) prices that are influenced by the household and loca-
tion-specific resource characteristics as well as commodity prices such
as food prices (Holden et al., 2010).
H2: High food and energy prices during the associated “land grab”
period in Malawi (2007–2013) induced higher expected profitability in
farming among smallholder farmers even in remote rural areas, thereby
increasing the land shadow prices, and especially the shadow sales
prices.
We assume the global demand for agricultural land and the
Government initiated programs like the Green Belt Initiative (GBI) in-
creased public awareness related to land use for commercial farming
and hence speculations that influenced land shadow prices in Malawi.
Programs like the GBI promoted large-scale land acquisitions especially
in remote rural areas close to large water bodies, like the Lake Malawi,
between 2007 and 2013 (Chinsinga, 2017).
H3: Rural land shadow prices have fallen after 2013 and fallen back
towards the previous low level in rural areas by 2016.
We assume that the global political discussions that imposed re-
strictions on large-scale land transfers as well as the change in Malawi’s
leadership after 2013 reversed expectations and speculations on in-
creasing land values in remote rural areas (Chinsinga, 2017; Gausi and
Mlaka, 2015).
H4: Land shadow sales prices relative to rental prices are higher in
peri-urban areas.
Table 1
Median deflated WTA land prices over space and time.






CPI deflated WTA Prices (2010 base year)
Deflated WTA sale
price (MK)/Ha
Median 1 – 22 0 – 0 7886 2478 4321
23 – 42 0 – 37 1513 2478 3116
43 – 62 40 – 80 950 1528 1800
63 – 82 80 – 140 751 1394 1299




Median 1 – 22 0 – 0 124 149 158
23 – 42 0 – 37 102 137 144
43 – 62 40 – 80 94 110 122
63 – 82 80 – 140 76 108 107





Median 1 – 22 0 – 0 36 20 20
23 – 42 0 – 37 15 19 20
43 – 62 40 – 80 10 16 14
63 – 82 80 – 140 10 12 11
82 – 102 161 – 379 10 11 10
3 Mzuzu city is within Mzimba district
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We build this hypothesis on the assumption that the land shadow
sales prices nearer urban centres are more associated with transforming
land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes with higher
potential land use values, whereas shadow rental prices primarily
transfer land for agricultural purposes only.
3. Survey methods and data
To assess the spatial and intertemporal change patterns of land
shadow prices, we use data from three-panel rounds of the Living
Standards Measurement Survey–Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
(LSMS-ISA) collected in 2010-11, 2013 and 2016-17 in Malawi
(National Statistics Office, 2017). The total number of panel households
in 2010, as the baseline year, was 1619 and increased in subsequent
years from both households splitting and new households joining the
survey. According to the Malawi National Statistics Office (NSO), this
increased the number of households to 1908 in 2013 and to 2508 in
2016. In subsequent years, the number of Enumeration Areas (EAs) also
increased from 98 in 2010 to 102 in 2013 and 2016. Across the survey
years, only one household was missing between 2010 and 2013.
However, there was a 4 percent attrition rate at the household level
between 2013 and 2016. Our analysis maintained all the households
that were available in each survey round. Thus, we maintained all the
EAs and kept track of the number of times a household appeared across
the survey years.
On the minimum WTA farmland prices, the survey was designed to
obtain these for owned and not for rented-in, leased, encroached or
borrowed land. In 2016, the survey design asked questions on minimum
WTA sales and rental prices at the parcel level compared to plot level in
the other years4 . We aggregated the plot level responses from the first
two survey rounds to the parcel level and did the analysis at the
household parcel level. NSO used the global positioning system (GPS) to
accurately measure the farmland area compared to farmers’ estimates.
The WTA prices were in Malawi Kwacha5 and were calculated per
hectare (ha) of GPS-measured area. We deflated these prices using a
consumer price index (CPI)6 with 2010 as the base year. After data
cleaning and keeping household-parcel level data for the owned parcel
land, the total number of observations used in this paper was 6557
household-parcels from 1131 households 1602 parcels in 2010, 1471
households 2245 parcels in 2013 and 1918 households 2710 parcels in
2016.
For this data, 0.07 percent of the sample gave a zero-valued shadow
rental price and a positive shadow sales price for the same parcel.
Furthermore, 0.9 percent had stated land shadow sales prices lower
than the shadow rental prices for the same parcel of land, which we
considered to be contradicting basic theory and likely to reflect a
misunderstanding or data errors. We therefore dropped these outlier
observations. Further inspection of the data using scatter and Kdensity
graphs also revealed some unrealistically large outlier observations in
sales, rental and ratio values. To reduce the noise in the data, we used
graphs and visual inspection to determine the upper limit values within
each quintile. Mainly, we inspected the scatter plots and the Kdensity
graphs for the untransformed and natural-log transformed data and
assessed the distribution of the data in the upper tail. To determine the
cut-off points, we aimed at getting tails of similar length at both ends of
the natural-log transformed distributions within each quintile and price
category7 . By controlling for the outliers, we dropped an average of one
percent of the total sample for either sales, rental or ratio prices data.
This was so small a share that it had no significant effect on our results.
For the spatial variables, we used the distance to the nearest major
city obtained at Enumeration Area (EA) through focus group discus-
sions. These groups consisted of community members of different age
and gender, local leaders/chiefs, skilled and unskilled workers. These
members should possess the relevant local knowledge, and there was no
indication of group incentives to bias the distance estimate. We used
this measure of distance in kilometre (km) for each EA listed in as-
cending order from the city zone for our analysis as a proxy for urban
proximity. The EAs within the city zone had a zero distance, and those
with the largest distances represented the most remote rural areas. We
clustered our analysis at the EA level, and each EA had some variation
in the number of household-parcel observations over time.
4. Estimation method
Following Rosen (1974), we used the Hedonic Price Method (HPM)
to estimate the effect of changing demands on shadow or Willingness to
Accept (WTA) land prices among smallholder farmers in Malawi. The
hedonic pricing refers to implicit prices of differentiated products based
Fig. 1. Median deflated WTA land sales prices over space and time.
Fig. 2. Median deflated WTA land rental prices over space and time.
Fig. 3. The ratio of WTA land sales to rental prices over space and time.
4 Parcel is a continuous piece of land that is not separated by river or path
wide enough to allow movement of an ox-cart or vehicle (National Statistics
Office, 2017). A parcel can include several plots of different crops under dif-
ferent crop management systems.
5 One US dollar to Malawi Kwacha (MK) was on average MK156.53 in 2011;
MK369.18 in 2013 and MK726.04 in 2017 sourced at www.rbm.mw.
6 The data on CPI was obtained from IMF website (International Monetary
Fund, 2016)
7 In the methodology, we controlled for outlier values within each quintile by
inspecting the data distribution using the scatter and Kdensity graphs. The data
distribution graphs are available from the authors upon request.
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on their attributes revealed by economic agents. HPM implies that the
price of a heterogeneous good consisting of a set of distinct attributes Z
= (z1, z2, …….,zk), is a function of all these attributes – both intrinsic
and extrinsic (Choumert and Phélinas, 2015).
In line with Palmquist (1989), agricultural or farmland is a het-
erogonous commodity where the market equilibrium price ZP ( ) is an
aggregate of implicit prices, zp ( ),j based on land attributes. The WTA
prices are the implicit or land shadow prices, zp ( ),j for the parcels of the
individual households based on their land and location-specific attri-
butes. Maddison (2000) and Parsons (1990) emphasized that the
function used to estimate hedonic prices should be additively separable
in terms of structural attributes of land and that prices should be in-
dependent of quantity. We thus, separately analyse the rate of change in
per hectare land sales and rental prices, and their ratio. We used a
natural-log-linear function specified in Eqs. (1) and (2) below for the
land shadow sales and rental prices and their ratio, respectively and the
per hectare land shadow prices to control for total parcel area.
= + + + + +XlnWTA D cijkijk jk t k ijk0 1 (1)
= + + + + +XlnRatioWTA D cijkijk jk t k ijk0 1 (2)
From the model in Eq. (1), we specify lnWTAijk as the natural-log of
per hectare minimum land prices, a household is willing to accept in
land sales or rent-out markets. The lnRatioWTAijk in Eq. (2) is for the
natural-log of the ratio of shadow sales to rental land prices8 .
To assess the associated market, micro and macro policy effects, we
used Djk in Eq.s (1) and (2) for household size to total farmland ratio
(number of persons per ha) as an indicator of farm household-level
Table 2
Dynamic changes in deflated minimum WTA land prices-Natural log land prices. (Full model results are in Appendix Tables A3, A4 and A5).
Variable (2010 base year) EA and distance quintiles
EAs 1 - 22 23 - 42 43 - 62 63 - 82 83 - 102
Distant range to the city 0−0 km 0−37 km 40−80 km 80−140 km 161−379 km
Sales model
2010 base year
Household size to total farmland 0.008**** 0.008** 0.010**** 0.003 0.005****
ratio (Number of persons per ha) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0010)
2013 year −0.107 0.379**** 0.362*** 0.661**** 0.339***
(0.2940) (0.0852) (0.1108) (0.0919) (0.1028)
2016 year 0.341 0.699**** 0.484**** 0.543**** 0.409****
(0.2466) (0.0886) (0.0986) (0.1105) (0.1040)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.650**** 7.311**** 7.039**** 6.910**** 6.249****
(0.5779) (0.2724) (0.1912) (0.3780) (0.2290)
Observations 392 1,070 1,851 1,598 1,574
R-squared 0.249 0.126 0.169 0.132 0.159
Number of EA id 22 20 20 20 20
Calculated change: 2013 to 2016 0.448 0.320*** 0.122 −0.118 0.07
0.3837 0.1229 0.1483 0.1437 0.1462
Rental model
2010 base year
Household size to total farmland 0.010**** 0.006** 0.008**** 0.005**** 0.004***
ratio (Number of persons per ha) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0012)
2013 year 0.186 0.102 0.085 0.340*** 0.275***
(0.1088) (0.0955) (0.0755) (0.1016) (0.0901)
2016 year 0.196 0.264*** 0.302**** 0.459**** 0.463****
(0.1591) (0.0843) (0.0754) (0.0848) (0.0714)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.027**** 4.957**** 4.950**** 4.762**** 3.987****
(0.2907) (0.1731) (0.1127) (0.2316) (0.2269)
Observations 385 1,076 1,847 1602 1,575
R-squared 0.241 0.201 0.249 0.236 0.234
Number of EAs 22 20 20 20 20
Calculated change: 2013 to 2016 0.01 0.162 0.217** 0.119 0.188
0.1927 0.1273 0.1067 0.1323 0.115
Land sales/rental price ratio model
2010 base year
Household size to total farmland −0.000 0.001 0.002** −0.001 0.001**
ratio (Number of persons per ha) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0003)
2013 year −0.252 0.319*** 0.332*** 0.310** 0.071
(0.3129) (0.0833) (0.0924) (0.1103) (0.1223)
2016 year 0.088 0.396*** 0.224 0.065 −0.026
(0.2938) (0.1075) (0.1115) (0.1091) (0.0916)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.656**** 2.293**** 2.145**** 2.390**** 2.257****
(0.6046) (0.2862) (0.1515) (0.3045) (0.2346)
Observations 386 1,060 1,833 1,585 1,564
R-squared 0.094 0.051 0.050 0.030 0.040
Number of EAs 22 19 20 20 20
Calculated change: 2013 to 2016 0.34 0.077 −0.108 −0.245 −0.097
0.4292 0.136 0.1448 0.1551 0.1528
Note. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at EA level. Significance levels: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. We calculated the change
from 2013 to 2016 by comparing the computed mean differences after the regression results. We used the t-test to assess the significance level of the mean difference
compared to zero.
8 As discussed in the data section, the estimation method controlled for the
noise observed in the data and we used the natural-log transformation to im-
prove the distribution of the data.
S.E. Tione and S.T. Holden Land Use Policy 94 (2020) 104509
5
population pressure across space. We specify the variable in line with
our theory of imperfect markets and high non-linear transaction costs
when markets are thin or missing. The parameter t represents the
correlation for the year dummy variables to capture the changing
trends in line with policy and global macro-economic factors across
space and over time. We assess these changes from 2010, 2013 and
2016 data and consider 2013 to be a reference point regarding the
changes in policy direction in political and economic support on large-
scale land investments in Malawi.
In the model, we control for Xijk that represent less dynamic and
relatively stable land characteristics, household characteristics, and
community control variables at the EA panel level. These included;
parcel area (GPS measured area); soil type (sandy, loam, clay, other
types) for individual parcels at household level; one-year lagged
drought/irregular rains experience at household level as an indicator of
weather-related shock, distance to major weekly markets at community
level; sex, age and education of the household head; distance to a
baseline dwelling location to control for household re-allocating be-
tween survey periods; the number of times a household appeared across
the survey years; and total livestock units for household wealth.
We included the distance to weekly markets at the community level
as a measure of access to established or mobile9 markets that are as-
sumed to gradually change with the expansion of urban area zones.
That is, the distance can reduce if urbanisation or expansion of the city
area zones results in building new permanent markets or increase if the
land is converted to other non-commercial use, thereby shifting mobile
weekly markets to other places. Appendix Table A1 provides a full
description of the variables included in the model. The error term is
+ck ijk and all the variables are for parcel household i-j from EA k. The
estimated coefficients are ,0 and for all variables listed above. The
ck is for EA time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and the ijk is the
idiosyncratic error term.
To facilitate the assessment of the dynamic change patterns in per
hectare minimum WTA land sales and rental prices, and their ratio, we
estimated the rate of change in land prices between 2010, 2013 and
2016 within and across quintiles. We use the linear fixed effects esti-
mator with heteroskedastic error term that we clustered at EA level10 .
Our analysis compared the year variable across five quintiles of distance
to an EA from the nearest major city and within the quintiles for the
spatial and intertemporal changes, respectively. By using the EA fixed
effects estimator, our model controlled for time-invariant EA-level
average household-parcel level characteristics. However, we do not
control for time-invariant specific parcel-level variables across house-
holds, like soil type and land to labour ratios. This implies that we
assess the spatial as well as the intertemporal variations in household-
level variables within an enumeration area while controlling for spe-
cific parcel-level variables. Based on the data period in this paper, we
do not expect much intertemporal change in parcel-level variables like
soil type within the EAs.
To define the EA quintiles, we used the distance from the city zones
that ranged from 0 to 379 km in our data. We grouped the 102 EAs into
five categories of 20 EAs each except for the first group that had 22 EAs
because we observed 26 EAs within the 0−2 km radius from the city
zone area. The grouping was to ensure our analysis focuses on land
price changes from the peri-urban to rural areas. The EAs were there-
fore given ordered numbers based on their increasing distance from the
nearest city zone. Therefore, the quintiles were; (1) EAs 1–22 within
0−0 km; (2) EAs 23–42 within 0−37 km; (3) EAs 43–62 within
40−80 km; (4) EAs 63–82 within 80−140 km; and (5) EAs 83–102
within 161−379 km. The use of quintiles was mainly to capture the
radial distribution of land prices.
5. Descriptive statistics
We present the summary statistics for the changes in median WTA
(shadow) land prices in Table 1 and Figs. 1, 2 and 3 to provide nu-
merical median values and visual price patterns. The table and the
figures report median untransformed but deflated prices in each quin-
tile of distance to a nearest major city. We use this in contrast to the
mean values that would be more affected by the skewness of prices and
outlier influence that may be stronger with data from contingent va-
luation methods (Holden and Bezu, 2016), and as observed in our data.
Following the urban growth theory, land prices in the city may respond
to development costs. That is, the land price captures the transforma-
tion costs into non-agricultural land use with much higher returns to
land, compared to land prices in peri-urban and rural areas where
agriculture land use remains dominant.
Fig. 1 illustrates that land shadow sales prices from peri-urban to
rural areas made close to a parallel shift from 2010 to 2013 while the
tendency of higher shadow sales price increase near urban areas be-
came stronger again in 2016. Table 1 also illustrates this, with the land
shadow sales prices being about three times as high close to urban areas
as compared to remote rural areas. We observe an almost similar par-
allel upward shift in shadow rental prices from 2010 to 2013 in Fig. 2
and that the change from 2013 to 2016 is minimal across the quintiles.
From 2013 to 2016, the shadow rental prices remain relatively higher
compared to the shadow sales prices that appeared to have declined to
some degree beyond 80 km distance.
Table 1 shows that land shadow rental prices respond much less to
urban proximity than land shadow sales prices. This also results in
larger ratios between these prices closer to urban areas (Fig. 3). While
the land shadow sales prices were on average 63 percent higher in near
urban areas (second quintile) as compared to remote rural areas be-
tween 2010 and 2013, shadow rental prices were, on average, only 36
percent higher near urban areas in the same period. It appears that this
ratio is on the increase near urban areas but that the increasing ratio
has expanded from the near urban areas from 2010 to 2013 and 2016.
We suggest that it was the macro-economic changes like high food and
energy prices that triggered speculative demands for land at large-scale
as well as the high food prices that affected smallholder households’
WTA selling (shadow) prices for land from 2010 to 2013 as discussed in
section two.
The summary statistics for all the explanatory variables are pre-
sented in Appendix Table A2 to accommodate for the quintile statistics.
As an indicator of farm household-level population pressure, Table A2
shows that the mean household size to total owned farmland ratio
ranged from 8 to 17 persons per ha with an overall higher ratio within
the 37 km radius or in peri-urban areas. However, there were variations
across space and over time, as observed from the standard deviations
for the mean values. Among the spatial control variables, the mean
parcel land holding size across the quintiles ranged from 0.3 to 0.5 ha
with larger parcel areas in more remote rural areas. The statistics also
show varying distances to weekly markets over time, especially in peri-
urban areas. The share of female-headed households was between 17
and 32 percent across the quintiles.
6. Results and discussion
Table 2 below presents the main regression results in the form of
key variables associated with the spatial and intertemporal land shadow
prices. We present the full model results in the Appendix Tables A3, A4
and A5. In this section, we assess our hypotheses based on the key re-
gression results presented in Table 2 below.
9 In Malawi it is common to have an open space area designated as a market
which is mostly operational one day per week. Traders gather in these markets
for a day before moving to the next market within the same week. These are
referred to as established mobile weekly markets.
10 Since the LSMS data collection method tracks the possible splitting of
households, this leads to an increase in the number of households in subsequent
years and since we used data from both stable and split households. We used
clustering at enumeration area and corrected standard errors accordingly.
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For the first hypothesis (H1), we stated that the “land shadow prices
increase with increasing farm household-level population pressure in
rural as well as in peri-urban areas”. The results in Table 2 show that
farm household-level population pressure correlates positively with
both land shadow sales and rental prices. For a one-unit increase in
household size to total farmland ratio (number of persons per ha), the
increase in WTA prices or land shadow prices ranges between 0.3 to 1
percent across the quintiles. The percent changes in both sales and
rental shadow prices are relatively higher in peri-urban and the inter-
mediate quintiles compared to more remote areas. These results may
signify the importance of agriculture for own food production even in
near urban areas as it is an important policy objective for households to
be self-sufficient in staple food (maize) production in Malawi, amidst
high transaction costs in agricultural markets (Chirwa and Dorward,
2013). Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis one (H1) and conclude that
farmland shadow prices are increasing across the peri-urban and rural
areas and that own agricultural production is still important for food
security and a driver of land shadow prices in Malawi.11
Figs. 1 and 2 and Table 1 in section 5, together with time dummy
variables in Table 2 below, provide relevant evidence to assess hy-
pothesis two (H2). We hypothesized that the “high food and energy
prices during the associated “land grab” period in Malawi (2007–2013)
induced higher expected profitability in farming among smallholder
farmers even in remote rural areas, thereby increasing the land shadow
prices, and especially the shadow sales prices”. The results indicate that
between 2010 and 2013, the increase in land shadow sales prices is
significant from peri-urban to rural area quintiles but not within the
city zone. This effect is higher at a distance above 80 km radius com-
pared to areas close to the city. The results seem to indicate that the
macro-economic price increase and the sharp increase in investor de-
mand for land, also penetrated the smallholder agricultural sector all
the way into distant rural areas in Malawi. It is possible that the sig-
nificant increase in the ratio between the land shadow sales and rental
prices is also a result of this macro shock, which may have affected the
land shadow sales values more strongly in areas not too far from urban
centres. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis two (H2) and conclude that
WTA or land shadow prices among smallholder farmers (also in remote
rural areas in Malawi) responded to changing demands in the period
associated with “land grabs” in Africa.
For hypothesis three (H3), we stated that the “rural land shadow
prices have fallen after 2013 and fallen back towards the previous low
level in rural areas by 2016″. To assess this hypothesis, we refer to
Fig. 1 and the calculated change from 2013 to 2016 in Table 2. These
demonstrate that land shadow sales prices have remained stable or
showed a slight decline in the more remote rural areas compared to
peri-urban areas. For the shadow rental prices, we observed a general
increase from 2013 to 2016 from peri-urban to rural areas but mainly
within the intermediate quintiles. Therefore, we reject our hypothesis
three (H3). The persistent high or increasing land shadow prices in-
dicate that, despite the fall of world prices and policies that constrained
the supply of land in rural areas of SSA, there are other upward push
factors that have prevented the land shadow sales and rental prices
from having fallen back to earlier levels. We controlled for one of the
upward push factors in the form of the farm household-level population
pressure that we observed to be increasing farmland shadow prices in
peri-urban and rural areas of Malawi in this study. Although there is
limited evidence on price transmission between global and domestic
food markets in Africa, Jayne et al. (2008) indicated that agricultural
policies that emphasize the use of fertiliser (like in Malawi) are gen-
erally vulnerable to energy price shocks. That is, an increase in oil price
can increase the cost of imported fertiliser which can lead to limited
supply, use, lower yields or higher output prices. In either case, farmers
are forced to intensify land use and hence attach more value to owned
farmland for food production. Thus, our results could imply these
competing and growing demand for agricultural land in both peri-urban
and rural areas.
Considering the importance of agricultural land in Malawi, we
stated hypothesis four (H4) as the “land shadow sales prices relative to
rental prices are higher in peri-urban areas”. From the results, we note
that the increase in the ratio of the sales to rental shadow prices be-
tween 2010 and 2013 expanded further into rural areas. This trend had
been partly reversed by 2016. We consider the higher changes in the
ratio values close to urban areas to indicate that land shadow sales
prices near urban centres may be more associated with transforming
land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes or new invest-
ment in agriculture for urban farming –like poultry, vegetable and
flower farms (Sinclair, 1967). Such demand may explain the higher and
increasing gap between shadow sales and rental prices, as we do not
think the ratio would have changed if the purpose remained for tradi-
tional agricultural use only, and without new investments. Therefore,
the data supports hypothesis four (H4).
7. Conclusion and policy implications
The sharp increase in world energy and food prices in the
2007–2008 period is associated with the sharp increase in demand for
land in the 2008–2013 period which also affected demand for agri-
cultural land in Africa. We utilized three rounds of nationally re-
presentative household-parcel level data (LSMS-ISA) from Malawi, that
asked landowners about their minimum Willingness-to-Accept (WTA)
selling and rent-out prices for their land. Building on the von Thünen
theory, the urban growth model and transaction cost theory, we studied
the effects of these global energy and food price shocks on farmland
shadow sales and rental prices, and the price ratio in peri-urban and
rural areas, within the broader agrarian political economy perspective
that jointly shape land valuation.
Our study indicated that the global price shocks penetrated the
smallholder sector and had strong positive effects on farmland shadow
prices even in remote rural areas of Malawi in the period 2010-2013.
However, with the falling energy and food prices, and changes in
agricultural policy direction after 2013, the farmland shadow sales
prices also reduced but less so than we had expected. Our study de-
monstrates that other factors, i.e. population pressure at farm house-
hold level contribute to explaining why the land shadow prices con-
tinued to remain high in 2016.
While much of the land policy focus in the past decade has been on
the recent large-scale land transfers within the agricultural sector in
Africa, we see that the farmland shadow prices within the smallholder
agricultural sector in Malawi are also affected by the grinding effects of
population growth and proximity to urban areas. With growing land
scarcity, Malawi needs to factor in the emerging land markets when
formulating rural and urban development policies. Policy considera-
tions can be on whether land markets can be an affordable avenue for
accessing land by land-scarce households or youths, or whether inter-
ventions are needed to enhance access to land for specific groups or
purposes. Such policy considerations can contribute to both rural and
urban transformation in Malawi.
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Deflated WTA sale price (MK)/Ha Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflated WTA land sales price for each parcel at the household level. Malawi Kwacha(MK)/
ha
Deflated WTA rent-out price (MK)/Ha CPI deflated WTA land rent-out price for each parcel at the household level MK/ha
Deflated WTA ratio-sales/rental price/Ha CPI deflated WTA land sales to rent out price ratio for each parcel at the household level
Distance (KM) to a nearest major city) Distance from a nearest major city in Malawi (Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu) to an
Enumeration Area (EA). The estimated distance was through a focus group discussion, and it is a
group estimate. We used this variable to define the quintile (five groups) from city to rural areas.
Different units were used to measure distant at EA, and we converted them to km.
Kilometer (KM)
Distance from 2010 household dwelling (KM) The NSO reported that 54 percent of households tracked in 2016 had moved from the baseline
house location in 2010. The variable shows the distance between the house locations in 2010
compared to 2013 or 2016, mainly for the tracked households.
KM
Household size to total farmland ratio (number of
persons per hectare)
The variable is an indicator of household farm-level population pressure. That is the number of
households’ members divided by total owned farm size measure in hectares. Although the data was
at the household parcel, we summed up the parcel area and used total owned farm size for this
variable.
Number/ha
GPS measured farmland parcel area (ha) Individual parcel area owned by the household. GPS was used to measure each. ha
One year lagged household drought/irregular
experience (1=Yes)
The variable captures if households experienced drought or irregular rains in the previous rainy
season that affected them. The response was a binary with 1=Yes
Dummy
Sex of Household Head (1=Female) Household member identified as heading the family with 1=Female Dummy
Education of Household Head (Years) Number of schooling years attained by the household head (continuous variable) Years
Age of household head Age of household head as a continues variable Years
Distance to Weekly market (KM) Distance to weekly markets where households can either buy inputs or sell their produce in a week.
The estimated distance was through focus group discussions at Enumeration Area, and we
converted all unit measures into km. The variable captures both established as well as weekly
mobile markets that are common in Malawi.
KM
Total Livestock Units A sum of all livestock units based on livestock unit’s conversion figures for different types of
animals
Number
One year lagged Total Livestock Units Livestock units owned by a household 12 months before the survey period Number
Soil type Categories of soil per parcel into sandy, loamy, clay and other classes. Number
Number of interviews per household across survey
years
Categorical variable ranging from 1 to 3 for the number of times a household appear in the data for
the years 201, 2013 and 2016, since our data includes both stable and splitting households plus
new households joining the survey.
Number
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Table A2
Summary statistics over space and time.
Variable Statistic Distance (km) 2010 2013 2016 Variable Statistics Distance (km) 2010 2013 2016
CPI deflated WTA Prices (2000 base year) Control Variables
Deflated WTA sale price (MK)/Ha Median D: 0 – 0 7886 2478 4321 Sex of Household Head
(1=Female)
Percent D: 0 – 0 9.57 14.03 19.17
D: 0 – 37 1513 2478 3116 D: 0 – 37 19.39 24.48 32.03
D: 40 – 80 950 1528 1800 D: 40 – 80 27.00 28.27 30.71
D: 80 – 140 751 1394 1299 D: 80 – 140 20.96 16.92 19.18
D: 161 – 379 562 1041 976 D: 161 – 379 19.70 23.88 30.55
Deflated WTA rent-out price
(MK)/Ha
Median D: 0 – 0 124 149 158 Age of household head Mean D: 0 – 0 39 44 48
D: 0 – 37 102 137 144 D: 0 – 37 44 46 47
D: 40 – 80 94 110 122 D: 40 – 80 47 48 49
D: 80 – 140 76 108 107 D: 80 – 140 43 45 47
D: 161 – 379 62 87 96 D: 161 – 379 44 45 46
Deflated WTA ratio-sales/rental
price/Ha
Median D: 0 – 0 36 20 20 Education of Household Head
(Years)
Mean D: 0 – 0 7.21 7.76 6.73
D: 0 – 37 15 19 20 D: 0 – 37 5.12 5.34 5.34
D: 40 – 80 10 16 14 D: 40 – 80 4.31 4.76 4.54
D: 80 – 140 10 12 11 D: 80 – 140 4.88 5.20 5.18
D: 161 – 379 10 11 10 D: 161 – 379 4.96 4.71 4.96
Key Explanatory Variables
Household size to the total
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Distance to Weekly market (KM) Mean D: 0 – 0 6.23 13.46 4.21 One year lagged household
drought/irregular experience
(1=Yes)
Percent D: 0 – 0 20.53 14.06 27.22
D: 0 – 37 2.72 2.14 6.18 D: 0 – 37 51.58 37.23 55.53
D: 40 – 80 4.39 4.57 5.67 D: 40 – 80 47.93 36.11 40.97
D: 80 – 140 3.58 3.80 3.37 D: 80 – 140 55.86 31.71 50.11
D: 161 – 379 5.25 4.58 5.50 D: 161 – 379 54.89 29.73 41.96
Distance (KM) to a nearest major
city)
Mean D: 0 – 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 Distance from 2010 household
dwelling (KM)
Mean D: 0 – 0 – 32.33 52.24
D: 0 – 37 27.31 27.75 27.25 D: 0 – 37 – 4.72 5.24
D: 40 – 80 61.31 60.08 60.09 D: 40 – 80 – 4.86 4.95
D: 80 – 140 109.76 109.67 110.00 D: 80 – 140 – 3.12 5.83
D: 161 – 379 229.34 222.82 217.56 D: 161 – 379 – 4.22 2.43
Sample Size N D: 0 – 0 53 147 195
D: 0 – 37 237 359 487
D: 40 – 80 484 624 763
D: 80 – 140 419 571 626
D: 161 – 379 407 544 633
Note: The number of EAs in each distance quintile is (1) EA 1–22 for 0 – 0 km; (2) EA 23–42 for 0–37 km; (3) EA 43–62 for 40–80 km; (4) EA 63–82 for 80–140 km;
(5) EA 83–102 for.161–379 km.
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Table A3
: Dynamic changes in deflated minimum WTA land prices (Natural-log prices)–Hedonic Price Model with linear fixed effect estimator.
Number of EA Model A: 0 < EA No. < =22 Model B: 22 < EA No. < =42
Distance to nearest major city (km) 0 to 0 km 0 to 37 km
VARIABLES 1a: Sales Prices 2a: Rental Prices 3a: Ratio Prices 1b: Sales Prices 2b:Rental Prices 3b:Ratio Prices
Household size to total farmland ratio 0.008**** 0.010**** −0.000 0.008** 0.006** 0.001
(Number of persons per ha) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0008)
weekly market distance (KM) −0.002 −0.016* 0.010 0.003 −0.003 0.014**
(0.0126) (0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0052)
Farmland parcel area (Hectares) −0.685**** −0.494** −0.082 −0.668*** −0.915**** 0.127
(0.1699) (0.1838) (0.0912) (0.1815) (0.1372) (0.0853)
distance to IHS3location (KM) −0.003*** −0.000 −0.002** −0.005 −0.001 −0.004
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0026)
Total Livestock Units 0.036* 0.031 0.015 0.011 0.017 −0.036
(0.0180) (0.0201) (0.0216) (0.0411) (0.0192) (0.0255)
Lag-total livestock units −0.001 −0.056 0.088 0.002 0.002* 0.001
(0.1291) (0.0648) (0.0896) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Household head sex (1=Female) 0.034 0.171 −0.005 −0.154*** −0.125* −0.083
(0.1311) (0.1133) (0.1192) (0.0521) (0.0695) (0.0774)
Household head age 0.002 0.004 −0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.0061) (0.0037) (0.0063) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0020)
Household head education (Years) 0.000 0.029* −0.011 0.006 0.001 0.007
(0.0230) (0.0153) (0.0180) (0.0135) (0.0077) (0.0137)
One year lagged household drought/irregular −0.088 −0.043 −0.047 −0.166* −0.056 −0.075
experience (1=Yes) (0.1689) (0.1028) (0.1937) (0.0873) (0.0586) (0.0782)
Soil Type - Compared to sandy soil
Loam soil 0.016 0.173 −0.157 0.072 −0.071 0.116
(0.1411) (0.1339) (0.1186) (0.0974) (0.0613) (0.0954)
Clay soil −0.102 0.161 −0.256 0.155 −0.060 0.233**
(0.2036) (0.1154) (0.2229) (0.1176) (0.0703) (0.1042)
Other types 0.132 0.114 0.080 0.070 −0.281** 0.399**
(0.4679) (0.2770) (0.3277) (0.1897) (0.1121) (0.1706)
Region (Compared to Central region)
Northern region 0.652 −0.007 0.489 2.451*** 2.650**** −0.304
(0.5253) (0.2300) (0.3625) (0.6502) (0.3225) (0.5207)
Southern region 1.257*** −0.073 1.204***
(0.4036) (0.1187) (0.3392)
2013.year −0.107 0.186 −0.252 0.379**** 0.102 0.319***
(0.2940) (0.1088) (0.3129) (0.0852) (0.0955) (0.0833)
2016.year 0.341 0.196 0.088 0.699**** 0.264*** 0.396***
(0.2466) (0.1591) (0.2938) (0.0886) (0.0843) (0.1075)
Number of interviews per household 0.480**** 0.148* 0.239*** −0.056 −0.004 −0.002
Across survey years (0.0883) (0.0742) (0.0751) (0.0608) (0.0437) (0.0618)
Constant 6.650**** 4.027**** 2.656**** 7.311**** 4.957**** 2.293****
(0.5779) (0.2907) (0.6046) (0.2724) (0.1731) (0.2862)
Observations 392 385 386 1,070 1,076 1,060
R-squared 0.249 0.241 0.094 0.126 0.201 0.051
Number of EA id 22 22 22 20 20 19
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at enumeration area. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4
Dynamic changes in deflated minimum WTA land prices (Natural-log prices)–Hedonic Price Model with linear fixed effect estimator.
Number of EA Model C: 42 < EA No. < =62 Model D: 62 < EA No. < =82
Distance to a nearest major city (km) 40 to 80 km 80 to 140 km
VARIABLES 1c: Sales Prices 2c: Rental Prices 3c: Ratio Prices 1d: Sales Prices 2d:Rental Prices 3d:Ratio Prices
Household size to total farmland ratio 0.010**** 0.008**** 0.002** 0.003* 0.005**** −0.001
(Number of persons per ha) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0009)
weekly market distance (KM) 0.011 −0.018 0.031* −0.007 −0.008 0.004
(0.0206) (0.0222) (0.0173) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0120)
Farmland parcel area (Hectares) −0.966**** −1.034**** 0.085 −0.699**** −0.862**** 0.146**
(0.0802) (0.0951) (0.0713) (0.1302) (0.1051) (0.0615)
distance to IHS3location (KM) 0.002 −0.000 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0012) (0.0020)
Total Livestock Units −0.022 −0.058*** 0.040 −0.002 0.003 −0.006
(0.0490) (0.0188) (0.0322) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0054)
Lag-total livestock units 0.073 0.055* −0.015 0.057 −0.007 0.085
(0.0560) (0.0282) (0.0540) (0.0779) (0.0515) (0.0799)
Household head sex (1=Female) −0.229** −0.039 −0.148** 0.029 −0.041 0.084*
(0.0803) (0.0714) (0.0592) (0.0804) (0.0524) (0.0461)
Household head age −0.003 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001 −0.003** 0.002
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0020)
Household head education (Years) 0.028** 0.006 0.022** 0.009 0.005 0.006
(0.0119) (0.0072) (0.0103) (0.0072) (0.0051) (0.0072)
One year lagged household drought/irregular −0.065 −0.111** 0.015 0.126 0.078 0.092
experience (1=Yes) (0.0817) (0.0474) (0.0784) (0.0898) (0.0475) (0.0762)
Soil Type - Compared to sandy soil
Loam soil 0.161** 0.130* −0.012 0.024 0.073 −0.048
(0.0636) (0.0737) (0.0933) (0.0959) (0.0840) (0.0746)
Clay soil 0.056 0.023 −0.019 0.029 0.038 −0.017
(0.0622) (0.0879) (0.0938) (0.1020) (0.1050) (0.0644)
Other types 0.161 0.152 −0.034 0.197* 0.035 0.148
(0.1125) (0.0949) (0.1707) (0.1080) (0.1485) (0.1971)
Regional (Compared to central region)
Northern region −1.138* 1.140**** −2.262****
(0.5587) (0.2927) (0.3900)
Southern region −0.447 −0.140 −0.579
(0.7177) (0.3030) (0.4667)
2013.year 0.362*** 0.085 0.332*** 0.661**** 0.340*** 0.310**
(0.1108) (0.0755) (0.0924) (0.0919) (0.1016) (0.1103)
2016.year 0.484**** 0.302**** 0.224* 0.543**** 0.459**** 0.065
(0.0986) (0.0754) (0.1115) (0.1105) (0.0848) (0.1091)
Number of interviews per household 0.056 0.009 0.028 0.052 0.008 0.002
Across survey years (0.0559) (0.0299) (0.0406) (0.0444) (0.0518) (0.0566)
Constant 7.039**** 4.950**** 2.145**** 6.910**** 4.762**** 2.390****
(0.1912) (0.1127) (0.1515) (0.3780) (0.2316) (0.3045)
Observations 1,851 1,847 1,833 1,598 1602 1,585
R-squared 0.169 0.249 0.050 0.132 0.236 0.030
Number of EA id 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at enumeration area. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5
Dynamic changes in deflated minimum WTA land prices (Natural-log prices)–Hedonic Price Model with linear fixed effect estimator.
Number of EA Model E: 82 < EA No. < =102
Distance to a nearest
major city (km)
161 to 379 km






Household size to total
farmland ratio
0.005**** 0.004*** 0.001**















Total Livestock Units 0.089** 0.040*** 0.050*
(0.0340) (0.0135) (0.0249)
















experience (1=Yes) (0.0718) (0.0553) (0.0580)
Soil Type - Compared to
sandy soil
Loam soil 0.069 −0.054 0.132**
(0.0836) (0.0733) (0.0573)
Clay soil 0.041 −0.063 0.077
(0.1013) (0.1078) (0.0672)
Other types −0.198* 0.060 −0.207
(0.1107) (0.0999) (0.1659)
Regional Dummies
Southern region 1.734**** 1.768**** 0.058
(0.2684) (0.2420) (0.2885)
2013.year 0.339*** 0.275*** 0.071
(0.1028) (0.0901) (0.1223)
2016.year 0.409**** 0.463**** −0.026
(0.1040) (0.0714) (0.0916)
Number of interviews per
household
−0.057 0.031 −0.085
Across survey years (0.0762) (0.0413) (0.0614)
Constant 6.249**** 3.987**** 2.257****
(0.2290) (0.2269) (0.2346)
Observations 1,574 1,575 1,564
R-squared 0.159 0.234 0.040
Number of EA id 20 20 20
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at enumeration area. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Abstract  
We assess how non-convex transaction costs constrain access to and participation in the land 
rental market by smallholder farmers within Sub-Saharan Africa. The theory suggests a 
dynamic externality due to such transaction costs and that orchestrated participation can reduce 
such costs and enhance future participation. We use dynamic random effects probit and Tobit 
models with balanced panel data from Malawi to assess participation on the tenant side of the 
market. We observe that land rental market experience upon entry significantly increase 
participation in the subsequent years, implying dynamic non-convex transaction costs and 
possible entry barriers in the market.  
Keywords: Land rental markets, Non-convex transaction costs, Dynamic random effects 
models, Malawi 




1. Introduction  
Land markets develop as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in allocating productive 
resources (de Janvry et al., 2002). Imperfections in the non-land factor markets create a 
rationale for land markets to balance factors of production across farms and in agricultural 
systems with low elasticities of substitution (Holden et al., 2010). Binswanger and Rosenzweig 
(1986) showed how the biophysical characteristics of land and non-land factors of production 
influence the factor market characteristics, distribution and redistribution of such factors 
among farm households in rural societies. These biophysical characteristics plus the 
institutional factors (cultural norms and political history), climatic conditions and population 
pressure potentially lead to non-missing but imperfect factor markets in rural societies 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Holden et al., 2010). With imperfect factor markets that are 
spatially dispersed and not well integrated, market participants face varying non-linear 
transaction costs across space and over time (Holden et al., 2010). Thus, the extent to which 
participants transact and the associated transaction costs are key in explaining the allocative 
efficiency of factor markets (Baland et al., 2007; Bell & Sussangkarn, 1988; Deininger, 2003; 
Skoufias, 1995). 
The varying non-linear transaction costs are with respect to the extent of factor market 
allocations among individuals, transportation costs and information asymmetry from policies 
and institutions that govern local access and use of productive resources (Fafchamps, 2004). 
Theory indicates that such non-linear transaction costs characterise both the land and non-land 
factor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and that such costs are high from policies, 
institutions and social factors that influence the degree of information asymmetry, access and 
use of production resources (Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 2010). The theory also suggests 
that market participants overcome such market imperfections, especially pertaining to 
information asymmetry by establishing localised and information networks that are inter-
personal when searching and negotiating, monitoring and enforcing market contracts 
(Fafchamps & Minten, 2001; Fafchamps, 2004). That is, upon entering the markets, 
participants invest in establishing the inter-personal networks of information, trust and 
reputation that are important for formulating and enforcing contracts. In line with Fafchamps 
(2004) and Holden et al. (2010), such initial investment costs can be high and non-linear upon 
entry but reduce over time from repeated engagements, thereby resulting in intertemporal non-
linear and non-convex transaction costs.  
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Non-convex transaction costs imply marginally decreasing costs mainly from participants 
overcoming the first hurdle related to market entry and with repeated market engagements over 
time (Fafchamps, 2004). With repeated engagements, searching and contracting costs reduce 
over time hence giving an advantage to experienced market participants compared to new 
entrants. With non-convex transaction costs, repeated engagements also imply that 
participation in the factor market can be state-dependent, where the previous status of a market 
participant is considered important for subsequent market transactions. Overall, both policies 
and institutional factors that govern the use and trade of production resources can influence 
transaction costs in a way that either promote or constrain participation in the markets.  
Despite theory indicating that factor markets in SSA are characterised by non-linear and non-
convex transaction costs, empirical evidence on the extent to which non-convex transaction 
costs characterise or restrict participation in the land markets that are developing in SSA 
remains limited. Reviewed literature indicated that the land markets and mainly the land rental 
markets that are developing in SSA, are facilitating efficient allocation of land and non-land 
resources to more efficient producers and improving household income and welfare depending 
on the context (Gebru et al., 2019; Holden et al., 2010; Kijima & Tabetando, 2020; Ricker‐
Gilbert et al., 2019). Holden et al. (2010) and Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin (2018) also 
showed that these rental markets are constrained by high and non-linear transaction costs. 
However, the extent to which such transaction costs are non-convex, or state-dependent 
remains an empirical question. Thus, assessing the non-convexity of transaction costs should 
be key for improving the allocative efficiency of land markets, more so the land rental markets 
that are more prevailing in SSA. 
We are only aware of studies in Ethiopia that have assessed the non-convexity of transaction 
costs on land rental markets with dominant sharecropping and kin member land rental contracts 
(Gebru et al., 2019; Holden et al., 2007). We are not aware of any study that has assessed non-
convexity of transaction costs in the land rental markets dominated by fixed and short-term 
contracts that are mainly developing in SSA. This could be because such short-term and fixed 
land rental contracts are considered less dependent on networks of trust and reputation in 
contract formulation, monitoring and enforcement (Alston et al., 1984). However, with market 
imperfections in SSA, assessing the non-convexity of transaction costs in the land rental 
markets should be key for understanding contract formulation with respect to search and 
negotiation costs. Such empirical evidence should be emphasized when developing policies 
that can lift entry barriers and further enhance the allocative efficiency of production resources 
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through markets. Thus, we add to this limited literature by assessing the extent to which non-
convex transaction costs encourage or restricts entry and extent of participation in land rental 
markets that are developing in SSA.    
We use three-panel rounds of the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data 
collected in 2010, 2013 and 2016, from which we constructed a balanced household panel data. 
Malawi is a country in SSA with emerging spatially dispersed land rental markets, dominated 
by short-term and fixed-rent contracts under customary land tenure systems (Lunduka et al., 
2009). The country has an instituted legal framework that allows households to trade their 
private or customary land according to land-use guidelines compared to other countries that 
strictly limit land market activities in SSA (Government of Malawi, 2002; Government of 
Malawi, 2016). For instance, the legal framework in Ethiopia prohibits land sales and only 
allows renting up to 50 percent of owned land per household (Holden & Ghebru, 2016). Also, 
the farming system in Malawi gives an advantage to using this data as it is dominated by a hand 
hoe that requires human labour compared to animal drought and other highly mechanised 
farming systems (Takane, 2008). Such use of human labour should be important for 
understanding the extent to which land rental markets equilibrate the land to non-land factor 
ratio at the household level. Furthermore, studies on land rental markets in Malawi shows a 
positive impact on household income and welfare (Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; 
Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). However, no study has assessed the non-linearity and non-
convexity of land rental markets that are developing in this country. Thus, the focus on 
transaction costs in this paper should be important for the development policy in Malawi and 
lessons for the region as land rental markets develop in SSA.  
We hypothesize that land rental markets ration the participation of potential tenants, and such 
participation is state-dependent on repeated engagements, observed from the tenant household 
side1. We assume that households with experience in the land rental markets have an advantage 
in search costs and negotiating contracts, which works to the disadvantage of new entrants in 
the market even with non-linear transaction costs. The sub-section on the theoretical model 
 
1 We focus on the tenant side of the land rental market mainly because of the LSMS data constraints on capturing 
landlord households. In our data, out of a balanced panel data of 1480 households, the classification in 2010 was 
7.3% tenants and 0.1% landlords; in 2013 it was 10.1% tenants and 0.5% landlords; and in 2016 it was 8.9% 
tenants and 1.7% landlords. The reason for this strong imbalance is still unclear, but it limits the suitability of the 
data for analysis on the supply side. See Deininger et al. (2017) for a full discussion on the limitations of the 
LSMS data on capturing landlord households. 
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below elaborates more on this assumption and the non-linearity of transaction costs. To our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study on dynamic and non-convex transaction costs in the 
land rental markets literature within SSA that uses nationally representative household panel 
data, with a focus on land rental markets dominated by short-term and fixed land rental 
contracts.  
We use the farm household model and the theory of dynamic non-linear transaction costs in 
the land rental markets (Holden et al., 2007; Holden et al., 2010). We estimate our results using 
the dynamic random effects probit and Tobit models (Wooldridge, 2010). With the dynamic 
models, we use the initial and lagged participation in the land rental markets to assess the 
specified hypotheses. In line with Wooldridge (2010), the initial participation dependent 
variable should be important for controlling the unobservable factors that may influence entry 
in the market including an initial investment in networks of information, trust and reputation. 
Furthermore, we evaluate the non-linearity of transaction costs based on the extent of 
participation in land rental markets with respect to owned land given in hectares (ha), observed 
from the tenant household side.  
We have organised the rest of the paper as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses section. This is followed by a section on estimation method and 
data. After describing the data, we present the descriptive statistics, results and discussion 
sections before concluding the paper. 
2. Theoretical model and hypotheses 
Fundamentally, under a fixed-rent contract, a potential landlord and a potential tenant will have 
to search for a potential partner for the preferred period. Imperfect information contributes to 
the initial search costs for the matching of potential landlords and tenants. Social networks may 
help to reduce these search costs and facilitate matchmaking in the market. At an early stage, 
when the market is thin, such costs may still be high. After finding a potential partner, a contract 
must be negotiated and agreed upon by both parties. The minimum conditions for a fixed rent 
contract are the duration of the contract and payment period. Thus, the theoretical model 
applied in this paper integrates the farm household model with a dynamic non-linear transaction 
costs model (Holden et al., 2007; Holden et al., 2010). 
We consider a farm household endowed with land (?̅?𝐴) and labour (𝐿𝐿�) and with the potential to 
trade these resources in a market. Focusing on a potential tenant household, such a household 
will aim at maximizing income utility (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌]) from renting in the land and achieving 
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the desired resource use level on own-farm (Holden et al., 2010). Assuming net use of labour 
on the farm and non-linear transaction costs from imperfect factor markets as discussed above, 
equation (1) specify the potential tenant farm household objective function. 
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐿𝐿
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿) − �𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� + 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿 + 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀�] and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0,  𝐿𝐿 > 0      (1) 
From the equation, [𝑌𝑌] is the income function for a potential tenant household and the choice 
variables are renting-in the land (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) and labour (L) use on own-farm. The income is the net 
market equivalent output value from production revenue less expenditure. That is, (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) is the 
output price while 𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿) is the production function where (𝐴𝐴) is the operational farmland that 
is equal to the total owned land (?̅?𝐴) plus rented-in land (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), i.e. [𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖]. The [𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +
η�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖�] is the expenditure function for renting-in the land. That is, (𝜌𝜌) is the land rent that is 
assumed to be linear in the amount of land rented-in and (η) is the non-linear transaction cost 
with respect to rented land among market participants. The theory assumes a linear unit land 
rent considering the initial fixed cost expected of any participant upon entry into the market 
while assuming that different individuals face varying non-linear transaction costs depending 
on the amount of land rented-in across space. On net labour use (𝐿𝐿), the parameter (𝜔𝜔) is for 
the market wage rate or shadow wage rate at the household level, and the (𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿) is a labour cost 
function aggregated at the household level. This net labour use-value implicitly captures both 
labour time used for work and leisure for all labour available at the household level (Singh et 
al., 1986). Furthermore, the function (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀) is for expenditure on other market inputs (M) with 
(𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚) as the market input price. 
Based on the income utility maximisation function and using the duality theory, we focus on 
the twice differentiable quasi-convex income function to assess the non-linearity in the 
transaction costs. When we normalise to one the output price (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) and the other market input 
price (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚), the first-order condition (FOC) from equation (1) with respect to rented-in land 





− 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
≤ 0                   ⊥         𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0        (2) 
i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
= 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
    if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 0    or   𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
< 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
  if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0    
From equation (2), the potential tenant will only trade if the marginal revenue from rented-in 
land � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
� is greater or equal to the marginal cost of renting-in land �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�, and will not 
trade if otherwise. To assess the non-linearity of the transaction costs in the land rental markets, 
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�. That is, the extent 




hence resulting in a local maximum and not a global maximum solution (Carter & Yao, 2002). 
 
Bliss and Stern (1982) indicated that in a well-functioning land rental market, the coefficient 
on own land is equal to minus one (-1) indicating linear costs. To assess such linearity in land 
rental market costs, we conduct a comparative analysis of the change in rented-in land (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) 














�  or simply given as �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� based on the demand 
functions estimated from the FOC in equation (2). This implies that the rate of market 
adjustment at household level will only be linear �𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
= −1� if the varying transaction costs 
are equal to zero (𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0). However, from the SOCs, the varying transaction costs are not 




> −1  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 �𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
< −1�� with increasing (decreasing) marginal change in varying 
transaction costs in absolute values. This results in non-linear and non-convex transaction costs 
across space. We have presented the detailed farm household model and detailed comparative 
statics in Appendix A.   
Considering that the discussed farm household model is a static decision across space, our 
theoretical frameworks further apply the dynamic transaction cost model for tenant households 
(Holden et al., 2007). Equation (3) specifies the intertemporal decision to rent-in land among 
tenant households.   






𝜍𝜍 ��    (3) 
The model indicates that amount of land rented-in (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) by household j at time t is an aggregate 
of accessed land from one or several landlord households (ℛ), given as ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ℛℛ [. ]. Access to 
rented land is further a function of transaction costs (c) which include an initial fixed cost (𝑐𝑐0) 
and a varying variable cost (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ℛ). The variable cost is a function of both observable and 
unobservable factors. These factors include the tenant household endowments of land (?̅?𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) and 





−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑). The previous participation variable captures both the initial entry and 
lagged participation in the land rental market over time. Lastly, the model captures the dynamic 
effect of the policy mix (∫ 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
−Γ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) that influences transaction costs in the rental market over 
time. This model specification is conditional on household and community characteristics 
(𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑
𝜍𝜍 ). Therefore, with this theoretical framework we hypothesize that;  
H1. The entry of potential tenants into the land rental markets is rationed.  
The initial search and negotiation costs should create a barrier to entry in the land rental markets 
from information asymmetry and such entry costs are higher when land rental markets are 
thinner like in Malawi.  
H2. The extent of participation by tenants in the land rental markets increases with earlier 
participation and such participation is state-dependent.  
Experience in land rental market should help in later participation decisions due to non-convex 
costs related to accessing relevant market information based on established networks of trust 
and reputation from previous years.  
H3. The likelihood of entry into the land rental market declines with owned land size.  
Farm households with more owned land are less likely to be potential tenants, especially in 
hand-hoe based farming systems like in Malawi where we assume no economies of scale.  
H4. High non-linear transaction costs characterise the extent of participation by tenant 
households if the coefficient on owned land is close to 0. 
In a well-functioning land rental markets with linear transaction costs, the coefficient on owned 
land is inverse and equal to minus one (-1).  
3. Estimation method and data   
To assess our hypotheses, we estimate the reduced form of the dynamic household participation 
decision �𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� model as specified in equation (4). 
𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾?̅?𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       (4) 
The variable (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) is for entry and extent of participation in the land rental market for household 
j and at time t. We assess the extent of market participation using the amount of rented land in 
hectares (ha) at the household level. Our parameters of interest in equation (4) are (𝜌𝜌) for 
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lagged participation variables and (𝛾𝛾) for the land endowment. The parameter (𝜋𝜋) is for labour 
endowment while (𝛽𝛽) is for household and community characteristics. The variable (𝜏𝜏) is for 
yearly dummies that partially control for dynamic policy mix. The function (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) captures 
the additive error term where (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) is for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and (𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) is 
the idiosyncratic error that is independent and identically distributed.  
From equation (4), the variable (?̅?𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) is for owned farmland area in hectare (ha) for household 
j and at time t. Owned farmland includes inherited land through customary systems or 
government distribution and purchases. We, therefore, use this definition of owned farmland 
area to assess participation decisions with respect to the land endowment. The variable 
excludes borrowed land, farmland for those on wage contract in estate farms providing tenant 
labour, encroached and rented-in land. These categories mainly imply operational farmland 
without secure tenure rights (Holden et al., 2013). We consider households accessing land from 
only the excluded sources to be landless in the ownership sense. In our context, landless 
households only hold an endogenous user right that does not include transfer rights or other 
more land tenure secure rights (Holden et al., 2013). Thus, our model includes a dummy for 
landless households to control for operational farmland but not the extent of owned land that 
we have already specified.  
Furthermore, we include the ratio of owned farmland to labour units2 (total adult equivalent 
labour units). Considering the dominant use of a hand hoe in Malawi that requires more human 
strength (Takane, 2008), we assume that more adult labour and particularly male labour may 
be associated with a higher demand for agricultural land. Hence, we also control for the share 
of male labour at the household level. Additionally, our model controls for other household 
and community characteristics. These include sex, age and education of the household head; 
consumer to worker ratio; and both the current and one-year lag Total Livestock Units (TLU) 
per labour unit ratio. We consider livestock to be an indicator of wealth that households can 
easily liquidate to support production and labour use decisions. At the community level, we 
include the distance to urban centres with a population of more than 20,000 people for 
proximity to urban areas.  
 
2 We calculated the labour units for household members present in the house for at least a month and excluded 
members who were away for 12 months. 
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To estimate equation (4), we use dynamic panel data models with binary and censored response 
variables (Wooldridge, 2010). Assuming data observation is from t=0 so that (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) is the first 
observation of outcome (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), for t=1, …., T, the dynamic random effects probit model can be 
specified as;  
𝑃𝑃�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗, 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� =  Φ(𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)         (5) 
Where (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) is the dependent variable and the subscript (𝑑𝑑 − 𝑛𝑛) is for the previous survey round 
denoted as (n). The (𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗) is a vector of explanatory variables and Φ is for a standard normal 
distribution function with the probability of success at time t and also the outcome from the 
previous (𝑑𝑑 − 𝑛𝑛) period. The (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) is for the unobserved heterogeneity. With this specification, 
one can test 𝐻𝐻0:𝜌𝜌 = 0 to assess initial conditions and state dependency in the model, once we 
control for 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗. The model assumes (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) to be additive and given as 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 = 𝜓𝜓 + 𝛼𝛼0𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼1 +
𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗. Where 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗~𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2) and independent of (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗). The (𝜓𝜓) is a constant. This 
structure allows the use of a likelihood function similar to random effect probit model if we 
add (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) and (zj) to the list of explanatory variables, and have 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �1, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗�. By 
doing so, we control for the unobserved effects of (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) and the initial household conditions 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  
On the extent of participation, Wooldridge (2010) specifies the dynamic random effects Tobit 
model as indicated in equation (6). 
𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�0, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗�. For all t =1, ..., T and j=1,2,..,N households.  (6) 
The idiosyncratic error term is 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 …𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 , 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�~𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2). Unlike the probit, the 
lagged outcome variable in Tobit model depends on whether (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) is equal to or greater than 
zero. Hence (𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ) can be replaced with 𝜉𝜉𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛)𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 . Where (𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛) is binary 
and equal to one if 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 0 and zero otherwise. Like the probit, this reduces the list of 
explanatory variables to 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑−𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 , 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗�. With these model specifications, one can 
compute the conditional or unconditional partial average effects similar to the probit and Tobit 
models but only with balanced panel data (Wooldridge, 2010).  
For our analysis, we constructed a three-year balanced panel data of 1,480 households from the 
1,619 households in the 2010 baseline survey round. We used the Malawi Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016. By construction, we 
observed an 8.6 percent attrition rate that we used to test for attrition bias. We estimated the 
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inverse mills ratio with a probit model presented in Appendix B, Table B1, which we included 
in our estimations. We did not observe an attrition bias effect in our analysis and hence we 
present the results that exclude the inverse mills ratio. Results with inverse mills ratio are 
available in Appendix B, Table B4 for comparison. Overall, our balanced data accounted for 
changes in household head over time, parcel-level information like sources of land, and parcel 
area in hectares (ha) measured using a global positioning system (GPS). As per the dynamic 
random effects model, we used the entry and extent of participation in the 2010 survey round 
as the initial year. At the same time, we used the 2010 participation as lagged participation 
variable in 2013, and the participation decision in 2013 as lagged participation variable in 2016 
survey round.  
4. Descriptive Statistics  
From Table 1, the percent of households that participated in the land rental markets were 7.3, 
10.1 and 8.9 for 2010, 2013 and 2016 survey rounds, respectively. The table shows that owned 
and operational farmland per household in our sample was on average 0.53 ha across the years. 
Among tenant households, the average rented-in land was 0.5 ha with the land endowment of 
0.33 ha that is significantly lower than 0.52 ha owned land among non-tenant households. The 
percent of landless households among the tenant households was 48 percent, which was 
significantly higher than the 30 percent landless households among the non-tenant households. 
These statistics show that the rental market possibly transfers land towards landless and land-
poor households although we do not know how land-rich those renting out this land are. A 
possible extension of the paper would be to assess both the landlords and tenants using 
longitudinal data if available.  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Average values all survey rounds 






(1 vs. 2) 
Participation in the land rental market     
Initial year (2010) – (percent) 7.3    
Subsequent year (2013)– (percent)  10.1    
Subsequent year (2016) – (percent) 8.9    
Initial year (2010) rented-in land     
     mean (median) in ha 0.03 (0.00) 0.45 (0.36)   
Subsequent years rented-in land     
   mean (median) in ha 0.05 (0.00) 0.50 (0.36)   
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Land area     
Owned farmland      
     mean (median) in ha 0.50 (0.35)  0.33 (0.11) 0.52 (0.36) **** 
Operational farmland      
     mean (median) in ha 0.55 (0.40) 0.82 (0.61) 0.53 (0.37) **** 
Landless/zero own farmland (percent) 31.53 48.07 29.94 **** 
Labour     
Own farmland to labour ratio (mean) 
(ha/adult equiv. labour unit) 
0.18 0.10 0.18 **** 
Share of male labour (mean) 40.67 41.04 40.63  
Control Variables     
Sex of HH head (%Females) 23.65 14.65 24.51 **** 
Age of HH head (mean –years) 45 42 45 *** 
Education of HH head (mean –years) 6.15 7.11 6.06 **** 
Household size to labour ratio (mean 
No. of persons/adult equiv. labour unit) 
1.66 1.69 1.66  
Total Livestock Units (TLU) to labour 
ratio (mean TLU No./ labour unit) 
0.11 0.13 0.11  
One-year lag TLU  0.07 0.09 0.07  
Distance to urban center (mean km) 28.38 30.89 28.14 *** 
N (Panel households) 4440 (1480) 389 4051  
Land rental market participation in the initial year and subsequent years  
 2013 (%) 2016 (%)   
Initial year = 2010 No Yes No Yes Total (N)  
No 93.15 6.85 93.22 6.78 1,372  
Yes 49.07 50.93 63.89 36.11 110  
Total (N) 1,331 149 1,348 132 1,480  
% 89.93 10.07 91.08 8.92 100  
Survey year = 2013 2016 (%)    
No No Yes Total (N)   
Yes 94.9 5.1 1,331   
 57.1 43.0 149   
Total (N) 1,348 132 1,480   
% 91.1 8.9 100   
Note: The t-tests compare the overall differences in the tenant and non-tenant households. The asterisks denote 
levels of significance at **** = p<0.001, *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, and * = p<0.1. 
Table 1 further shows that the tenant households are operating an average of 0.82 ha, which is 
significantly larger than the average operational and owned farmland (0.53 ha) for non-tenant 
households. The data could imply that tenants are non-land resource-rich households (labour 
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and capital), that could manage to increase their operational land size. Ricker‐Gilbert et al. 
(2019) observed a similar distribution in Malawi using one-year matched landlord-tenant data 
in selected districts. On labour endowment, our data show no significant differences in the 
share of male labour between tenant and non-tenant households considered important for hand-
hoe based farming systems like in Malawi. On the contrary, land relative to the labour 
endowment is higher for non-tenant households3. 
Table 1 also shows that tenant households are less likely to be headed by a female and that land 
rental markets are common in rural areas. A tenant household is more likely to be headed by a 
slightly younger person and a household head who is slightly more education than non-tenant 
households. Among the tenants and non-tenant households, there are no significant differences 
in consumer to worker ratio a possible indicator of households needs to be self-sufficient. To 
confirm the short-term and fixed-rent contracts in our data, we observed that almost all 
contracts were for one growing season or one calendar year. Only 4 percent of the households 
combined upfront cash payment with sharecropping contracts across the years and we 
maintained these households in our sample. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the rate of market 
re-entry from the initial baseline year (2010) was 51 percent in 2013 and 36 percent in 2016. 
Those who participated in 2013, 43 percent also participated in 2016 survey round. This shows 
a land rental market with participation from both experienced participants and new entrants 
across the survey years, that is important for the dynamic assessment of the land rental market.   
5. Results and discussion 
Table 2 presents the average partial effects [𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝑿𝑿)] from the dynamic random effects probit 
and Tobit models. Parsimonious models are followed by three models with additional controls 
for each of the probit and Tobit specifications. The first three models (P1 to P3 and T1 to T3) 
include initial participation, lagged participation and resource endowment variables only, while 
the fourth model (P4 and T4) includes all the other household and community control variables. 
Appendix B, Tables B2 and B3 present further details on conditional average partial effects 
[𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝑿𝑿,𝑦𝑦 > 0)] for the dynamic random effects Tobit model and coefficients for the dynamic 
random effects probit and Tobit models, respectively. We chose to focus on the unconditional 
 
3 Since the percent of landless households was not constant over the years, we could not directly drop the landless 




mean partial effects [𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝑿𝑿)] for us to assess participation decisions that include potential 
tenant households in the land rental markets in line with our hypotheses.   
To assess hypothesis one (H1), we evaluate the dynamic random effects probit model results 
presented in Table 2. The hypothesis stated that the entry of potential tenants into the land 
rental markets is rationed. From the table, we note a significant positive effect of initial year 
participation dummy and the lag participation variables, significant at 1 and 10 percent, 
respectively. The average marginal effects show that the initial participation year (2010) 
variable increase the probability of participation in later years by 11 percentage points (model 
P4). The lagged rent-in dummy increase participation by 6.8 percentage points but significant 
at the 10 percent level. The results imply that potential tenant households with experience, after 
getting over the first hurdle of entering into the market, are more likely to re-enter the market. 
This support the theory of non-convex transaction costs in the land rental markets developing 
in Malawi. Fafchamps (2004) indicated that entry into a market and establishing information 
networks is a sunk cost that potential traders must overcome and later use this information for 
future transactions. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis one (H1) and conclude that entry of 
potential tenants into land rental markets is rationed by giving an advantage to participants with 
experience in the market compared to new entrants.    
To assess hypothesis two (H2), we use the unconditional margins for initial and lagged 
participation variables from the Tobit model results. Hypothesis two stated that the extent of 
participation by tenants in the land rental markets increases with earlier participation and such 
participation is state-dependent. From T4 model results, we note that it is only the initial year 
participation variables (entry and extent of participation) that are significant but not the lagged 
participation variables. Considering the initial year variables, the marginal increase in the 
average amount of land area rented-in is 0.02-0.03 ha in model T4. By not observing a 
significant effect of lagged participation variables, our results show that it is mainly the initial 
entry and extent of participation in the market that increases the extent of participation in the 
subsequent years but not necessarily the market participant status in the years after entering the 
market in Malawi. These results confirm the challenge of getting over the first hurdle of entry 
into the market and that participation in subsequent years is a factor of initial market investment 
costs that are non-convex over time. Thus, the results give less support for state-dependent land 
rental markets after participants have entered the market which could imply high and non-linear 





































































































































































   
   
   































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the third hypothesis (H3), we stated that the likelihood of entry into the land rental market 
declines with owned land size. To assess this hypothesis, we refer to the results from the probit 
model P1 presented in Table 2. The results indicate that a one ha increase in own farmland area 
reduces the probability of participation by 3 percentage points. However, given that the average 
farm size is below one hectare in our data, we consider this to be a very small effect. Thus, 
considering the percent of landless households in our sample, when we add the dummy for 
landless households in models P2-P4, we note a significant effect on being landless. By 
construction, the summary statistics showed that almost 32 percent of our sample are landless 
in the land ownership sense.  
Since landless implies zero owned land, we tried to run the analysis without the landless 
dummy in models P2 to P4 to assess the independent effect of owned land. With this 
specification, the owned land variable was still not significant in all P2 to P4 models, hence 
supporting the need to separately assess the landless households. From the results, landless 
households have a 2-4 percentage point higher likelihood of accessing land in the rental market 
than households who own land. Our results imply that the rental market transfers land to 
landless households to some extent or that the landless households (in the ownership sense) are 
more willing to participate than those with some owned land.  
Our observations concur with the study of Baland et al. (2007) in Uganda, who observed that 
landless households were able to purchase more land than those with initial land inheritance. 
Furthermore, the community members in Uganda were more willing to trade land to those with 
a low probability of inheriting the land, a sign of social-network based exchange that reduces 
transaction costs. Thus, our results only provide weak support for hypothesis three (H3) since 
owning land is not significant but being landless in the ownership sense. We proceed to inspect 
hypothesis four (H4) on the extent of market allocation (amount of land rented-in per 
household) using the dynamic Tobit models.  
In H4 we stated that high non-linear transaction costs characterise the extent of participation 
by tenant households if the coefficient on owned land is close to 0. To assess this hypothesis, 
we compared the Tobit model results from Table 2 (unconditional margins) and Appendix B- 
Table B3 (conditional margins). From Table 2, the unconditional average partial effects of both 
owned farmland and the landless dummy are close to zero (0.01) while significantly different 
from zero. Contrasting these results with the conditional marginal effects, we note a significant 




margins) for landless households. The small changes in land area rented-in from both the 
conditional and unconditional marginal effects indicate high non-linear transaction costs, even 
for households already participating in the market. Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis four 
(H4) which implies the inefficient allocation of land rental markets in Malawi despite dynamic 
non-convex transaction costs.  
6. Conclusion    
Land markets, and more so land rental markets with short-term and fixed-rent contracts are 
developing in many countries across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These markets are developing 
in a way that is facilitating the reallocation of productive resources among farm households 
faced with market imperfections. Theory of factor market indicates that upon entry, market 
participants in SSA invest in information, trust and reputation networks that lead to non-linear 
and dynamic non-convex transaction costs across space and over time. Where non-convex 
transaction costs imply marginally decreasing costs over time from repeated engagements. 
Participants invest in such networks if market information and contract formulation costs are 
high and state-dependent on the previous status of market participants upon entry into the 
market.  
Despite the theory of transaction costs in factor markets within SSA, the extent to which such 
costs characterise or restrict participation in the land rental markets that are developing in this 
region remains an empirical question. In this paper, we contributed to this literature by 
assessing the extent to which non-linear and non-convex transaction costs ration potential 
tenants’ entry into the land rental markets and whether the extent of participation is state-
dependent on previous engagements in the market. We used a nationally representative 
balanced panel data, constructed from the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS) conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016.  
Our study revealed high non-linear transaction costs in the land rental markets developing in 
Malawi, an indicator of a thin land market that has a long way to go before it can ensure 
allocative efficiency. That is, non-linear transaction costs continue to constrain land-use 
efficiency and hinder efficient resource recombination across farms. However, the problem is 
likely to reduce over time as overcoming the first hurdle of entering the market reduces 
transaction costs and improves access to rented land despite the dominance of short-term and 
fixed-rent contracts. That is, potential landlords and tenants who have entered the markets are 




in the market. Thus, policies that can reduce entry barriers associated with information 
asymmetry will be important for improving the allocative efficiency of land rental markets in 
Malawi. Use of low costs strategies that disseminate land market information at the community 
level can be relevant in improving access to rented land, especially for land constrained 
households. 
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Non-convex transaction costs and land rental market participation in Malawi 
Appendix A 
A farm household and land rental market transaction costs model 
Assuming a farm household endowed with land (?̅?𝐴) and labour (𝐿𝐿�) has the potential to trade 
these resources to achieve desired levels of resource use on the farm. Such a household would 
have the ability to either rent-in or out land or else hire-in or out labour resources in short to 
medium term. The household intermediate resource use functions would be 𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
and 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗. Where 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿 is the level of land and labour used on the farm, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is the amount of land and labour rented or hired in, while 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 and 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 is the amount of land 
and labour rented or hired out, respectively. The ?̅?𝐴 is for all pieces of the land area owned by 
the household and 𝐿𝐿� is the sum of time labour used for work (𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢) and for leisure (𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒) given as 
[𝐿𝐿� = 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢 +  𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒]. Following Singh et al. (1986), the decision to trade resources in the market 
implicitly captures the time used for work and leisure at the household level. Furthermore, total 
labour endowment is equal to the total number of household individuals in adult equivalent, 
that assign total time to work and leisure (Singh et al., 1986). Thus, the intermediate land and 
labour resource use function will hold if;  
(i)    𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 0 (ii) 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 = 0  for renting or hiring in 
(iii)  𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 > 0 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0   (iv) 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 > 0 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 0   for renting or hiring out 
(v)  𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 0 =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖     (vi) 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 = 0 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖    for not participating   
Following Singh et al. (1986), the problem for such a farm household is to maximise income 
[𝑌𝑌] utility generated from using these resources. The utility function is given as 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌], 
where the function is a twice differential quasi concave function.  Assuming a perfect market 
with linear market costs, equation (i) specifies the income utility function. 
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜,𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 − 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀]       (i) 
and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0  
Where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 are the decision variables for renting or hiring in and out of land and labour, 
as discussed above. The [Y] is the household income function that is twice differentiable and 
quasi-convex. 
From equation (i), the (𝜌𝜌) is the land rent or land price, and (𝜔𝜔) is the wage rate in the labour 




that is also a function of land (𝐴𝐴) and labour (𝐿𝐿) use on own farm. The (𝑀𝑀) is for other market 
input with (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚)  as the input market price. Thus, the income function [Y] is the net market 
equivalent output value from production revenue less expenditure. The income function is 
assumed to be equivalent to the consumption goods acquired by the household either through 
their farm production or markets (Singh et al., 1986). The basic assumption in equation (i) is 
that households can freely trade in the land, labour and all other markets (like credit and other 
inputs) and that markets work perfectly without constraining the household decision to trade.  
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) indicated that the immobility of land, the incentive and 
moral hazard problems in labour market results in high labour transaction costs from 
negotiating and monitoring contracts while the long gestation period and poor collateral 
suitability of agriculture sector limit access to credit and capital. This result in imperfect land, 
labour and credit markets, characterised by market fragmentation; information asymmetry and 
enforcement problems (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 
2010). Such transaction costs may restrict potential households from participating in the land 
or labour markets.  
For simplicity, we assume away liquidity constraints related to credit and output markets 
because of delayed output in agriculture and the associated production and price risks in outputs 
markets (Carter & Yao, 2002). The agricultural output may also depend on individual 
household risk preferences and crop choices (Holden & Quiggin, 2016). Thus, we normalise 
to one the output (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) and input (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚)  prices for all goods, hence we dropped them going 
forward. With imperfect markets that lead non-linear transaction costs, the income utility 
function [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌)] would be; 
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜,𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿) − {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)} − {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿 − 𝜑𝜑(𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)}] (ii) 
and  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 
In equation (ii), the land rent (𝜌𝜌) and the wage rate (𝜔𝜔) are assumed to be linear in the amount 
of land rented-in while having non-linear transaction cost with respect to land and labour. The 
theory assumes a linear constant land rent or wage rate considering the initial fixed cost 
expected of any participant upon entry into the market while assuming that different individuals 
face varying non-linear transaction costs depending on the amount of resources traded in the 
market. Thus, the parameters (η), (𝜃𝜃), (𝜏𝜏)  and (𝜑𝜑) reflect varying non-linear transaction costs 




For the transaction costs, we assume that the level of varying transaction costs for those renting-
in land or hiring-in labour to be different from those renting-out land or hiring-out labour, 
respectively because of differences in market supply and demand functions. We further assume 
these costs to be higher for those renting-in land or hiring-in labour because households 
demanding land are more likely to incur higher search costs than those supplying the land 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986). Thus, the new variables compared to equation (i) are (𝜂𝜂) 
and (θ) for transaction costs when renting-in or out the land while the (𝜏𝜏) and (φ) are for 
transaction costs for hiring in and out labour, respectively. Where (𝜂𝜂) > (θ) and (𝜏𝜏) > (𝜑𝜑) 
because of differences in supply and demand functions. All other variables remain as above. 
Thus, equation (ii) indicates that a household renting-in land will incur a cost, given as the sum 
of land rent plus transaction costs as a function of area rented-in. For households renting out 
land, they will gain land rent less transaction costs that are a function of land area transacted in 
the market. These conditions also apply to the labour market.  
So far in the model, we have looked at joint land and labour market decisions for a farm 
household. However, the availability or seasonality of agricultural labour markets throughout 
the production season implies that households might sequence their decisions, starting with 
land trade decision at the start of the production season and later make labour market decisions 
within the season. Based on this assumption, we hold the household decision to trade labour 
constant and focus on land rental decisions relative to labour endowment. We abstract from the 
fact that agricultural land rental market is spatially fragmented into many poorly integrated 
markets. On the one hand, spatial isolation and varying transportation distances determine 
linear land rent while information asymmetry and market fragmentation imply varying non-
linear transaction costs. Thus, holding the labour decisions constant, the farm household 
objective function becomes;   
Max
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜,𝐿𝐿
𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑞𝑞(?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝐿𝐿) − {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + η(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)} + {𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗)} − 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿]                      (iii) 
and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿 > 0 
The 𝑞𝑞�?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝐿𝐿� is a production function where �𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 � for land resource use 
and L is the net labour use (𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗) on the farm. Recall that the (𝐿𝐿�) includes time spent 
working and for leisure. Thus the (𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿) is a cost function in the labour market, and 𝜔𝜔 is the 
market wage rate or shadow wage rate for non-traded labour. All other variables are the same 




Using duality theory and taking the derivatives of twice differential quasi-convex income 







− 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
≤ 0                   ⊥         𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0       (iv) 
That is, the net return in income with respect to rented-in land � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
� is equal to the marginal 
change in revenue on land rented in � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 � less land rent (𝜌𝜌) and marginal change in transaction 
costs with respect to rented-in land � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�, which is non-linear. Using the complementary slack 
conditions, we derive the optimal conditions for renting land as specified in equation (v). 
 i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
= 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
    if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 0    or   𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
< 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
  if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0      (v) 
Equation (v) shows that a household renting-in the land will maximise income if the marginal 
revenue from rented-in land � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
� is greater or equal to the marginal cost of renting-in land 
�𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�. Secondly, rented-in land will be zero if the marginal revenue is less than the marginal 
cost of renting-in land.  





+ 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
≤ 0                   ⊥         𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0                (vi) 
Like in equation (iv), the non-linear transaction costs are not constant, and the marginal change 
in equation (vi) depends on the land area rented out. Solving equation (vi) and using the 
complementary slack conditions, equation (vii) derives the optimal conditions for renting out 
land as;  






≥ 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
                (vii) 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
= 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
    if 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 > 0    or  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
> 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
   if 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 0  
Equation (vii) indicates that households will only rent out land if the marginal benefit on land 
to be rented out � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
� is less or equal to net return �𝜌𝜌 − 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
� and that they will not rent out land 
if marginal benefit on land to be rented out is greater than the net return.  
Net farm labour use 









  i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
= 𝜔𝜔    if 𝐿𝐿 > 0      
The optimal labour conditions imply that the marginal revenue with respect to labour should 
be greater or equal to the market or shadow wage rate.  
Non-participating households  
Based on the FOCs in equations (v) and (vii), the optimal conditions for non-participating 
household or the shadow value with respect to the land endowment is given in equation (ix).  




� < 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
                  (ix) 
Equation (ix) indicates that non-participating households consider their shadow value to land 
to be greater than the net return from renting out the land and at the same time, less than the 
marginal cost of renting-in land. Hence, they fall within a threshold. Table 1 gives a summary 
of the optimal conditions for participating in the land markets.  
Table A1: Summary of household optimal decisions in the land markets    
 Land rental market 
 
Net buyer 
�𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊 > 𝟎𝟎� 
Non-participant 
�𝑨𝑨𝟎𝟎 = 𝟎𝟎 = 𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊� 
Net seller 
(𝑨𝑨𝒐𝒐 > 𝟎𝟎) 
Net farm labour use 
(𝑳𝑳 > 𝟎𝟎) 
Land poor 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
Land sufficient 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 < 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 < 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
Land rich 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 
 
To further assess if these conditions hold, we review the second-order conditions (SOC) and 
the associated Hessian matrix as sufficient conditions.  
Using equations (iv) and (vi), we derive the SOCs as follows; 










≤ 0           or  𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
=  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0           (x) 










 ≤ 0       or 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
= 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 ≤ 0               (xi)   











If transaction costs are linear, the SOCs would be 𝜕𝜕
2𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2
≤ 0 or 𝜕𝜕
2𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜2
≤ 0 (as expected). However, 













That is, the extent of resource trade adjustment depends on the level of varying non-linear 
transactions costs. Equations (xiii) and (xiv) presents a 2 by 2 Hessian matrix and its 
determinant for assessing the convexity of these transaction costs.  
 [𝐻𝐻] = �𝑓𝑓11 𝑓𝑓12𝑓𝑓21 𝑓𝑓22
�  ⟹ �
𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 −𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜




� ≥ 0               (xiii)      
 |𝐻𝐻| = �𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖��𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0� ≥ (𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)
2                (xiv) 
The |𝐻𝐻| implies that, depending on the extent of transaction costs, the Hessian matrix may not 
satisfy the sufficient conditions for a global maximum solution. Thus, to understand this 
convexity in transaction costs, we use the comparative statics. We assess that the marginal 
varying transaction costs are non-linear, that is  𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
≠ −1 and  𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
≠ 1 following Bliss and 
Stern (1982). 
Comparative statics  
Using Kuhn-Tucker conditions and solving the FOCs, one can determine the demand functions 
that we denote as 𝐴𝐴∗(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌, 𝐿𝐿�, ?̅?𝐴) for land and 𝐿𝐿∗(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌, 𝐿𝐿�, ?̅?𝐴) for labour, considering that we 




−1 and  𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
= 1. Assuming an interior solution for households renting in or out land (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 >
























� ⟹ −�𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗� = �
0 −1 −𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿� −𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴�







Thus, the changes in land rental markets with respect to the endowment will be; 

























Assuming the shadow return to own land is equal to rented-in land values, then 
  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and   𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖                (xvi) 
Equation (xvi) indicates that the transaction costs will be equal to -1 iff 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0 and that rate 




−1 if increasing marginal variable transaction costs or 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
< −1 if decreasing marginal 
variable transaction costs. 


















2           (xvii)   
If the shadow return to own land is equal to net return to renting out land, then 
  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜  and  𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0            (xviii) 
Where the solution is equal to 1 iff 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 = 0. Thus, the rate of market adjustment depends on 
𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜?̅?𝐴 = 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴0𝐴𝐴0 and the change will be either 
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
> 1 if increasing marginal variable 
transaction costs or 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝐴
< 1 if decreasing marginal variable transaction costs.  
Overall, the model implies that land market transaction costs can increase to ration out potential 
participants or decrease to promote participation, subject to factors that influence transaction 
costs and access to information. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Probit model for attrition bias from 2010 baseline year 
 Attrition Probit Model 
VARIABLES Coefficient Robust standard error 
Sex of HH head (1=female) -0.176 0.15 
Age of HH head (years) -0.004 0.00 
Household size -0.120**** 0.03 
Total Livestock Units (TLU) -0.131 0.15 
One-year lag TLU -0.106 0.23 
Reside (1= urban) 1.092**** 0.12 
Population density -0.313**** 0.05 
Constant 0.118 0.22 
LR Chi (7) 134.49  
Prob > chi2 0.000  
Observations 1,619   
Note: The attrition: 1= dropout from 2010 and 0 otherwise. The asterisks show **** = p<0.001, *** = p<0.01, 
**= p<0.05, *= p<0.1 
 
Table B2: Dynamic random-effects Tobit models for renting-in land – conditional 
average partial effects [𝑬𝑬(𝒚𝒚|𝑿𝑿,𝒚𝒚 > 𝟎𝟎)] 
VARIABLES T1-Margins  T2-Margins T3-Margins T4-Margins 
Initial year (2010) rent-in dummy 0.071** 0.071** 0.073** 0.054** 
              (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Lag rent-in dummy  0.044 0.042 0.039 0.036 
    (previous survey round) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Initial year (2010) rent-in land (ha) 0.099** 0.103** 0.108** 0.077* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Lag total rent-in land (ha) 0.057 0.051 0.045 0.050 
   (previous survey round) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Own farmland (ha) -0.023*** -0.010 0.012 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 




  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Own farmland to labour ratio    -0.081* -0.094** 
    (ha/adult equiv. labour unit)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Share of male labour    0.019 -0.002 
       (0.02) (0.03) 
Share of purchased own farmland    -0.020 -0.009 
   (0.03) (0.02) 
Sex of HH head (1=female)    -0.039*** 
    (0.01) 
Age of HH head (years)    -0.001 
    (0.00) 
Education of HH head (years)    0.000 
    (0.00) 
Household size to labour ratio     0.018* 
 (No. of persons/adult equiv. labour unit)    (0.01) 
Total Livestock Units (TLU) to labour     0.005 
ratio (TLU No./ adult equiv. labour unit)    (0.01) 
One-year lag TLU to labour ratio    0.005 
 (lag TLU No./ adult equiv. labour unit)    (0.01) 
Distance to urban centers (km)    0.002**** 
    (0.00) 
Regional dummy (Compared to Central)     
Northern region    -0.109**** 
    (0.02) 
Southern region    -0.041**** 
    (0.01) 
Year 2016 -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 
Number of Panel households 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 
Note: Normal standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks denote levels of significance at **** = p<0.001, *** 
= p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, and * = p<0.1. The table omitted the constant, sigma_u, sigma_e and number of censored 























































































































   
   
   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Can rainfall shocks enhance access to rented land? Evidence from Malawi 
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Abstract 
This study investigates the spatial downside and upside rainfall shock effects on tenant 
household renting behavior and access to rented land in the short-term and medium-term. We 
model the tenant households’ demand decisions within the state-contingent framework with 
renting-in of land as a risky input choice. Our data is a three-year balanced panel constructed 
from the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Surveys, combined with the corresponding 
seasonal district-wise rainfall shock data across regional agro-ecological zones in Malawi. 
Using the correlated and dynamic random effects panel probit and Tobit models that control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, spatial heterogeneities were revealed. In the Central Region of 
Malawi, where land rental markets are most active, the one-year and two-year lagged downside 
rainfall shocks help tenant households to access land in the short-term and medium-term after 
a rainfall shock. For the more land constrained Southern Region of Malawi, with less 
prevalence of land rental markets, the two-year lagged downside rainfall shock is associated 
with less access to rented land. The results reveal surprising spatial variations that call for 
regional specific market-oriented, market-assisted or non-market policy strategies that can 
improve access to land amidst recurring rainfall shocks across space and over time. 
Keywords: Rainfall shocks; Land rental markets; State-contingent framework; Malawi.  







1. Introduction  
The rainfall variations associated with climate change continue to expose farm households to 
production and consumption shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa (Asfaw et al., 2019; IPCC, 2014). 
The upside and downside variations that happen within and across production seasons are 
constantly affecting the decisions of farm households in this region. These are farm households 
that mainly depend on rainfed production while having poor access to weather-related 
information (Cooper et al., 2008). Such households also pursue food self-sufficiency objectives 
considering market imperfections, limited access to credit and insurance, limited off-farm 
opportunities and the growing land scarcity challenges in the region (Dercon, 2002; Holden et 
al., 2010; Jayne et al., 2014).  
When confronted with rainfall-related shocks, literature shows that the farm households 
manage or cope with such shocks using different agricultural and non-agricultural strategies 
that are evolving (Alobo Loison, 2015; Asfaw et al., 2019; Cooper et al., 2008; Dercon, 2002). 
The choice of the strategy, combination and recombination of these strategies at the household 
level is mainly a function of resource endowments (land, labour and assets), political history 
and institutions that facilitate access and use of these resources (Winters et al., 2009). One such 
institution is a market, both for land and non-land factors of production.  
With non-missing land markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), farm households are responding 
to the challenge of access and use of productive resources by participating in land rental 
markets developing in this region. The land markets theoretically develop as an efficiency-
enhancing mechanism in the allocation of productive resources, amidst imperfections in the 
non-land factor markets (de Janvry et al., 2002; Holden et al., 2010). Although the literature 
shows that these land markets are thin, spatially dispersed (due to the immobility of land) and 
characterized by high transaction costs, their impact is positive on household income and 
welfare (Holden et al., 2010; Ricker-Gilbert & Chamberlin, 2018; Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). 
Empirical evidence also shows that farm households use these markets as a coping strategy in 
the form of distress land rentals after downside rainfall shocks (Gebregziabher & Holden, 2011; 
Kusunose & Lybbert, 2014).  
Despite literature indicating that farm households are utilizing the land rental markets as a 
coping strategy ex-post the rainfall shocks, the corresponding spatial effect on the uptake of 
the supplied land has not been subject to much research in the land rental market literature. 




effects of recurring rainfall variations or shocks on households’ decisions to rent-in farmland. 
We are only aware of the study by Kusunose and Lybbert (2014) in Morocco that assessed how 
limited access to credit affect who can rent-in or rent-out farmland after a drought year. 
However, the study mainly focused on credit constraints and not the rainfall variations or shock 
effects on tenant households’ renting behavior. Thus, to our knowledge, there is limited 
empirical evidence on how recurring rainfall variations or shocks are influencing the uptake of 
rented land across a heterogeneous group of farmers and over time. If the downside rainfall 
shocks are shifting the supply of land in the rental markets, we consider understanding the 
extent to which tenant households are utilizing these opportunities as a missing link in the land 
rental market literature. Therefore, we assess whether lagged rainfall shocks are kick-starting 
the land rental markets by shifting supply and hence affecting access to rented land across 
different agro-ecological zones. 
In line with Quiggin and Chambers (2006) the decision to rent-in the land is state-contingent 
but also a risky input choice because tenant households make such a decision and cover costs 
before the state of nature is revealed. This implies that previous rainfall shocks that shift supply 
should be important for tenant household decisions in the subsequent years. With a production 
shock, farm households can experience the associated effect in the immediate future or beyond 
a single production season. Thus, the rainfall shocks that shift the supply of rented land could 
also result in both immediate and lasting effects beyond one production season across different 
agro-ecological zones.  
Considering that land rental markets that are developing in SSA are thin and spatially dispersed, 
access to market information after the shocks should be key for participating in the subsequent 
years. Fafchamps (2004) indicated that overcoming the first hurdle of entering a factor market 
in SSA increases the likelihood of re-entering the market. This is mainly from reduced access 
to market information and contract formulation costs that are based on trust and reputation. 
Following this literature, we use the previous participation0F 1 in the land rental markets to control 
for transaction costs related to accessing market information or contract formulation. That is, 
tenant households with experience in the market should face relatively lower transaction costs 
 
1 Our analysis uses participation in the reference production season for each survey rounds that have a three-year 
production season gaps between the three survey rounds. We did not use the one-year lag participation variables 
as this was not observed in the data. However, the observed participation in the previous survey round should 




compared to new entrants (Gebru et al., 2019; Kusunose & Lybbert, 2014). This is also a 
possible entry barrier that we should control for when assessing the long-term lagged rainfall 
shock effects in the land rental markets. To our knowledge, our study is the first to present such 
an empirical understanding of the spatial effects of lagged rainfall shocks on uptake of rented 
land with a dynamic analysis that controls for transaction costs. We control for these transaction 
costs as they may ration participation in the markets or influence non-market response 
strategies to rainfall shocks among farm households. Such empirical evidence should be key 
for initiating policy discussions on land rental markets developing in SSA.  
Our analysis uses rainfall data combined with household balanced panel data from Malawi, a 
country in SSA. The household data is from the Malawi Living Standards Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016 from which we constructed a three-year 
balanced panel. The data from Malawi is suitable for this context because the country is an 
agricultural-based economy that heavily depends on a unimodal rainfall pattern for income and 
food security (Government of Malawi, 2016b). The diversity of agro-ecological zones across 
the three regions of the country also provide spatial variations in rainfall patterns (see Appendix 
A, Figure A2) that are important for understanding the associated effects on land rental markets 
developing in this country. Over the last two decades, the country has been experiencing not 
only frequent droughts but also floods that vary across the three regions of the country 
(Government of Malawi, 2016a; Katengeza et al., 2018). Furthermore, land rental markets are 
evolving as land scarcity challenges increase within and across regions in Malawi (Chamberlin 
& Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; Chinsinga, 2011; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2014).  
We measure rainfall shock as the district-level deviation of the total amount of rainfall observed 
in the early to mid-season periods (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) from their 10-year period1F 2 mean (?̅?𝑥) values, i.e. (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −
?̅?𝑥). See the maps of Malawi in Appendix A, Figures A1 and A2 for the regional and district 
boundaries plus weather stations across the country. The district-level deviation variable is an 
indicator of rainfall shocks that are covariate and affect many households at the same time 
within the district. The variable captures the within-region and not the within-district rainfall 
shock effects, hence it may not capture all the relevant rainfall variations or shocks at the 
household level. However, such district level and the within-region variations should capture 
 
2 We generated the 10-year mean by calculating the average for the seasonal variations for the past 10 years in the 




the spatial farm household heterogeneity that is relevant for assessing the effect of rainfall 
shocks on participation decisions in the land rental markets.  
Our assessment of spatial rainfall shock effects mainly focuses on the early to mid-season 
deviations in each production season. We chose early to mid-season periods based on the fact 
that early-season deviations can affect input use and crop germination while mid-season 
deviations can affect crop development and production compared to the late-season deviations 
that coincide with crop harvesting period (Government of Malawi, 2012). Thus, early to mid-
season deviations should account for previous production shocks that can push other 
households to rent out the land hence offering the opportunity for tenant households to rent-in 
the land in subsequent years. In the Malawi context, we constructed the early-season period to 
correspond to the first three months (October to December) while the mid-season corresponds 
to the next two months (January and February) of the production season. We based this 
categorization on a unimodal rainfall pattern that goes from November to April. We included 
October in the early-season as a preparation month and also the time some areas in the country 
receive early rains but not effective planting rains (Government of Malawi, 2012).  
In addition to assessing the early to mid-season deviations, our analysis split the rainfall 
deviations into downside (absolute negative) and upside (positive) values. The absolute 
downside deviation values should capture the implicit shift in supply reported in the literature 
as a driver of distress rentals among poor landlords (Gebregziabher & Holden, 2011). By 
including the upside deviations, we go beyond only focusing on the downside effect that is 
mostly reported in SSA. Thus, we propose that an increase in either lag downside or upside 
absolute rainfall deviation values, that happens early to mid-season increases entry and extent 
of tenant households’ participation in the land rental markets across space. Our analysis uses 
the household random effects and dynamic random effects estimation methods that control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in household decisions plus unobservable initial market entry 
conditions that may ration participation across space and over time.     
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a conceptual framework 
underlying the recursive state-contingent decision in the land rental market before stating the 
specific hypotheses. We discuss the data and estimation methods in section three and present 
the descriptive statistics in section four. In section five, we present and discuss the results 





2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
A farm household whose objective is to maximize utility based on their beliefs about the 
likelihoods and production outcomes under alternative states of nature make state-contingent 
input decisions accordingly (Quiggin & Chambers, 2006). Farm households make ex-ante 
input decisions before weather conditions are revealed based on their beliefs, expectations, 
preferences and consumption needs that are implicit in such decisions (Dercon & 
Christiaensen, 2011; Quiggin & Chambers, 2006). In an intertemporal setting with sequential 
decisions, households are repeatedly engaged in these decision processes and adjust their 
beliefs based on past experiences about states of nature and their past decisions outcome. 
Households acquire experience that shapes their subjective production risk assessment, input 
choices and consumption decisions, ex-ante and ex-post the production period. Land rental 
markets open an additional adjustment opportunity across farms in terms of balancing land and 
non-land resource use. Overall, the state-contingent framework indicates that household input 
use is decided before the state of nature is revealed to the farmer (Quiggin & Chambers, 2006).  
According to Holden and Quiggin (2017) “any increase in exogenous risk, defined as the 
increase in the probability of a less favourable state of nature like drought or flood, leads to an 
increased share of risk substituting inputs in the vector of non-stochastic input mix for a given 
expected output”. That is, in a state-contingent decision, farm households are more likely to 
allocate non-stochastic inputs like owned land in a way that reduces the production risks 
depending on their endowment and needs. However, renting-in the land is a state-contingent 
but risky decision because households have to invest their wealth in the decision before the 
state of nature is revealed compared to using only owned land. Dercon and Christiaensen 
(2011) further indicated that farm households make these state-contingent and risky input 
decisions based on expected consumption needs as an ex-ante risk management strategy to 
hedge against ex-post consumption shocks. Overall, the state-contingent decisions go beyond 
risk aversion to include risk-reducing mechanisms when the probability of accessing the input 
credit, insurance and consumer credit is low, as experienced in most countries in SSA (Dercon 
& Christiaensen, 2011; Holden & Quiggin, 2017). Figure 1 summarizes the recursive state-




























Figure 1: Recursive household state-contingent decisions for renting-in the land over time. 
In Figure 1, we consider a rural farm household that heavily depends on a varying unimodal 
rainfall pattern, like in Malawi. Such a household is endowed with farmland (?̅?𝐴), labour (𝐿𝐿�) 
and capital (K) factors of production. Markets for land and labour are non-missing but with 
imperfections (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Holden et al., 2010). We assume that land is 
scarce and that there are limited off-farm opportunities except for seasonal casual labour on 
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other farms within the communities (Jayne et al., 2014). Land constrained households may 
rent-in more land to ensure food self-sufficiency, increase income or production utility. We 
also assume that downside and upside rainfall shocks that lead to distress rentals result in 
favourable rental prices for tenant households. However, this effect does not affect transaction 
costs related to market information or contract formulation because of localized and not well-
integrated land rental markets.  
From Figure 1, the shaded arrows define the main pathways in which lag rainfall deviations 
can affect tenant household participation in the land rental markets. The figure shows that the 
initial year or the two-year lagged upside or downside deviations that can affect the household 
consumption needs, can push farm households to cope with such shocks by either renting out 
the land in distress or trading the non-land factors (assets and labour). Thus, in the subsequent 
year (one-year lag), the farm households who are capable of smoothing consumption, and with 
the ability to increase the operational farmland can rent-in the land or increase the amount of 
rented land. Such a decision is state-contingent where crop outcome is known after the state of 
nature is revealed. 
Depending on the crop outcome after the state of nature is revealed in the subsequent year, 
households that are not able to cope with consumption shocks will again engage in either 
renting out the land or trading non-land factors. We hold the non-agricultural sector strategies 
constant due to limited opportunities amongst farm households in rural areas in SSA. Again, 
this allows potential tenants to rent-in the land in the subsequent year (current production 
season), implying the recursive state-contingent decisions that households continue to engage 
in overtime. Apart from the year to year effect, long-term shock effects beyond one production 
season can also push potential tenant households to re-enter the market from earlier 
participation in the markets. This implies that rainfall shocks can have both immediate and 
long-term effects in the land rental markets for tenant households, conditional on the supply. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that; 
H1: One-year lag downside rainfall deviations (early to mid-season) increase entry and extent 
of tenant household participation in land rental markets in the subsequent year. 
H2. One-year lag upside rainfall deviations (early to mid-season) increase entry and extent of 
subsequent year tenant household participation in land rental markets. 
H3. Rainfall shocks trigger more land rental market participation beyond the immediate effect 




households’ over the first hurdle of entering the market, such households are more likely 
to re-enter beyond the immediate effect from gaining the experience in the market.      
3. Data and estimation methods  
Our data is from three rounds of the Malawi Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). 
The survey periods were from (i) March 2010 to March 2011; (ii) April to December 2013; 
and (iii) April 2016 to April 2017. The survey data collection period coincided with the end of 
production period for a unimodal rainfall season in Malawi that starts from November to April. 
Thus, the reference production seasons for each survey round in our data were (i) November 
2009 to April 2010; (ii) November 2012 to April 2013; and (iii) November 2015 to April 20162F 3. 
In 2010, the total number of surveyed households was 1,619 that we used to construct a 
balanced panel of 1,480 households. This represented an 8.6 percent attrition rate that we used 
to test for attrition bias in our results3F 4.  
For the rainfall variables, we used monthly rainfall data (accessed in millimeter) from October 
2006 to April 2017 observed at the district level weather stations across Malawi (Appendix A, 
Figure A2). We sourced the data upon official request to the Department of Climate Change 
and Metrological Services in Malawi (www.metmalawi.gov.mw). In Malawi, the 
administrative boundaries are categorized as national, regional, district and community. In 
total, the country has 28 districts that are grouped into 3 regions (see Figures A1 and A2 in 
Appendix A) that vary in rainfall pattern, population density and land distribution (Chinsinga, 
2011; Government of Malawi, 2019). Thus, our focus in this paper is on district-level rainfall 
deviations that capture the within-region rainfall shock effects across different agro-ecological 
zones. For the early to mid-season lag rainfall deviation variables, we use the period from 
October to February in the previous seasons for each reference production period in the survey 
rounds. We further used the decimeter (dm) as a unit of measure4F 5 in our analysis to have 
suitable coefficient sizes when discussing our estimated results.    
 
3 For the survey periods that crossed to the next production season like in 2010 and 2016 rounds, we verified that 
the reference production period remained the same for all households. For instance, if a household was interviewed 
in April 2017, the reference period remained 2015-16 production season and not 2016-17 production season.  
4 We did not observe any significant attrition bias effects in our results based on including the inverse mills ratio 
in our estimations. The results with inverse mills ratio are available from the authors upon request. 




As a risky state-contingent input decision subject to random states of nature (rainfall shocks), 
observable and unobservable heterogeneity affect tenant household participation decisions. 
Thus, we specify the decision to participate in the land rental markets (𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) as reduced 
functional form models of stochastic rainfall variables in equations (1) and (2). The equations 
are for both entry and extent of participation hence the parameter (𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) is for either the probit 
or censored Tobit models. Our study applies both the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) and 
the Dynamic Random Effects (DRE) probit and Tobit models to control for time-invariant 
unobservable household and farm heterogeneity because we have limited dependent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2010). The CRE approach in equation (1), first suggested by Mundlak (1978) 
and Chamberlain (1982), is equivalent to using the household fixed effect in models with 
continuous dependent variables. The DRE model specification in equation (2) is important for 
assessing the intertemporal rainfall shock effects because the model can also control for initial 
unobserved conditions in the decision or dependent variable. This specification requires 
balance panel data (Wooldridge, 2010) and hence the use of balanced panel data in our 
analyses. 
CRE-models by region: 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝜚𝜚𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝛾𝛾Χ�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + ?̅?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 + ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗       (1) 
Dynamic RE-models by region: 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝜚𝜚𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝜑𝜑𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛𝜌𝜌 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗     (2) 
The parameters of interest in the equations are 𝜆𝜆 and 𝜚𝜚 for lag downside (N) and lag upside (H) 
absolute values of rainfall deviations from means that happens from early to mid-season, 
respectively. After a pooled analysis we noticed significant regional differences in the data, 
hence instead of just controlling for these differences with regional dummies, we found that 
region-wise models gave better results and revealed important spatial differences. However, 
based on the constructed household balanced panel data from the LSMS, the number of 
households renting in the land in the Northern Region of Malawi was too low to do meaningful 
analysis5F 6. Thus, our analysis only focused on the Central and Southern Regions of Malawi.  
 
6 Only 11 households out of 525 sample (2 percent) in the Northern Region participated in the rental market 
against 250 households out of 1830 (14 percent) in the Central Region, and 133 households out of 2085 (6 percent) 




Apart from dropping the Northern Region due to data limitations, the Central and Southern 
Regions also differ in population density, agro-ecological zones and land distribution which 
we consider important for assessing region-wise models that give spatial variations compared 
to a pooled analysis (Chinsinga, 2011; Government of Malawi, 2019; Kanyama-Phiri et al., 
2000). We, therefore, run separate models for the Central and Southern Regions of Malawi to 
obtain region-specific coefficients. The superscript (k) in the equations (1) and (2) is either 1 
for Central Region or 2 for Southern Region, for both probit and Tobit models.  
Based on CRE specifications, equation (1) controls for the means (Χ�𝑗𝑗 , ?̅?𝑍𝑗𝑗) and deviations from 
the mean (𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗, ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗) of farm and households characteristics while the DRE model specification 
controls for the observed farm (X𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) and household (𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) characteristics. From both equations 
(1) and (2), the 𝜏𝜏 is for time (year) dummies and the 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the error term. We assume the 
error term to be additive in line with the specified random effects models (Wooldridge, 2010). 
The variable 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  is the time constant unobserved heterogeneity at the household level and the 
variable 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the idiosyncratic error that is independent and identically distributed. This 
specification applies to both the CRE and the DRE probit and Tobit models. However, the DRE 
model has a further specification for the variable 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 in the error term. 
According to Wooldridge (2010), the 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  in the dynamic random effects (DRE) models with 
limited dependent variable is also additive and given as 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 = 𝜓𝜓 + 𝛼𝛼0𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗. Where 
𝜓𝜓 is a constant and the variable 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗 is the error term independent of 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 and specified as 
𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗~𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2). The 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0 is the initial year observation for the dependent variable and 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 
is for exogenous explanatory variables. This structure allows the use of a likelihood function 
similar to assessing the marginal effects in the random effect probit or Tobit models. However, 
the DRE model must include the lagged dependent variables to the list of explanatory variables. 
Specifically, for the probit model, we add the initial year and lag dependent binary variables to 
the list of explanatory variables, which changes to 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �1, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛,𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗� as indicated in 
equation (2).   
The Tobit models require that we replace 𝛼𝛼0𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0 with  𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 = 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛)𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛. 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 is the lagged participation in the previous survey round (n) and the 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 is a 
binary variable that is equal to one if 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛 = 0 and zero otherwise. Like the probit, this 
reduces the Tobit explanatory variable list to 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛,𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗0, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗�. That is, we include both 




random effects Tobit models (Wooldridge, 2010). By doing so, we control for the unobserved 
effect (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) and the initial household conditions that are likely to facilitate entry and extent of 
participation in the subsequent years. This include transaction costs related to accessing market 
information that households can easily acquire upon entering and gaining experience in the 
market. 
Specifically, the data for equation (1) included the observed participation in all three survey 
rounds and the respective rainfall deviation variables. In equation (2) we included the lag of 
the dependent variable observed in the previous survey round [𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛] and not the one-year 
lagged participation which was not observed in the data. Following Wooldridge (2010), we 
used the observed participation in 2010 as the initial year in our data and also the lag 
participation variable for the 2013 survey round. Subsequently, we also included the observed 
participation in 2013 survey round as the lag participation variable in the 2016 survey round. 
Thus, the total number of observations for equation (1) in the Central and Southern Regions 
were 1830 and 2085, while for equation (2) the sample observations were 1220 and 1390, 
respectively. This is based on the three rounds of constructed balanced household panel from 
610 Central Region households and 695 Sothern Region households. 
The farm and household-level characteristics in the equations include owned farmland area 
(GPS measured); owned farmland to labour ratio; share of male labour; sex, age and education 
of household head; household size to labour ratio; Total Livestock Units (TLU); one-year 
lagged TLU, capital asset index to labour ratio and distance to urban centres. We considered 
owned farmland to be the land acquired through customary inheritance systems; government 
distribution and/or purchases. We considered acquiring land through borrowing, encroachment 
and farming under estate management to be an endogenous right in our model (Holden et al., 
2013), hence we categorize such households as landless in the land ownership sense. We 
include the share of male labour because farming systems in Malawi are highly dominated by 
a hand-hoe that requires more physical strength and time on the farm, hence more male labour 
could be an advantage among farm households. Further, we estimated the capital asset index, 
that ranges from negative to positive values using the Factor Component Analysis (FCA) based 
on household ownership of durable assets and farm implements. Considering the long asset list 






4. Descriptive Statistics  
The statistics on rainfall deviations in Figure 2 shows the early to mid-season average rainfall 
amount for the Central and Southern regions in Malawi over ten seasons (intertemporal rainfall 
distribution). The early to mid-season periods capture the average monthly rainfall amounts as 
defined above. The shaded bar graphs indicate the rainfall deviations in the previous two 
production seasons for each survey round while the empty bars reflect the reference production 
season in the survey periods. The horizontal lines represent the regional 10-year mean rainfall 
values for the period 2006–07 to 2016–17. With the horizontal line, the bars in the graph further 
show the average regional deviations from the means. We dropped the 2006-07 and 2016-17 
production seasons in the figure to emphasize the period of interest in this analysis.         
   
Figure 2: Regional early to mid-season annual rainfall (mm) for each survey round 
From Figure 2, the 2007-08 season shows upside deviations in both regions while 2008-09 
slightly vary across the regions. The rainfall seasons between 2010 and 2012 both exhibit a 
downside effect in both regions with a slightly higher downside effect in the Southern Region 
for the 2011-12 season. The rainfall seasons between 2013 and 2016 were characterized by 
both flood and drought in Malawi (Government of Malawi, 2015; Government of Malawi, 
2016a). The upside deviations in 2014-15 production season reflect such flood effect that 
severely affected the Southern Region in January 2015. However, during the same time, the 
Central Region experienced relatively downside rainfall deviations. Overall, these are the 
rainfall deviations that support the need to understand their effect on farm household 
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Table 1 present statistics for the household and farm variables that we controlled for in our 
model summarized across all survey rounds and for each region. In the table, we first present 
the statistics for the overall sample and then present for the tenant and non-tenant households6F 7. 
We use the t-test to show the overall mean differences between tenant and non-tenant 
households in our data. Since we control for previous participation in our analysis, we also 
present a detailed table on the extent of re-entry into the market in Appendix A, Table A1. 
For the household variables, Table 1 shows that participation in the land rental markets is more 
prevalent in the Central Region (14 percent) compared to the Southern Region (6 percent). 
Tenant households in both regions rent-in an average of 0.5 ha which is almost equivalent to 
the average landholding size for non-tenant households in our data (0.6 ha and 0.5 ha in the 
Central and Southern Regions, respectively). In both regions, non-tenant households are 
relatively land rich and have a higher land to labour ratio compared to tenant households. 
However, we did not observe significant differences in the share of male labour that might be 
considered more important in a farming system that requires more human labour based on using 
a hand-hoe like in Malawi (Takane, 2008). 
On the contrary, tenant households are rich in capital asset index to labour ratio and slightly 
more educated than the non-tenant households in both regions. In the Central Region, a tenant 
household is on average headed by a younger head. We also observed a significant household 
head gender difference in the Southern Region where tenant households are less likely to be 
headed by a female, despite the data indicating that female-headed households in both regions 
owned less land compared to male-headed households on average. The average community 
level distance to urban centres among tenant households is significantly higher than non-tenant 
households in both regions (significant at 5 percent in the Central Region and 10 percent in the 
Southern Region). On the extent of market re-entry, Appendix A-Table A1 shows that 51 and 
64 percent of tenant households who participated in the baseline year (2010) also participated 
in 2013 and 2016 survey rounds, respectively.  
 
7 Due to LSMS data constrains, we were not able to specify a landlord category hence we combined those renting 
out and not participating into non-tenant households. In our data, we constantly observed a very small percentage 
of households renting out land. That is, in 2010, we observed 7.3% tenants and 0.1% landlords; in 2013 9.9% 
tenants and 0.5% landlords; and in 2016 8.9% tenants and 1.7% landlords in our data. We refer to Deininger et al. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of those who participated in 2013, 43 percent also participated in 2016 survey round implying 
a market that facilitates access to land for both experienced tenants and new entrants. In 
general, these are the regional variations that are important for assessing the within-region 
spatial rainfall shock effects in our analysis. However, a research issue beyond this study would 
be to assess the spatial effect of population pressure on the development of land rental markets 
considering our observation that land rental markets are more active in the Central Region 
where population density is lower than the Southern Region (Government of Malawi, 2019).     
5. Results and discussion  
We present the key probit and Tobit model results in Table 2. The average marginal effects are 
for the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) and Dynamic Random Effect (DRE) probit and Tobit 
models for the Central and Southern Regions. The CRE and DRE Tobit models present the 
conditional average partial effects [𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|𝑿𝑿,𝑦𝑦 > 0)]. The more detailed result tables for both the 
average marginal effects and the coefficients are found in Appendix A, Tables A2 to A9 for 
both regions. The detailed Appendix A tables first present the parsimonious random effects 
model which were our starting point in the analysis before estimating the CRE and DRE 
models. The combination of models helped to assess the robustness of the key results to the 
alternative model specifications. We discuss our hypotheses using the joint results from the 
CRE and DRE probit and Tobit models across the regions. 
Our hypothesis H1 stated that one-year lag downside rainfall deviations (early to mid-season) 
increase entry and extent of tenant household participation in land rental markets in the 
subsequent year. For this hypothesis, we use both the CRE and DRE probit and Tobit results 
from both regions. The results from the Central Region CRE and DRE probit models show that 
one-year lag downside rainfall deviations significantly increase entry into the rental markets in 
the subsequent year. On average, if the one-year lag downside rainfall deviations (absolute 
values) increases by one dm (100 mm), entry into the land rental markets increase by 4 
percentage points in the subsequent year (significant at 5 and 10 percent levels). However, on 
the extent of participation (amount of land rented-in at household level in hectares), the effect 
is only significant at the 10 percent level in the CRE Tobit model and is insignificant in the 
DRE Tobit. The one-year lagged variables were insignificant for the Southern Region. Thus, 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































On hypothesis H2, our results provide no support for the flood effect. The hypothesis was stated 
as one-year lag upside rainfall deviations (early to mid-season) increase entry and extent of 
subsequent year tenant household participation in land rental markets. This may be because the 
effect of the floods in the Central Region was not sufficiently severe, where land rental markets 
are more prevalent or that the flood effect observed in the Southern Region was not 
significantly important to affect land rental market participation where such markets are less 
prevalent. As observed in Figure 2 and as discussed in Katengeza et al. (2018), Malawi mostly 
experience downside shocks like drought or in-season dry spells but fewer severe floods. This 
takes our discussion to hypothesis three.  
Hypothesis H3 stated that rainfall shocks trigger more land rental market participation beyond 
the immediate effect in the following year. We assess this hypothesis using the two-year lagged 
rainfall deviation variable results from the CRE and DRE models. Table 2 shows that a one dm 
absolute negative deviation in the two-year lagged rainfall variable resulted in a 3.0 percentage 
point increase in land rental market participation. In both the CRE and DRE probit models, this 
effect was significant at 5 percent level in the Central Region. Furthermore, the effect was also 
significant in the CRE and DRE Tobit models with an increase of 0.02 ha area rented in per 
dm rainfall deficit in both models (significant at 5 and 10 percent levels). This demonstrates 
robust support for hypothesis H3 in the Central Region.   
In the Southern Region, the two-year lagged rainfall variable was on the contrary negatively 
and significantly associated with renting-in the land. Both the CRE and DRE probit and Tobit 
models provide strong evidence to reject hypothesis H3 in this region. It appears that such past 
rainfall shocks cause households to cling more to their limited land as a self-sufficiency food 
security strategy. However, households with experience in the markets are more likely to re-
enter the land rental markets in this region, a possible indicator of demand by land constrained 
households over time. These are surprising findings considering that rainfall shocks further 
shrink the land rental markets in the Southern Region of Malawi where population pressure 
and land scarcity is high compared to the Central Region of Malawi. That is, land markets do 
not necessarily start to work better with the increase in population for this region. However, 
such a non-linear relationship between population pressure and land rental market activity 






6. Conclusion  
Rainfall variations within and across production seasons, that result in either drought or floods, 
are recurring states of nature. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), farm households renting out their 
land in distress as an ex-post coping strategy can be an outcome of such shocks. If rainfall 
shocks are shifting supply of rented land, the extent to which tenant households are utilizing 
these opportunities across space and over time is a missing link in the land rental market 
literature in SSA. In this paper, we assessed whether rainfall shocks are kick-starting the land 
rental markets by shifting the supply of rented land, thereby creating opportunities for tenant 
household to access land across space, observed from tenant households’ side. We used three 
rounds of household balanced panel data constructed from the Malawi Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2016 to investigate this. To assess 
the spatial rainfall shock effects, we combined the survey data with the corresponding district-
level rainfall data that captured the within-region effect in Malawi.  
Our analysis used the one-year and two-year lagged downside and upside deviations from 
average district-level rainfall data in the early to mid-season periods based on a unimodal 
rainfall pattern in Malawi. Using the state-contingent framework for risky input choice, we 
proposed that increase in either downside or upside absolute rainfall deviation values increases 
entry and extent of tenant households’ participation in land rental markets in the subsequent 
years and across the regions. Our data revealed spatial heterogeneities when we categorized 
the sample into the three administrative regions of North, Central and South in Malawi. Further, 
we observed that land rental markets are most active in the Central Region followed by the 
Southern Region and least active in the Northern Region. We also found that our analysis of 
the relation between rainfall shocks and land rental market activity only made sense in the 
Central and Southern Regions and therefore we dropped the Northern Region sample. We 
estimated our results using both the correlated random effects and the dynamic random effects 
probit and Tobit models that control for unobserved heterogeneity and initial market entry 
conditions.  
The results show that, where the land rental markets are most active, that is in the Central 
Region of Malawi, the one-year and two-year lagged downside rainfall shocks significantly 
increased tenant households’ access to rented land. This implied both an immediate and a 
medium-term rainfall shock effect on land rental market participation in this region. However, 




In the Southern Region where the farm sizes are very small from high population pressure and 
with less prevalence of land rental markets, the two-year lagged absolute negative rainfall 
shock was associated with less access to rented land, an indicator of households holding owned 
land for self-sufficiency objectives than trading in the market.  
Overall, our results indicate that where land rental markets are most active, the rainfall shocks 
in the form of droughts are helping to kick-start tenant household participation. Such area-
specific effect calls for orchestrated access to land rental market information as a climate 
response strategy that can improve land allocation through markets after rainfall shocks. Where 
land markets are more likely to shrink after rainfall shocks, non-market (government 
distribution) or market assisted (government facilitated purchases) policy strategies can help to 
facilitate access to land, especially for land constrained households. However, the 
heterogeneity in the results calls for more research on the rainfall shock effect, population 
growth and land market development nexus to understand further the spatial variation effects 
across farm households in Malawi.  
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Can rainfall shocks enhance access to rented land? Evidence from Malawi 
Appendix A 
Map of Malawi 
          
Figure A1: Map of Malawi showing districts          Figure A2: Rainfall map with weather stations across Malawi  
Source: Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services: www.metmalawi.gov.mw 
 
Factor Component Analysis variables for Capital Asset index: 
(i) Durable assets 
(1) Mortar/pestle (Mtondo), (2) Bed, (3) Table, (4) Chair, (5) Fan, (6) Air conditioner, (7) Radio 
('wireless'), (8) Tape or CD/DVD player or HiFi, (9) Television, (9) VCR, (10) Sewing machine, (11) 
Kerosene/paraffin stove, (12) Electric or gas stove; (13) Hot plate, (14) Refrigerator, (15) Washing (16) 
Machine, (17) Bicycle, (18) Motorcycle/scooter, (19) Car, (20) Mini-bus, (21) Lorry, (22) Beer-brewing 
drum, (23) Upholstered chair, (24) Sofa set, (25) Coffee table (for the sitting room), (26) Cupboard, 
(27) Drawers, (28) Bureau, (29) Lantern (paraffin), (30) Desk, (31) Clock, (32) Iron (for pressing 
clothes), (33) Computer equipment & accessories, (34) Satellite dish, (35) Solar panel, (36) Generator, 
(37) Radio with flash drive/micro CD. 
(ii) Farm implements 
(1) Hand Hoe, (2) Slasher, (3) Axe, (4) Sprayer, (5) Panga Knife, (6) Sickle, (7) Treadle Pump, (8) 
Watering Can, (9) Ox Cart, (10) Ox Plough, (11) Tractor, (12) Tractor Plough, (13) Ridger, (14) 
Cultivator, (15) Motorised Pump, (16) Grain Mill, (17) Chicken House, (18) Livestock Kraal, (19) 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The falling land to labour ratios and agricultural trade response strategies in Malawi 
Sarah E. Tione  
School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, 1432, Ås, Norway 
sarahti@nmbu.no or sarahtione@gmail.com  
Abstract 
This study assesses how the growing land scarcity relative to family labour is influencing the 
household decision to trade in agricultural land and labour markets as their livelihood 
strategies. Using the farm household model, I analyse the decisions to rent-in land or hire out 
labour among smallholder farmers in Malawi. I use two rounds of a nationally representative 
household balanced panel data and apply a systems approach to jointly estimate the land rental 
and labour market decisions while controlling for simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. 
From the results, the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio can push households to 
participate in either land rental or seasonal agricultural labour markets. But, the probability of 
hiring out labour for casual work and short-term gains reduces if potential tenant households 
rent-in the land. Using asset wealth to labour endowment ratio, wealthier households are more 
likely to rent-in land while the poorer and majority of the farm households hire out labour. 
These results point towards higher friction in the land rental compared to agricultural labour 
markets and liquidity constraints that can support agricultural household operations and needs. 
Thus, agricultural policy in Malawi should aim at reducing frictions in the factor markets.   
Keywords: Land scarcity; Factor markets; Ganyu; Conditional Mixed Process; Malawi. 




1. Introduction  
The general trend of agricultural land in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been from land 
abundance towards scarcity mainly from population growth (Holden, 2020; Lowder et al., 
2014). Land scarcity is particularly a challenge for farm households that rely on agricultural 
land and labour factors of production for both income and food security in SSA (Chamberlin 
et al., 2014; Hazell, 2020). Literature indicates that the trend on farm households’ owned land 
to labour endowment ratios has been falling, especially in areas with high population density 
in SSA (Headey & Jayne, 2014; Jayne et al., 2014). The falling land to labour ratios has resulted 
in farm households using more family labour relative to owned farmland considering the labour 
market imperfections and limited opportunities to use labour outside the agricultural sector 
(Jayne et al., 2014; Wineman & Jayne, 2020). Such use of labour is considered less profitable 
if households can trade in the labour and land factor markets (Wineman & Jayne, 2020). 
Therefore, understanding the farm household decisions to trade in the land and labour markets 
should be important for developing policies that can improve factor markets in SSA.  
The literature on household decisions from both farm household models and the livelihood 
approach studies in SSA, shows that farm households have been responding to the land scarcity 
challenge by diversifying and intensifying the use of land and labour factors of production, 
mainly within the agricultural sector (Alobo Loison, 2015; Jayne et al., 2014). Despite the 
existing literature, empirical evidence on the extent to which the changing farm households’ 
owned land to labour endowment ratio is influencing the decision to trade in either agricultural 
land or labour markets, as livelihood strategies remain limited in SSA. The empirical gap has 
been partly an issue of missing, absent or thin land markets despite non-missing but imperfect 
agricultural labour markets in most Sub-Saharan African countries (Jayne et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, land markets are now developing with more active and expanding land rental 
markets in SSA (Chamberlin et al., 2014; Holden et al., 2010). Thus, the objective of this paper 
is to understand how the changes in the owned land relative to family labour are influencing 
the trade of land and labour among smallholder farmers, amidst land scarcity challenges. 
Specifically, I consider the labour rich (more family labour) relative to farmland households, 
who are capable of renting-in the land or hiring out labour for casual work in seasonal 
agricultural labour markets. The focus on the relative labour rich farm households is because 
of the increase in farm household-level population pressure and landlessness that is leaving 
households with relatively more labour to owned farmland in most counties in SSA (Hazell, 
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2020; Holden, 2020). Furthermore, I analyse how the falling owned land to labour endowment 
ratio is affecting entry and extent of farm households’ participation in either land rental or 
seasonal agricultural labour markets.  
Considering that land rental markets develop to enhance the efficient allocation of land and 
non-land factors of production (Holden et al., 2010), I further assess the extent to which renting-
in agricultural land is influencing the decision to hire out labour for seasonal agricultural casual 
work. I specifically assess the decision to hire out labour for casual work because the majority 
of the smallholder farm households in SSA use or trade their labour within the agricultural 
sector because of limited skills, capital and labour opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors 
(Davis et al., 2017; Van Hoyweghen et al., 2020). Additionally, trading labour for agricultural 
casual work within SSA is considered a short-term economic response to food consumption 
needs (Bezu et al., 2012; Orr et al., 2009; Pender & Fafchamps, 2006; Van Hoyweghen et al., 
2020). Casual work is also considered a coping strategy to idiosyncratic shocks that might 
reallocate labour out of family farms, thereby worsening the poverty gap (Cole & Hoon, 2013; 
Fink et al., 2014; Orr et al., 2009; Whiteside, 2000). Thus, understanding how the land rental 
markets are influencing the labour trade decisions should be key for developing policy 
strategies that can sustain livelihoods and improve the use of labour for medium to long-term 
gains among smallholder farmers. 
I use two rounds of balanced household panel data from Malawi, one of the countries in SSA 
with high population density. The balanced panel data is from the Malawi Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in 2013 and 2016. Malawi is appropriate for this 
study considering the increase in land pressure and demand for land for both food security and 
economic growth (Government of Malawi, 2019; Headey & Jayne, 2014). The reviewed 
literature from Malawi also shows a history of farm households responding to such land 
scarcity challenges by doing casual work in the localised seasonal agricultural labour markets, 
as a coping strategy to food consumption shocks (Ellis et al., 2003; Whiteside, 2000).  
In addition, recent evidence shows that land rental markets are developing in Malawi with a 
positive impact on resource allocation, income and welfare (Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert, 
2016; Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). However, from the reviewed literature, no study has focused 
on the joint decision to trade either agricultural land or labour as livelihood response strategies 
to the falling owned land to labour endowment ratios in Malawi. There is also limited evidence 
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on how the developing rental markets are influencing the farm household decision to hire out 
labour for casual work among smallholder farmers in Malawi.  
To achieve the objective of this paper, I use the bivariate and recursive bivariate models for 
entry into the land rental and seasonal agricultural labour markets, as a joint and sequential 
decision, respectively. On the extent of participation, I use a simultaneous system approach 
combining the Tobit model for renting-in the land and fractional probit model for hiring out 
labour. I apply the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) estimation method that considers both 
the simultaneity and endogeneity issues even in a recursive system (Roodman, 2011). Overall, 
the paper adds new empirical evidence to the growing literature on diversification of livelihood 
strategies and efficient allocation of productive resources through market assisted strategies in 
SSA (Asfaw et al., 2019; Holden et al., 2010).  
In what follows, section two gives a background of the land and seasonal agricultural labour 
markets in Malawi. Section three presents the household theoretical model and highlights the 
specific hypotheses proposed in this paper. Section four presents the data and estimation 
methods while section five gives the descriptive statistics. Section six presents and discusses 
the results with a conclusion in section seven.       
2. Background   
Malawi is an agricultural-based country where 84 percent of the population resides in rural 
areas while the agricultural sector employs 64 percent of the workforce (Government of 
Malawi, 2013; Government of Malawi, 2019). The country is among the areas with high 
population density in SSA, reported at 186 persons per square kilometre (Government of 
Malawi, 2019). Almost 67 percent of the total land is under customary tenure system and 
mainly cultivated by smallholder farmers in rural areas (Government of Malawi, 2002). The 
rural households and to some extent the urban dwellers mainly depend on this customary land 
and family labour for both income and food security (Ellis et al., 2003; Headey & Jayne, 2014). 
Tione and Holden (2020) showed that the demand for land and how farm households value 
their land has been increasing over time from both household-level population pressure and 
proximity to urban areas. Thus, land and labour remain the key factors for sustaining rural 
livelihoods in Malawi.   
Literature shows that the smallholder farm households in Malawi have been responding to the 
land scarcity challenge by mainly hiring out family labour for casual work in seasonal 
agricultural labour markets, commonly known as ganyu (Ellis et al., 2003; Whiteside, 2000). 
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Ellis et al. (2003) indicated that farm households in Malawi mainly trade their labour for casual 
work (ganyu) to cope with the mismatch between land ownership and ability or wish to 
cultivate agricultural land, due to non-existing (absent) land rental markets. Considering that 
the land rental markets are now developing in Malawi (Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019), assessing 
the farm household trade response strategies should be important for developing policies in 
Malawi and lessons relevant for other countries in SSA.  
Following Whiteside (2000), the word ganyu broadly means any “off-own-farm work”, 
calculated as piecework and usually agricultural-related, that individuals do on a casual basis, 
covering days or weeks with payment as cash or in-kind (for instance food). Overall, ganyu 
involves daily wage or short-term wage contracts. Such contracts are mostly localised within 
or neighbouring communities involving unskilled work like ploughing or weeding using a hand 
hoe and also harvesting or shelling of grains or legumes. Ganyu differs from skilled labour 
work and long-term agricultural labour contract mostly offered under estate farms commonly 
known as “tenant labour” in Malawi (Kerr, 2005).  
Historically, smallholder farmers engage in ganyu activities as both a livelihood and a coping 
strategy during acute food shortage period (December to February) and when there is a high 
demand for agricultural labour, based on the unimodal rainfall pattern that starts from 
November to April in Malawi (Kerr, 2005; Peters, 1988; Whiteside, 2000). Scholarly papers 
have argued that households who engage in ganyu either neglect all or part of their farms, 
especially the female-headed households, while others have argued that households hire out 
male labour, leaving female members to attend to family farms, which are possible indicators 
of household vulnerability to shocks and a poverty trap (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2011; Dimowa 
et al., 2010; Fink et al., 2014; Orr et al., 2009; Takane, 2008; Whiteside, 2000). However, as 
indicated by Ellis et al. (2003), this could also have been an indicator of limited opportunities 
to trade farmland from non-existing or absent land rental markets, which are now developing 
in Malawi.     
Recent literature shows that the land rental markets in Malawi are reallocating land-use from 
relatively land-rich and labour-poor households to land-poor and relatively labour-rich 
households. Evidence also indicates that farm households renting-in the land are relatively 
more productive and wealthier in non-land factors (capital and labour) compared to landlords 
(Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert, 2016; Lunduka et al., 2009; Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). This 
could be an indicator of stress renting out of the land by poor farm households who cannot sell 
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land due to family ties or who are not willing to sell their land despite their labour endowment 
conditions (Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). Such evidence highlights the important role of capital 
wealth and labour endowment in facilitating household decision to trade agricultural land or 
labour. Thus, the study analyses the farm household decision to participate in the land rental 
and seasonal agricultural labour markets, as the trade response strategies to the falling owned 
land to labour endowment ratio and the changes in asset wealth (capital) relative to labour 
endowment. This is in addition to understanding the extent to which land rental markets are 
influencing the allocation of family labour for casual work (ganyu) among smallholder farmers 
in Malawi.   
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
A farm household whose objective is to maximise income utility from land and labour 
endowment can either use all or part of their endowment on their own-farm or trade these 
resources across farms to achieve desired levels of resource use (Holden et al., 2010). The farm 
households with the potential to trade can either rent-in or rent out the land, hire-in or hire out 
their labour in short to medium term. For such a household, the income utility function can be 
given as 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌], where the utility is a twice differentiable quasi-concave function 
(Singh et al., 1986). The [Y] is for the equivalent income from both crop production output and 
trading of resources. Thus, a farm household endowed with land (?̅?𝐴) and labour (𝐿𝐿�) will have 
the intermediate own-farm resource use functions as 𝐴𝐴 = ?̅?𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 and 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜. 
Where 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿 is the level of land and labour use on own-farm, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜is the amount of land 
rented-in or out, while  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 is the amount of labour hired-in or out, respectively. Following 
Singh et al. (1986) the labour endowment (𝐿𝐿�) is the sum of labour time used for both work 
(𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢) and for leisure (𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒) given as [𝐿𝐿� = 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢 +  𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒]. Thus, the total estimate of labour at 
household level is based on the total household adult equivalent labour, that farm households 
can use or trade while implicitly capturing leisure time.  




𝑈𝑈[𝑌𝑌] = 𝑈𝑈[𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿,𝑘𝑘) − η�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� + 𝜃𝜃(𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜)  − 𝜏𝜏�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖�  + 𝜑𝜑(𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜) − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀]  (1) 
and  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0 
From equation (1), the household choice variables reflect the land and labour use and/or trade. 
In the equation, the (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) is for output prices and the 𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿,𝑘𝑘) is the production function subject 
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to own-farm use of land (A), labour (L) and capital (K) factors of production. Considering the 
market imperfections that characterise markets in SSA, farm households mostly face non-linear 
transaction costs even with linear unit prices of goods, from either information asymmetry or 
transportation costs (Fafchamps, 2004; Holden et al., 2010). Thus, the parameters (η) and (𝜃𝜃) 
for renting-in and renting out the land, and (𝜏𝜏) and (𝜑𝜑) for hiring in or out labour are the overall 
non-linear prices in the equation. This assumes that market participants on the demand and 
supply sides encounter different transaction costs even if they may face a similar unit land rent 
(Sadoulet et al., 2002). The (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀) is the total cost of other marketed inputs used on the farm. 
For simplicity, the model assumes away liquidity constraints related to credit, and output 
market prices, considering the long gestation period of agriculture products and risk factors, 
that are associated with output prices and household preferences (Carter & Yao, 2002; Holden 
& Quiggin, 2017; Sadoulet et al., 2002).  
Using the duality theory, the theoretical framework in this paper focuses on the income 
function, that is twice differentiable and quasi-convex. If prices of both output (𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞) and other 
marketed inputs (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚) are normalised to one, the First Order Conditions (FOCs) from the 
income function are as specified in equations (2) to (6). The FOCs shows that household will 
only participate in the markets if the marginal revenue of trading the factors of production is 
greater than the marginal cost of using the resources on own-farm. Based on the FOCs, Table 
1 summarises the optimal trade response strategies for farm households. I present the detailed 
optimal trade options that reflect the FOCs in each cell in Appendix A, Table A1.  
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Table 1: Summary of potential optimal household trade response strategies  
  Trade response strategies 
                                         Labour option (Equation 2) 
  
Hire-in 
(𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊 > 𝟎𝟎)  
Non-participant  
�𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎𝟎 = 𝑳𝑳𝟎𝟎�  
Hire out 
















(𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊 > 𝟎𝟎)  
Hire-in labour or rent-in 
land (Labour poor and 
land poor) 
Not trading labour but 
rent-in land (Labour 
sufficient and land poor) 
Hire-out labour or rent in 
the land (Labour rich 
and land poor) 







Hire-in labour or not 
trading land (Labour 
poor and land sufficient) 
Not trading both labour 
and land (Labour and 
land sufficient) 
Hire out labour or not 
trading land (Labour 
rich and land sufficient) 
    
Rent-out 
(𝑨𝑨𝒐𝒐 > 𝟎𝟎)  
Hire in labour or rent out 
the land (Labour poor 
and land rich) 
Not trading labour but 
rent out the land (Labour 
sufficient and land rich) 
Hire out labour or rent 
out the land (Labour rich 
and land rich) 
 
From Table 1, the farm household trade response strategies to land scarcity challenge can be 
to trade in the land or labour market only, participate in both markets or not participating in 
any market depending on owned land to labour endowment ratios and their ability to participate 
in the market. Based on the FOCs, the ability to participate in the markets is further a function 
of non-linear transaction costs that can raise the household shadow value on factors of 
production, hence rationing potential market participants into the non-participating group. 
Thus, assessing each or a combination of these optimal solutions, even among non-
participating but potential market participants, should be important for understanding the farm 
household trade responses to the changing resource ratios in SSA.  
With increasing land pressure and assuming more family labour relative to land for the majority 
of the farm households in Malawi, I hypothesize that;  
H1. Falling owned land to labour endowment ratio increases entry and extent of (amount of 
land rented-in) farm household participation in land rental markets.  
With land rental markets developing as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms to the non-land 
factor markets, the focus on this hypothesis is whether the change in owned land to labour 
endowment ratio is a push-factor among smallholder farmers in the land rental market. In line 
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with Alobo Loison (2015), a push-factor is a negative factor that may force farm households 
to seek additional livelihood activities within or outside the farm.   
H2. Entry into the land rental market is negatively associated with trading labour for casual 
work (ganyu) in seasonal agricultural labour markets. 
From the theoretical framework, renting-in land increases operational farmland. By renting-in 
agricultural land, farm household should allocate more family labour for their farm work than 
hiring it out for short-term wage assuming imperfect and seasonal agricultural labour markets. 
Also, assuming that farm households make the land rental decisions at the start of the season 
while making the labour decisions throughout the season, I assess how entry into the land rental 
markets can influence entry into the labour markets using a recursive model.  
H3. Increase in the household asset wealth to labour endowment ratio increases tenant 
household entry and extent of participation in the land rental markets.  
H4: Increase in the household asset wealth to labour endowment ratio reduces entry and extent 
of hiring out labour for agricultural casual work (ganyu). 
Using the asset wealth variable should be important for assessing household ability to finance 
agricultural activities, as opposed to using the available income at the farm household level. 
The use of available household income can be challenging considering the liquidity constraints 
that most farm household face when producing under a unimodal rainfall pattern and with high 
output price fluctuations across space and over time (Cornia et al., 2016). Thus, higher asset 
wealth to labour endowment ratio should be associated with the higher ability of a farm 
household to rent-in the land, while reducing the need to hire out labour for casual work.     
4. Data and estimation method  
The study uses data from two-panel rounds of the Malawi Living Standards Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) collected in 2013 and 2016. In 2013, the sample size was 1,990 that I used to 
construct a balanced panel of 1,895 households, signifying a 4 percent attrition rate. Using the 
inverse mills ratio estimated from a probit model, I did not observe attrition bias hence the 
results that I present excludes the inverse mills ratio 1. Since land and labour decisions in 
Malawi mainly follow rainfed production with a unimodal rainfall pattern, farm households 
are also vulnerable to production shocks across different agro-ecological zones (Katengeza et 
 
1 The results with inverse mills ratio are available upon request.   
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al., 2018). Thus, I use the monthly district-level rainfall data from Malawi that was shared upon 
request from the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services 
(www.metmalawi.gov.mw). The monthly district-level rainfall data is for 10 years (2007 to 
2017) and covers the within-region rainfall variations across the three regions in Malawi 
(North, Central and South). I consider these variations to be important for prompting 
households to trade their land and labour resources aftershock, as a coping strategy amidst 
increasing climate shocks in Malawi (Katengeza et al., 2018).  
To estimate the results, I jointly assess the participation in land rental and seasonal agricultural 
labour markets using the bivariate and recursive bivariate models for entry into the markets 
while using Tobit and fractional probit models for the extent of participation (Kassouf & 
Hoffmann, 2006; Roodman, 2011; Wooldridge, 2010). The Tobit model analyses the farmland 
area rented-in at the household level (measured in hectares) while the fractional probit analyses 
the share of adult equivalent household labour located for casual work in the seasonal 
agricultural labour markets. The additional use of a recursive bivariate model is to understand 
how entry into the land rental markets, a decision that households make early in the season, is 
likely to influence the labour decisions made throughout the production season. Furthermore, 
with limited dependent variables, I apply the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model that 
uses the Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) device, which is equivalent to using 
household fixed effects in a model with a continuous dependent variable. Overall, I use 
Roodman (2011) Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) that applies the full-information 
maximum likelihood estimation method, which allows estimating the equations jointly in line 
with the Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model specification. 
Based on the discussed theory, I jointly estimate the reduced functional form of household 
renting-in the land or hiring out labour over time. Equations (7), (8a) and (8b) specify the farm 
household decision to participate in the land rental (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) and seasonal agricultural labour (𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) 
markets for household j and at time t as a joint decision. Equations (7) and (8a) are for bivariate 
entry and extent of participation in each market while (8b) is for the recursive bivariate land 
and labour market decisions. The parameters of interest in line with the hypotheses are 𝛽𝛽, 𝜎𝜎, 
and 𝛿𝛿 for household land to labour ratio, asset wealth to labour ratio and renting-in the land 
under a recursive system, respectively.  









+ 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + ?̌?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 + ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜚𝜚𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗              (7) 
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+ 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + ?̌?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 + ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜚𝜚𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗              (8a) 





+ 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 + ?̌?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 + ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜚𝜚𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗           (8b) 
Land endowment (?̅?𝐴) is defined as land acquired through customary inheritance systems, 
government distribution and purchases. Following Holden et al. (2013), I categorised 
households who use farmland from either borrowing, encroachment and farming under estate 
management as having only pre-rental farmland without secure land ownership. Thus, I 
categorise such households as landless in ownership sense, as they hold an endogenous tenure 
right while controlling for pre-rental land in the analysis. The pre-rental land captures farmland 
from all other sources operated by a household but excluding the rented-in land.  
On asset wealth to labour ratio, I use the Factor Component Analysis (FCA) to estimate the 
asset wealth (K) index for each household depending on their endowment of durable goods and 
farm implements. The list of goods and farm implements included in the FCA is presented in 
Appendix A. For the labour endowment (𝐿𝐿�), I estimated the total adult equivalent labour from 
all available household members in a year. Using the asset wealth to labour endowment ratio, 
I categorised the households into four quantiles (25th quartiles) that reflect their endowment 
and capacity to rent-in the land. Households in the 25th quartile are in the lowest group hence 
considered poor compared to the above 75th quartile with an ascending order in the intermediate 
groups.  
In line with the CRE specification, the equations control for means and “deviations from the 
mean” of the community or household (?̌?𝑍𝑗𝑗  ?̂?𝑍𝑗𝑗) and farm (𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗, 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗  ) characteristics, respectively. 
Specifically, the analysis controls for sex, age and education of the household head; household 
size to labour ratio; livestock ownership based on Total Livestock Unit (TLU) in the current 
and one-year lag periods; pre-rental farmland; and distance to nearest city area zone for 
proximity to urban areas with high demand for land, and with a higher probability of labour 
opportunities in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  
Furthermore, the analysis controls for one-year lag upside and downside rainfall variations that 
happen early to mid-season at district-level and within the regions in Malawi. Such rainfall 
variations should reflect the spatial production shock effects that can facilitate the need to shift 
household land and labour resources through factor markets. The variables 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 and 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗−1𝑒𝑒+𝑚𝑚 
are for one-year lag downside (N) and upside (H) deviations while (e) is for early and (m) is 
for mid-season periods in Malawi. With a unimodal rainfall pattern in Malawi, the early to mid-
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season variables capture the period from October to February of each production season, 
including October as a preparation month. I use the early to mid-season variations to reflect the 
production shock effects related to crop development and maturity while excluding the late-
season period that coincides with harvesting time in Malawi (Government of Malawi, 2012).  
The 𝜏𝜏 is for time dummy while 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the additive error term with the time constant 
unobserved heterogeneity (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) and the idiosyncratic error (𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) that is independent and 
identically distributed. Although with observational data it is challenging to fully estimate 
causal effects, I consider that the specified estimation methods have accounted for potential 
endogeneity and simultaneity concerns in this analysis. Thus, the interpretation of the results 
should be able to unveil policy issues that can be relevant for improving factor markets in 
Malawi.  
5. Descriptive statistics  
Recall that in this paper, a lower land to labour ratio implies more labour relative to farmland 
while a higher ratio implies less labour relative to farmland. The Lorenz curves in Figures 1(a) 
and 1(b) shows the distribution of the owned land and operational land to labour endowment 
ratios. In the figures, I broadly categorise the farm households into four groups, which reflect 
who participated in one or both markets and who did not participate in the factor markets. 
However, to assess the statistical differences in line with the hypotheses, the four categories in 
the Lorenz curves are re-organised into three main categories, which I present in Table 2.  
The categories in Table 2 and their respective percentages in the sample are (i) renting-in or 
tenant households, 9 percent; (ii) hiring out or casual labour households, 52 percent; (iii) non-
market participant households who are 43 percent of the sample. Focusing on the trade response 
strategies in this study, the ttest in Table 2 assesses the differences between households renting-
in (tenants) and hiring out (casual labour), independent of the non-market participant 
households. To further understand the heterogeneity in asset endowment that can reflect 
potential market participants within the non-market participant group, I further sub-divided the 
households in this group into three other categories. These groups are (i) regular farmers 
defined as households that cultivated their land in both survey rounds, (ii) non-regular farmers 
defined as households that cultivated their land in either one of the survey rounds and (ii) non-





Figure 1: Lorenz curves, (a) owned land to labour endowment ratio (b) operational farmland to 
labour endowment ratio. Note: Owned land excludes rented, borrowed or encroached land. Operational or 
cultivated land includes land from all the reported sources at the farm household level.  
From Figure 1(a), the Lorenz curves show that households hiring out labour have a relatively 
higher owned land to labour endowment ratio while households renting-in the land have 
relatively lower owned land to labour endowment ratio. This implies that households hiring 
out labour for casual work (ganyu) have less family labour relative to owned land, an indicator 
of hiring out of labour in distress. This concurs with Ellis et al. (2003) observation that 
households use ganyu as a coping strategy for short-term food consumption needs in Malawi. 
For tenant households, the Lorenz Curves in Figure 1(a) shows a lower ratio that implies more 
family labour relative to the owned land, which could be important for renting-in the land. The 
owned land to labour endowment ratios for farming non-participants are slightly lower than 
the casual labour households. Households that engaged in both markets have lower owned land 
to labour endowment ratios compared to casual labour households but these are slightly above 
the tenant households.  
The differences in the intermediate groups reflect that households can easily shift in and out of 
either market depending on their endowment, needs and market-related transaction costs over 
time. The operational land to labour endowment ratios, therefore, should reflect such shifting 
of households as observed in Figure 1(b). From Figure 1(b), there are no visible differences in 
operational farmland to labour ratio among different groups of farm households compared to 
Figure 1(a). This could signify the importance of land and labour factor markets in reallocating 
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To further assess the differences in owned land to labour endowment ratios, Table 2 shows that 
there are significant differences in the ratios between households renting-in the land and those 
hiring out labour for casual work. However, the table does not show significant differences in 
household adult equivalent labour, while showing significant differences in owned land 
amongst tenant and casual labour households. Thus, the differences in the owned land to labour 
endowment ratio should be reflecting the land scarcity challenges in Malawi. 
On other household characteristics, Table 2 shows that tenant households own an average of 
0.37 ha but rent-in an average of 0.49 ha which increases their operational farm size to an 
average of 0.87 ha. The share of labour allocated to casual work is on average 28 percent of 
total adult equivalent household labour. On average, casual labour households own and operate 
0.5 ha, which is significantly lower than tenant households. The percent of households with no 
pre-rental farmland is higher among those renting-in the land compared to causal labour 
households when I exclude households in the non-market participant group. Furthermore, 
tenant households are significantly wealthier as indicated by higher asset wealth index value 
compared to casual labour households.  
Comparing the distribution of the households across the asset wealth to labour endowment ratio 
quartiles, tenant households have a higher distribution in the upper quartiles while those hiring 
out labour have a higher distribution in the lower quartiles. However, observations from the 
non-market participant categories show that the tenant households are not the wealthiest in the 
sample. This suggests that renting-in the land could not be an issue of the rich exploiting the 
poor but more related to resource use on the farm. Among the non-market participants, regular 
farmers are indeed poor but slightly better off than casual labour households on average, which 
point to poor households using casual work as a livelihood coping strategy. The non-regular 
farmers and the non-agricultural households are wealthier than the tenant households, an 
indicator of less dependency on rented land and farming activities.  
Table 2 further shows that the percent of female-headed households is higher among casual 
labour households and such households are headed by slightly older and less educated heads 
compared to tenant households. Casual labour households also own relatively lower livestock 
units than tenant households. There are no significant differences in the household size to 
labour ratio, thus pointing to both household categories aiming at producing for own 
consumption. At the community level, the distance to nearest city area zone shows that tenant 
households are on average farther away from the nearest city area zone or urban area compared 
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to casual labour households in Table 2. At the district level, the rainfall shock variables show 
that the one-year lag downside rainfall deviations were on average higher than the upside 
deviations in 2013. On the contrary, in 2016 it was the upside one-year lag rainfall deviations 
that were higher than downside deviations on average. Such rainfall variations should be 
important in accounting for spatial and intertemporal production shock effects in Malawi.  
6. Results and discussion  
Tables 3 and 4 present the key results that can be used to test the hypotheses. Specifically, 
Table 3 presents the bivariate and recursive bivariate average marginal effects for entry into 
the land rental and seasonal agricultural labour markets, based on the Conditional Mixed 
Process (CMP) estimation method. Table 4 presents the CMP average marginal effects for the 
extent of participation in the land rental and casual labour markets, estimated using the Tobit 
and Fractional Probit models, respectively. In both tables, models 1 and 2 presents the joint 
random effects models while models 3 and 4 presents the joint Correlated Random Effects 
(CRE) models. The random effects models were a starting point in the analysis, which I used 
for robustness check on model specification before estimating the CRE. Nevertheless, the 
discussion of the results mainly focuses on the joint CRE models presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
The full analytical results expounding Tables 3 and 4 are in Appendix A, Table A2 to A5. In 
what follows, I present and discuss the results in line with the stated hypotheses.   
In hypothesis one, the study proposed that the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio 
increases entry and extent of (amount of land rented-in) farm household participation in land 
rental markets. The results in Table 3 and 4 indicate that an increase in the ratio decreases 
participation in land rental markets from both the bivariate and recursive bivariate models. 
Assessing the other side of the coin, this implies that decreasing or falling owned land to labour 
endowment ratio increases participation in the land rental markets. From Table 3–models 3a 
and 4a, the results show that at 5 percent significance level, a decrease in the land per adult 
equivalent labour (ha/labour unit) increases entry into the land rental market by an average of 
10 percentage points. From Table 4–model 3, the extent of land rental market participation also 
increases by an average of 0.08 hectares with a unit decrease in the land per adult equivalent 
labour, at 5 percent significance level. Overall, the results support hypothesis one, which 
implies that farm households with more family labour relative to owned land are more likely 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although the analysis shows that farm households with more family labour relative to owned 
land are likely to be potential tenants, the results in Tables 3 and 4 also show that the fall in the 
owned land to labour endowment ratio is also positively associated with being a potential 
casual labour household. Both the bivariate and recursive bivariate models in Table 3 show 
that at one percent significance level, the decrease in the owned land to labour endowment ratio 
(ha/labour unit) is likely to increase hiring labour for casual work (ganyu) by an average of 20 
percentage points. However, this effect is only significant at 10 percent in the fractional probit 
model on the extent of participation in Table 4. If the falling owned land to labour endowment 
ratio is a push factor in either land rental or agricultural labour factor markets, how are the land 
rental market decisions influencing hiring out of family labour for casual work? I focus on this 
question in hypothesis two.  
Hypothesis two stated that entry into the land rental market is negatively associated with 
trading labour for casual work (ganyu) in seasonal agricultural labour markets. The recursive 
bivariate probit model results in Table 3–model 4b, shows that households that rent-in the land 
are less likely to trade their labour for casual work (ganyu). If a farm household rents in the 
land, the probability of hiring out labour for short-term casual work statistically reduces by 38 
percentage points, at one percent significance level. Such a reduction shows how the land 
markets can improve labour use on own-farm for medium to long-term gains compared to the 
short-term gains associated with casual labour work within the agricultural sector (Dimowa et 
al., 2010; Headey & Jayne, 2014). On Ganyu as a livelihood coping strategy, Ellis et al. (2003) 
hinted that households hire out labour for casual work because of absent land rental markets 
that could facilitate the use of land and labour among smallholder farmers in Malawi. The 
results in this paper concur with this argument by indicating that land rental markets can reduce 
hiring out labour for casual work among potential tenant households.  
The observed negative association of land rental market decisions on casual labour market 
decisions is further augmented by the observation that having no pre-rental land is likely to 
push farm households into renting-in land than hiring out labour. Table 3 shows that at one 
percent significance level, having no pre-rental land is positively associated with increasing 
land rentals by 5 percentage points while being negatively associated with hiring out of labour 
by 11 percentage points on average. These results could imply that households aim at allocating 
land and labour for own production to achieve self-sufficiency objectives compared to relying 
on short-term wages from labour markets. Thus, the results support hypothesis two, which calls 
for the need to consider land rental markets as an affordable means of accessing agricultural 
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land, that can allow for more profitable use of farm household labour among smallholder 
farmers. 
But then I ask, who is capable of renting-in land? Hypotheses three and four partly answer to 
this question, which I discuss jointly. Hypothesis three stated that an increase in the household 
asset wealth to labour endowment ratio increases tenant household entry and extent of 
participation in the land rental markets. Hypothesis four stated that the increase in the 
household asset wealth to labour endowment ratio reduces entry and extent of hiring out labour 
for agricultural casual work (ganyu). The analysis compares the statistically significant 
differences across asset wealth to labour endowment ratio quartiles with the highest quartile as 
the reference group.  
From Table 3, the bivariate and recursive bivariate model results show that households in the 
bottom half of the asset wealth to labour endowment ratio are less likely to rent-in the land 
compared to the quartiles in the upper half, based on the negative sign in the result tables. 
However, the negative association is only significant between the lowest and the highest 
quartiles, which imply that the very poor households in asset wealth relative to labour 
endowment ratio are rationed out of land rental markets compared to the intermediate groups. 
In the seasonal agricultural labour markets, the observed association is slightly different. The 
results indicate that the households across all the lower quartiles compared to the highest 
quartile are more likely to hire out labour. Being in the 25th, 50th and 75th quartile increase the 
probability of hiring out labour compared to above 75th quartile. This suggests that hiring out 
labour for casual work (ganyu) is not only for the very poor but the majority of the smallholder 
farmers in Malawi.   
The results in Table 4 also show a similar effect of asset wealth to labour endowment ratio on 
the extent of participation in both markets. Overall, the results are consistent with literature that 
participation in the land rental markets increases with more capital (asset wealth) and labour 
endowment while the very poor are rationed out (Ricker‐Gilbert et al., 2019). On the contrary, 
hiring out labour for ganyu in seasonal agricultural labour markets is generally higher among 
the poor and the majority of the smallholder farmers because of low capital relative to labour 
endowment (Fink et al., 2014). The results flag out the farm household capital or liquidity 
constraints that can affect agricultural activities like renting in the land and how farmers resort 





As land scarcity challenges continue to increase in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from both 
population pressure and increase in urbanisation rates, and as land markets continue to develop 
in most countries within SSA, the objective of this paper was two-fold. Firstly, I assessed the 
extent to which the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio and asset wealth relative to 
labour endowment ratio is affecting the farm household decisions to either rent-in agricultural 
land or hire out family labour, as the trade response strategies to the growing land scarcity 
challenges. Secondly, I assessed how the land rental markets are influencing the farm 
household decision to hire out family labour for short-term agricultural casual work. Using the 
Malawi Living Standards Measurement Survey data collected in 2013 and 2016, I constructed 
a balanced household panel data which I combined with district-level rainfall data to control 
for spatial rainfall related production shocks. I used the system approaches to jointly analyse 
the decisions to rent-in land or hire out labour while controlling for possible endogeneity, 
simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity.  
The results indicate that the falling owned land to labour endowment ratio is a push factor for 
farm households to participate in either the land rental or seasonal agricultural labour markets. 
However, renting-in agricultural land can reduce entry into the labour markets to engage in 
casual work and earn short-term wage returns. Using asset wealth to labour endowment ratio, 
it is the wealthier farm households who are more likely to rent-in the land. The poor in asset 
wealth relative to labour endowment and the majority of the smallholder farm households are 
more likely to hire out labour for casual work in Malawi. A higher probability of smallholder 
farmers hiring out labour for casual work could be a sign of household liquidity constraints 
related to agricultural operational and other household needs, or higher friction or transaction 
costs in the land rental markets compared to the labour markets. 
To ensure that factor markets efficiently allocate land and labour, agricultural and land-use 
policies can focus on easing the liquidity burden amongst potential tenant households through 
programs like input subsidies or cash transfers at the start of the season. On market friction, 
policy strategies like land campaigns, access to land market information at the community level 
and even establishing a land bank that can facilitates access to capital for land rental 
transactions can help farm households to achieve food self-sufficiency and sustain their 
livelihoods. However, future research is needed on how decisions of both potential tenants and 
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